Asia-Pacific Overview: February 2026

Bangladesh: Violence among political parties escalates ahead of the election

As Bangladesh’s general election, scheduled for 12 February, looms closer, violence involving political parties escalated in January compared to the month prior, with at least 12 people killed during the month. The violence took the form of both street clashes between party supporters and targeted attacks, and over 35% involved supporters of the two main electoral contenders: the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami alliance. Factional violence within the BNP and its associated groups made up another fifth of the violence. Such internecine violence is a common feature in Bangladeshi politics, where factional leaders wield significant clout in their areas and internal competition over candidature can spill over into violence. 

The Awami League, banned over its role in the deadly crackdown on the 2024 anti-government protests,¹ has been largely absent from the campaign so far. According to ACLED data, Awami League supporters carried out only one act of violence targeting other political parties in January. Nevertheless, the upcoming election will be the first without the party in decades, and accommodating its disenfranchised supporters into the political set-up may pose a challenge for the new government. In her first public address since taking exile in India, former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina questioned the legitimacy of holding elections in the Awami League’s absence, stating that democracy was “in exile.”² 

See our latest report, Bangladesh heads toward a landmark election amid rising political violence, and more of ACLED’s coverage on Bangladesh. 

India: ​​Naxal-Maoist clashes intensify

Over 22 to 23 January, Indian security forces carried out an anti-militancy operation in Jharkhand state, reportedly killing at least 17 rebels, including a high-ranking leader, from the Communist Party of India (Maoist), the largest of the Naxal-Maoist armed groups. Together with earlier operations in neighboring Chhattisgarh state, security forces killed at least 39 Naxal-Maoist rebels in January. Indian security forces have maintained sustained pressure on the rebels across the insurgency-impacted “Red Corridor” over the last year, as they push to meet the government’s stated aim of crushing the Naxal-Maoist insurgency — one of the longest-running non-international armed conflicts in the world — by 31 March.³ 

Having rejected peace overtures from the Naxal-Maoists,⁴ security forces appear to be pursuing a decisive military victory. ACLED data corroborate the aggressive nature of the campaign — reported fatalities from armed clashes between security forces and Naxal-Maoist rebels increased by nearly 35% in 2025, even as the number of clashes remained broadly consistent with the previous year. Naxal-Maoist foot soldiers comprised the overwhelming majority of these fatalities. At the same time, activists have raised concerns over the actions of security forces during some of the more deadly clashes, claiming that they killed unarmed members alongside armed militants.⁵

See more of ACLED’s coverage on India.

Myanmar: Resistance groups launch offensives amid phased military elections

Resistance groups across Myanmar escalated offensives against military positions during the regime’s phased elections from 28 December to 25 January, capturing residential areas and at least seven outposts and prompting vote cancellations in multiple locations. These operations spanned at least 25 townships, from northern Kachin state through central Sagaing and Magway regions to southern Bago region and western Rakhine state.

Coordinated attacks by groups aligned with the National Unity Government targeted six townships in Magway region, including strikes on power lines supplying military defense factories (KaPaSa) Nos. 21, 22, and 24 in Pauk and Sidoktaya townships.⁶ In the Bago region, the Arakan Army (AA) and allied groups attacked a military convoy near KaPaSa 16 in Padaung township, reportedly inflicting 10 fatalities on regime troops. While resistance groups have long surveilled military factories, this campaign marked the first direct actions against them.

Simultaneously, offensives intensified in Sagaing region and Rakhine and Kachin states. Attacks on regime positions in Sagaing’s Katha and Bhamo townships partially disrupted voting following the capture of five military outposts,⁷ while resistance operations led to full vote cancellations in Kachin state’s Momauk and Mansi townships.⁸ In Rakhine state, the AA renewed assaults in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu townships, capturing two outposts near Sittwe, one of the few towns still under military control.⁹

Resistance gains, however, incurred significant costs. Military counter-offensives — including ground assaults and airstrikes in both active and inactive conflict zones — targeted both fighters and civilians. In Sagaing’s Wuntho township, the military captured and killed 12 resistance fighters during a raid, while nationwide, 232 airstrikes resulted in at least 171 fatalities alone in January. Overall, compared to the four weeks prior, these renewed offensives and military reprisals drove an around 20% increase in conflict-related violence over the election period.

See our latest report, Myanmar’s military elections will not lead to peace or improvement in the political crisis, and more of ACLED’s coverage on Myanmar.

Pakistan: The Balochistan Liberation Army’s latest operation triggers the deadliest fighting in years

Over the weekend of 31 January, separatist militants from the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) launched phase 2 of Operation Herof, targeting security camps and administrative offices in at least 12 locations across Balochistan province, including suicide bombings in at least four cities. In Quetta, the provincial capital, militants nearly breached the Red Zone, which houses several important government buildings, including the chief minister’s office. Government officials confirmed that the attacks killed at least 31 civilians and 17 security personnel.¹⁰ Pakistan blamed neighboring India for supporting the militants; India rejected the accusations as “baseless.”¹¹

The scale and sophistication of the attacks speaks to the separatists’ growing strength. While the first phase of Operation Herof (Black Storm) in 2024 also involved coordinated attacks across the province, the use of multiple suicide bombings and attempts to seize urban centers in this phase marks an escalation. Their appetite to occupy public spaces had, however, been building: In 2025, ACLED data show that the separatists had temporarily occupied public areas in at least five towns.

In response to the attacks that began 31 January, Pakistani forces launched extensive same-day anti-militancy operations, reportedly killing 92 militants on that day alone.¹² If the total estimate of 140 fatalities is confirmed, this would make it one of the insurgency’s deadliest days in recent years. Its response is also likely to involve a tightening of civil liberties. Balochistan’s chief minister warned that militants’ families could face legal action for not reporting them.¹³ A heavy-handed approach risks alienating the population and fueling recruitment for the separatist cause.

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Pakistan.

Papua New Guinea: Search for illegal guns turns deadly during raid in Enga

A special operation to confiscate illegal firearms in Enga escalated into deadly violence in early January. On 2 January, a joint military and police security task force, operating under the Counter-Terrorism Act (2024) powers, conducted an intelligence-led raid in the Tsak Valley of the Wapenamanda district, targeting suspected holders of high-powered weapons, including factory-made weapons. The operation, in Alumanda village, devolved into a gunfight between the task force and armed locals, resulting in five deaths from the Watenge clan of the Yambatani tribe. 

Security forces reported that two of those killed were armed suspects and stated they encountered resistance while retreating, including villagers blocking escape routes after trees were felled.¹⁴ Local leaders, however, contested this account, claiming all the victims were civilians and calling for an independent investigation into the conduct of the operation.¹⁵ The violence prompted members of the Watenge clan to protest in Wapenamanda on 8 January, demanding compensation, the release of detained clansmen, and a formal commission of inquiry.¹⁶ 

The incident marks the first deadly encounter since 2023, when four violent incidents between the joint force and armed locals were recorded in Enga. Without credible accountability mechanisms and broader disarmament strategies, weapons seizure operations are likely to provoke further armed resistance and trigger violence in the province, where firearms are increasingly prevalent in tribal conflict dynamics. 

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Papua New Guinea. 

Philippines​​: The NPA and military fight in Mindoro amid an overall decline in clashes

On 1 January, Philippine government forces faced off with communist New People’s Army (NPA) militants in three successive clashes in Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro province. The NPA’s parent organization, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), as well as human rights groups, accused the military of firing indiscriminately using helicopter gunships, and dropping at least 12 bombs during the clashes, allegedly killing four civilians. However, the military refuted claims of indiscriminate gunfire and denied this casualty count.¹⁷

The New Year’s Day firefight received widespread media attention due to the presence of alleged new young recruits to the NPA, including a university student who, according to the rebels, died from an existing illness amid the clashes.¹⁸ A young Filipino-American activist was also later found alive by the military near the clash site a week after she had been reported missing.¹⁹

The alleged presence of new recruits during the fighting indicates the apparent efforts of the CPP to rebuild itself following years of heavy losses, including the loss of its most senior leaders. Clashes between the NPA and state forces have been declining yearly since 2020. ACLED records only 106 clashes between state forces and the NPA in 2025 versus 273 in 2020, or a 61% decline in five years. However, not all areas have seen a decrease; fighting in the two Mindoro provinces (Oriental Mindoro and Occidental Mindoro) reached their highest levels in 2025, with 11 clashes recorded, signaling a possible NPA push in the area.  

See more of ACLED’s coverage on the Philippines.