Asia-Pacific Overview: January 2026

Afghanistan: The National Resistance Front strikes back amid a decline in anti-Taliban activity 

On 8 December, the National Resistance Front (NRF) attacked a key Taliban base in Panjshir province using explosives and rockets. While the Taliban denied the attack, local sources confirmed that at least eight Taliban fighters were killed,¹ making it one of the deadliest anti-Taliban operations of the year. The attack broke a broader pattern of decline in activity by anti-Taliban armed opposition groups. The NRF and the Afghanistan Freedom Front are less active than they were in the past. Their combined activity more than halved in 2025 compared to the previous year, according to ACLED’s data collection, which is based on the groups’ own reporting and subject to limited independent verification due to restrictions on media access. 

The contraction reflects the Taliban’s repression of former government and security personnel, who form the core of these groups, and funding constraints in the absence of an external state sponsor.² In addition, attacks by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), regarded by the Taliban as its main rival, also significantly declined, from 19 in 2024 to only five in 2025, as Taliban operations raided several ISKP hideouts.

However, despite the Taliban consolidating power, tensions with Pakistan over the Taliban’s perceived support for the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) risk spilling over and impacting domestic security. Pakistan has signalled its displeasure with the Afghan Taliban by referring to it as a “regime” instead of a “government.”³ Afghan opposition leaders also held a conference in Islamabad in September, which was unlikely to have taken place without Pakistan’s acquiescence.⁴ In 2025, rising TTP militancy triggered the deadliest fighting between Afghanistan and Pakistan’s militaries since the Taliban’s takeover. Going forward, Pakistan may also seek to pressure the Taliban to act against militants operating from its territory through more covert means, such as by increasing direct support for anti-Taliban groups.

Bangladesh: Sharif Osman Hadi’s assassination triggers nationwide unrest

On 18 December, Sharif Osman Hadi, a leader of the 2024 student-led demonstrations, died after succumbing to gunshot injuries sustained during election campaigning in Dhaka, triggering widespread rioting. Hadi was an outspoken critic of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the government of India, which he regarded as her principal backer.⁵ As rumors swirled that his assassins had escaped to India,⁶ Hadi’s supporters targeted sites linked to Hasina’s Awami League (AL) party and India across the country. They set fire to the Dhaka offices of Prothom Alo and the Daily Star, two of Bangladesh’s leading publications accused of being pro-India, and threw stones at the Indian High Commission in Chittagong. In Mymensingh, a mob lynched a Hindu man following allegations of blasphemy.

The latest unrest comes amid an overall decline in the security situation since Hasina’s ouster in August 2024, as the interim government struggles to restore stability before February’s elections. The country’s Hindu minority, often scapegoated for supporting the secular AL, has been particularly impacted. ACLED records more than 150 instances of attacks against Hindus and Hindu properties and places of worship since 5 August 2024, compared to just 22 in the same period prior to Hasina’s removal. In 2025 alone, targeted attacks and mob violence killed at least five Hindus in Bangladesh amid the overall escalation in anti-India rhetoric, where Hindus form the overwhelming majority. 

Correction: A previous version of this monthly overview stated "targeted attacks and mob violence killed at least seven Hindus in Bangladesh" but the ACLED team retrospectively determined two of the killings were more likely criminal, not political. It has been changed to "at least five."

Thailand-Cambodia: Large-scale and deadly border conflict ends in a fragile ceasefire

Thailand and Cambodia’s recent border conflict, which lasted for three weeks between 7 and 27 December, marked a significant intensification compared to the five-day conflict in July earlier in the year. December’s fighting involved the use of heavy weaponry on both sides, spanned multiple border provinces, and resulted in dozens of civilian and combatant fatalities and widespread civilian displacement.⁷

Although the 28 July ceasefire agreement — initially brokered under Malaysian and United States mediation — had aimed to halt hostilities,⁸ low-intensity border incidents persisted from July onward. Tensions rose and the truce further unraveled after landmine incidents in late November and early December injured Thai patrols, amid accusations that Cambodian forces planted new mines.⁹ Open fighting resumed in early December and rapidly expanded beyond traditional flashpoints, spreading across all border provinces on both sides and Siem Reap province in Cambodia, which is not directly on the border.¹⁰ Thailand conducted coordinated air and ground operations, including F-16 strikes on what it identified as Cambodian military positions, while Cambodia responded with BM-21 rocket artillery and reportedly deployed drones against Thai forces.

On 27 December, both countries agreed to an immediate ceasefire, halting troop movements and committing to demining and humanitarian measures.¹¹ Thailand also released 18 detained Cambodian soldiers after 72 hours of compliance with the ceasefire.¹² Despite the agreement, the ceasefire remains fragile, with continued accusations of violations, including allegations of drone incursions. Its durability will depend on restraint, renewed border talks, and effective bilateral dispute-management mechanisms.

Myanmar: The battlefield shifts southward as the military tries to neutralize resistance threats in the north

Armed clashes between resistance groups and the military rose slightly in December compared to November, but remained much lower than the monthly average for 2025. However, the overall trend for 2025 shows a decline in such clashes: There were 17% fewer clashes between resistance groups and the military over the year compared to 2024. 

One of the most significant areas of this decline was in the Sagaing region, which has been a major front of the conflict for the past four years. Sagaing, which borders Shan and Kachin states, recorded a 37% reduction in armed clashes compared to 2024, reflecting sustained military pressure and conflict spillover in the north. On the other hand, violence has gradually intensified in southern Myanmar, particularly in the Ayeyarwady region and Kayin state, reflecting a geographic shift rather than an overall reduction in conflict nationwide.

In northern Myanmar, the conflict has largely entered a holding phase. The military and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) remain locked in a strategic stalemate over Bhamo in Kachin state, with neither side able to secure decisive gains. Meanwhile, the military has reduced its number of active fronts in northern Shan state by securing ceasefires with the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Kokang Army.

In southern Myanmar, by contrast, active conflict has expanded. New battlefronts are emerging in the Ayeyarwady region, transforming what was previously a relatively calm area into an active conflict zone. This escalation is partly driven by the Arakan Army’s eastward incursions into Bago, Magway, and Ayeyarwady regions, aimed at consolidating territorial control in Rakhine state while securing alternative access corridors to mitigate the effects of military blockades. In Kayin state, resistance forces led by the Karen National Liberation Army have made tangible military gains. Following the capture of the significant Manerplaw base at the end of 2024, which served as its headquarters until the 1990s, resistance forces went on to capture more than a dozen military bases over 2025. 

For more, see the report on Myanmar in ACLED’s 2026 Conflict Watchlist.

Pakistan: Drone strikes escalate in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province

In December, both military forces and the TTP increased their use of drones to carry out attacks in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province compared to the month prior. Using commercially available quadcopter drones modified to carry explosives, TTP militants carried out 11 strikes, six of which struck civilian areas or positions of community-led, pro-government militias. These strikes may have been an attempt to discourage local cooperation with security forces. For their part, military forces targeted suspected hideouts of the TTP, Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP), and Hafiz Gul Bahadur groups. Six drone strikes reportedly killed at least 27 militants. 

December’s escalation follows an exponential increase in the deployment of drones in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province last year: ACLED records nearly 100 drone strikes in 2025, the highest in a single year since ACLED coverage began. The majority of these strikes were carried out by the military as they confronted a resurgent TTP. Recognizing the changing conflict landscape, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa police announced the creation of Pakistan’s first dedicated drone unit in early December.¹³ Days later, IMP-linked social media accounts claimed that the group had acquired an anti-drone gun during a clash with security forces, highlighting both the militants’ efforts to keep up with evolving security measures and potential vulnerabilities within security ranks.¹⁴ 

For more, see the report on Pakistan in ACLED’s Conflict Watchlist 2026.

Taiwan Strait and South China Sea: Tensions heighten as China asserts its claims through expanding maritime activities

In the South China Sea, tensions flared following a series of confrontations between Chinese maritime forces and Philippine civilian and government vessels in December. On 6 December, Chinese forces stationed on Subi Reef, a heavily militarized artificial island in the Spratly Islands, fired warning flares toward a Philippine fisheries surveillance aircraft conducting a routine patrol with the Philippine Coast Guard.¹⁵ Beijing claimed it had expelled the aircraft for entering Chinese airspace, an assertion Manila rejected.¹⁶ The situation escalated further on 12 December near Sabina Shoal, approximately 150 kilometers west of Palawan and within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, when China Coast Guard vessels used high-pressure water cannons against 24 Filipino fishing boats.¹⁷ Three fishermen were injured, two boats were damaged, and the Philippines claimed that Chinese vessels cut anchor ropes, leaving several fishermen adrift at sea.¹⁸ 

These incidents follow a year of repeated confrontations. ACLED records more than 20 incidents mainly around Scarborough Shoal (Panatag Shoal) and Sabina Shoal (Escoda Shoal), as Manila sought to internationalize the dispute through closer cooperation with the US, Japan, and India — moves that Beijing strongly opposes. As the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct negotiations remain stalled and the Philippines prepares to assume a greater regional leadership role, prospects for easing tensions in the near term remain limited.

At the same time, China escalated military pressure in the Taiwan Strait. On 29 December, China’s military force, known as the People’s Liberation Army, launched large-scale “Justice Mission 2025” exercises, the largest drills around Taiwan since 2022.¹⁹ The exercises were held in waters to the north, southwest, southeast, and east of the island.²⁰ Live-fire drills were conducted within Taiwan’s contiguous zone, up to 24 nautical miles from its coast, blurring the line between exercises and potential combat.²¹