Asia-Pacific Overview: July 2026

Afghanistan and Pakistan: Tit-for-tat aerial strikes mark renewed escalation in hostilities

Cross-border hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan escalated once again in June. In what has become — and will likely remain — the new normal, major militant attacks by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on the outskirts of Peshawar on 8 June and by its Jamaat-ul-Ahrar faction in Karachi on 27 June prompted retaliation from Pakistan in Afghanistan’s border provinces. While Pakistan claimed that its airstrikes targeted militant bases, the United Nations confirmed at least 41 civilian fatalities from the combined strikes. The Afghan Taliban responded with drone strikes in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, targeting alleged Islamic State and anti-Taliban group bases. 

The main point of contention remains Afghanistan’s alleged support for militant groups fighting the Pakistani state, which has grappled with a resurgence in militancy since the Afghan Taliban’s takeover in 2021. Pakistani cross-border strikes alone, however, unless complemented with internal responses that target both governance gaps and domestic security failures, are unlikely to be effective in combating this resurgence. The Karachi attack, which took place a significant distance away from the borderlands, underscores the strength of the militants’ domestic networks. 

With militancy unlikely to abate, the current period of stasis between Afghanistan and Pakistan will also persist. The conflict will likely be dominated by aerial and remote warfare: Since fighting broke out in late February, ACLED data show that Pakistan has carried out almost 200 aerial strikes and shelling into Afghanistan, nearly half of which injured or killed civilians or hit civilian settlements. No armed clashes have been recorded between the two militaries since April. Aerial strikes allow Pakistan to signal a strong response without drawing its armed forces into protracted conflict or making difficult policy choices that may be unpopular domestically. For the Afghan Taliban — which does not have a fully functional air force — deploying commercially available drones, modified to carry explosives, offers a cost-effective yet seemingly reciprocal means to respond to Pakistan’s aerial ingress. These drones have had limited impact, and their deployment has remained tit-for-tat in nature so far. If they were to result in significant Pakistani civilian casualties, however, Islamabad will feel increasing pressure to escalate the intensity and frequency of its response to a level similar to that seen in the initial weeks of the conflict, when its strikes hit places deeper within Afghanistan, including Kabul and Kandahar.

Indonesia: Prabowo’s flagship free lunch program triggers another wave of protests 

Nationwide opposition to President Prabowo Subianto's economic policies — specifically the Free Nutritious Food (MBG) program — erupted in over 150 demonstrations throughout June, echoing similar widespread protests that emerged in February 2025. Students and other citizens who perceive the initiative as a catalyst for pushing the national deficit toward constitutional limits — as it is estimated to cost over 300 trillion rupiah (around 18.61 billion USD) annually — cited concerns that Indonesia is “on the path to bankruptcy.” Beyond fiscal concerns, protesters raised alarms regarding public health, highlighting past incidents of food poisoning linked to the program that affected thousands of schoolchildren. While most demonstrations remained peaceful, violence and destruction of government building gates occurred in nine provinces, including Jakarta, Central Java, West Java, and North Maluku. Dozens of protesters were also arrested, and there were cases of both students and police officers being injured in demonstrations.

Counter-protests supporting the MBG program also emerged in late June; however, reports suggest these rallies were often orchestrated by beneficiaries of the program, with participants admitting to receiving cash and goods. While direct physical confrontation between opposing groups appears unlikely, the volatility surrounding Prabowo’s economic agenda is likely to fuel continued civil unrest, particularly around key government sites that may attract demonstrations and sporadic violence. The situation remains precarious as Indonesia's economy has deteriorated, resulting in high inflation, capital flight, and rising fuel and staple food prices, all exacerbated by the substantial fiscal burden of the MBG program. Despite facing criticism, Prabowo appears determined to keep the MBG program, opting to instead reduce the budget and reallocate funds, as the program is his main vote-seeking policy for the upcoming election.

Myanmar: Deadly armed clashes intensify as Arakan Army advances toward eastern Myanmar

Armed clashes between the Myanmar military and the combined forces of the Arakan Army (AA) and its allies were the primary drivers of conflict-related violence and fatalities in June. Battles between the AA and the military accounted for 30% of all battles involving the military and 40% of subsequent fatalities, compared to a prior monthly average of 17% and 15%, respectively, in 2026. Fighting intensified across four key fronts: within Rakhine state and along its borders with Magway, Bago, and Ayeyarwady regions. Given the strategic importance of these fronts and the incompatible objectives of both sides regarding territorial control, fighting will likely intensify in the border regions in the coming months.

The escalation in Kyaukphyu and Sittwe townships in Rakhine state, as well as Mindon township on the Rakhine–Magway border, was largely driven by military efforts to penetrate Rakhine state from the central regions, disrupt AA supply lines, and regain lost territory. Throughout June, the military deployed approximately 1,000 soldiers to Mindon township in an attempt to advance into Rakhine state, but made limited progress as AA forces repeatedly repelled assaults using drones and artillery. The military also failed to halt AA offensives in Kyaukphyu and Sittwe despite deploying paramotors, conducting airstrikes, and providing naval fire support. 

In contrast, the AA’s continued eastward expansion into Bago, Magway, and Ayeyarwady regions drove fighting in Padaung township on the Rakhine–Bago border and Yegyi township on the Rakhine–Ayeyarwady border, including efforts to target military weapons-production facilities and air-defense assets. The AA's eastern offensives achieved incremental gains. In Bago region, it captured three front-line positions linked to the military defense factory (KaPaSa) No.16 in Padaung township, bringing the total seized since January to six. In Ayeyarwady region, the AA-led forces captured three military bases in Yekyi township and seized significant quantities of weapons, ammunition, and drones.

Pakistan: Deadly demonstrations erupt in the disputed Kashmir territory over regional autonomy

June marked one of the deadliest months of domestic unrest in Pakistani-administered Kashmir in years, as clashes between security forces and civil society activists left dozens dead. The announcement of provincial elections in July proved to be the trigger, as the government failed to come to an agreement with the civil society consortium Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC) on the composition of the legislative assembly. The JKJAAC has long opposed the reservation of a quarter of seats in the provincial assembly for refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir currently residing elsewhere in Pakistan, arguing that this provision undermines autonomy by allowing national parties to influence the makeup of the local government. For its part, the government sees the arrangement as constitutionally mandated to maintain its claim over the undivided Kashmir region.

The JKJAAC called for a general strike on 9 June, while the government banned the group under anti-terrorism laws, shut off major roads, suspended the internet, and restricted media access, setting the stage for a confrontation. Despite this crackdown and information blackout, ACLED records at least 25 protests by the JKJAAC across the region, mainly between 5 and 15 June. Indicative of the tense situation, 40% of demonstrations descended into deadly clashes with security forces. During at least four protests, security forces deployed lethal violence against peaceful protesters. This quick recourse to force reflects Pakistan’s interest in maintaining an iron grip over the territory:  ACLED data since 2018 show that security forces are more likely to resort to lethal force against peaceful protesters in Pakistani-administered Kashmir than in any other province in the country. 

Although protests subsided toward the end of the month, the region remains on edge. The JKJAAC has called for a boycott of the upcoming elections, but its ability to organize is limited due to the government crackdown, which continued with the arrest of key JKJAAC leader Shaukat Nawaz Mir on 30 June. The authorities’ heavy-handed response may succeed in curtailing violence ahead of the elections, but will likely only inflame grievances and prove unsustainable in the longer term.

Papua New Guinea: ​​A failed peace ceremony triggers retaliatory killings in Enga

The latest collapse of a customary peace ceremony between the Makol and Makol Tap/Yengulam clans on 6 June illustrates the fragility of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms in Enga province and the risk of rapid escalation when they break down. During the “bel kol” (peace) compensation ceremony in Laiagam — intended to settle a standing dispute through the exchange of goods, livestock, and cash — intoxicated individuals disrupted proceedings. The Makol Tap/Yengulam clan subsequently rejected the settlement and, while departing, fired on the Makol clan, killing two members according to a 9 June report printed in The National newspaper. The following day, the Makol clan retaliated by killing a young man in Laiagam whom police later identified as an uninvolved bystander. While no additional violence has been reported, continued police deployments and appeals to community leaders underscore concerns that the dispute could widen if reconciliation efforts fail to be restored.

The incident reflects a broader pattern in Enga in which the failure of customary reconciliation processes can transform localized disputes into cycles of retaliatory violence. A similar incident occurred during clashes between the Yakuman and Yangakuni tribes in September 2025, when the collapse of a verbal truce and stalled mediation efforts contributed to reprisal attacks that resulted in 30 deaths and extensive property damage. 

Given the central role of compensation and reconciliation ceremonies in resolving disputes and containing violence, the breakdown of the Laiagam settlement increases the risk of further retaliatory attacks by relatives or affiliated communities of those killed.  

Philippines: New Chinese installation in Scarborough Shoal provokes outcry in Manila

In June, tensions rose between Beijing and Manila after Philippine authorities monitored new Chinese installations in the hotly contested Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. The Philippines’ National Task Force for the West Philippine Sea first publicly acknowledged the structure on 9 June, although the country had been monitoring unusual Chinese activity in the waters since late May. The Philippines reported the presence of Chinese personnel and the installation of a 6-by-6-meter structure with an antenna.

The Philippines lodged a diplomatic protest and issued multiple demarches against China, objecting to the installation. Philippine officials have expressed fear that China’s recent moves in Scarborough Shoal represent an escalation that seeks to establish full and permanent Chinese control of the feature. The shoal, which is just over 100 nautical miles from the main Philippine island of Luzon, is a major flashpoint in maritime territorial disputes between Beijing and Manila. China rejected the Philippines’ reaction to the new structures in Scarborough, asserting sovereignty over the feature and identifying the floating structure as a “temporary scientific research facility” of the South China Sea Institute of Oceanology. By 17 June, the Philippines confirmed that the Chinese installation had been removed, with China declaring that the research activities had been completed. However, by the next day, new Chinese vessels were seen operating in the waters.

China portrayed Manila’s response as “sensationalist hype” when it announced the conclusion of the research, which in turn led Philippine military officials to goad China to release the results. The Philippines’ willingness to raise a diplomatic furor over China’s supposed research activities is likely to test China’s appetite for bringing global attention to the South China Sea disputes, especially amid the Philippines’ expanding military partnerships. The eventual dismantling of the research structure — which gave way to the more routine presence of Chinese vessels — indicates that China is currently not intent on dialing up its engagement in the area that would deepen its rift with the Philippines over the particularly sensitive feature, making direct military confrontation less likely in the near term.

For more on maritime activity in the region, see ACLED’s South China Sea Monitor.