Asia-Pacific Overview: November 2025

Afghanistan and Pakistan: Rising Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan militancy prompts deadly cross-border clashes 

October saw the most intense clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan since the Taliban’s takeover in August 2021, as long-standing tensions over a resurgent Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) — whom Pakistan accuses Afghanistan of harboring — boiled over. Following deadly TTP attacks in Pakistan’s Orakzai district, Pakistan launched airstrikes on 9 October, suspectedly targeting the TTP leadership in Kabul city. This marked an escalation, as previous Pakistani military intervention in Afghanistan had been restricted to the border regions. In response, Afghanistan fired at Pakistani posts along the border, leading to a broader confrontation there: Armed clashes spanned the length of the disputed Durand Line, engulfing all but one border province, while Pakistani airstrikes hit seven Afghan provinces, including both the centers of power — the political capital in Kabul city and Kandahar province, which houses the Taliban’s leadership. ACLED records more than 40 clashes between the two countries’ militaries, and no fewer than 12 Pakistani airstrikes in Afghanistan, between 10 and 17 October. Though Afghanistan and Pakistan have reported differing numbers on security personnel and militant fatalities,¹ the United Nations confirmed significant civilian casualties during the week’s conflict.²

On 19 October, the two countries agreed to a ceasefire after talks mediated by Qatar and Turkey. Ongoing TTP militancy, however, threatens the fragile ceasefire, even as the next round of talks began in early November.³ In an indication of the ongoing cross-border threat, Pakistani military forces clashed with TTP militants near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border on 24 October, killing at least 25 militants. The military claims it acted in an effort to foil two infiltration attempts by the militants.⁴

Meanwhile, two recent developments offer insight into the potential impact of these talks. On 30 October, Pakistani military forces killed Qari Amjad, a key TTP commander and former deputy chief, during an intelligence-based operation in Bajaur district. While it is unclear whether cooperation from Afghanistan resulted in this tactical success, the TTP termed the killing a “betrayal,” suggesting some level of collusion.⁵ At least one new militant group, called the Tahafuz Emirat-e-Islami Force, also emerged in October, claiming responsibility for an attack — reminiscent of those carried out by the TTP — in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. As the TTP comes under increasing pressure, whether military from Pakistan or diplomatic from Afghanistan, such proxies may become increasingly active. 

Indonesia: TPNPB commander killed as violence soars in Papua

Deadly armed clashes between the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) and Indonesian military forces intensified in October in Papua, pushing the conflict’s death toll in the region to its highest monthly level this year. At least 22 people, including civilians, were killed in confrontations across Highland, Central, and West Papua. The escalation came on the back of coordinated operations launched by Indonesian forces in early October. It also coincided with the first anniversary of Prabowo Subianto’s administration, which had pledged to deploy additional troops to the region.

As part of the operations, the military had conducted multiple air- and drone strikes earlier in the month. A high-profile leader of the TPNPB, Lamek Alipky Taplo, was among those killed in the operations — the first to be killed in combat this year. Taplo, along with three others, was killed during an offensive on the TPNPB base led by him in Kiwirok, Highland Papua Province on 19 October. Taplo, who was the head of Regional Defense Command XV Ngalum Kupel in Pegunungan Bintang Regency, had been implicated in over 20 violent incidents between 2020 and 2025, and his death is likely to alter the group’s operational dynamics in the region. 

Elsewhere, in Central Papua province, the TPNPB sustained heavy losses in a confrontation in Intan Jaya. At least 14 people, including civilians, were killed in fighting that resulted in the military’s recapture of a key base on 15 October. Following the clashes, a local TPNPB subdivision leader, Undius Kogoya, reportedly died from illness. 

Despite leadership losses, TPNPB factions have vowed to continue their operations, while the military remains on high alert for retaliatory attacks, indicating that violence in Papua is likely to escalate in the coming months.⁶

Myanmar: The Ta’ang Army agrees to ceasefire with the military, giving up major gains

Following two days of China-brokered negotiations in Kunming on 27 and 28 October, the Palaung State Liberation Front/Ta’ang National Liberation Army (PSLF/TNLA) agreed to withdraw its forces from the ruby-mining town of Mogoke in Mandalay region and from Mongmit in northern Shan state.⁷ The TNLA is the second member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance to agree to a ceasefire this year, potentially freeing up further Myanmar military resources to be reassigned to western Myanmar and fight the Arakan Army ahead of the planned military-staged elections in December. The agreement is the PSLF/TNLA’s first concession since Operation 1027, when it seized 12 towns across northern Shan state and Mandalay region. 

Earlier negotiations failed to reach an agreement. The PSLF/TNLA demanded the establishment of a new Palaung state encompassing the areas it seized during Operation 1027 as well as a few additional towns.⁸ Meanwhile, the military insisted on the return of five strategically and economically important towns that are crucial to regaining control of the land trade route between central Myanmar and the Chinese border: Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, Hsipaw, Mogoke, and Mongmit.⁹

The talks took place in a context of increasing pressure on the PSLF/TNLA. It lost Kyaukme and Hsipaw to the military in October and Nawnghkio in July. The military has been escalating air attacks, with ACLED recording nearly 50 military airstrikes this month on TNLA-controlled areas, killing at least 47 civilians. The final agreement came after months of PSLF/TNLA statements denying it would sign and supporting the nationwide revolution against military rule. In return for signing, the military is expected to cease attacks in the remaining PSLF/TNLA-held territories. 

If the TNLA withdraws from Mogoke and Mongmit, the military could more easily operate in Mandalay region and Kachin state. However, other anti-coup resistance groups, including the Mandalay People’s Defense Force, which fought alongside the TNLA in Operation 1027, said they will still try to defend Mogoke from military attacks.¹⁰ While militarily this would be extremely challenging, attacks on the military as it moves into Mogoke are possible, signaling the area may remain volatile. 

Papua New Guinea: A police operation against informal mining triggers violence

Police intervention over reports of informal mining at a restricted site in Eastern Highlands province in October escalated into a series of confrontations that resulted in one death.

The violence broke out on 26 October, when a group of local villagers and settlers entered a PNG Power Limited (PPL) site near Yonki, an area designated for electricity infrastructure.¹¹ Miners fled upon seeing police, and one man, reportedly from Enga, drowned after he jumped into a river to escape. The following day, the deceased’s relatives brought his body to the PPL site and attacked police officers, injuring several, including the police station commander, who sustained a head wound. Gunfire was exchanged, a police vehicle was damaged, and the mob attempted to storm the police station. In response, police burned market structures in the settlers’ area, forcing residents to flee. Reinforcements were later deployed, though police operations remain constrained by limited resources due to ongoing local government elections.¹² 

The Yonki clashes reflect a broader pattern of security incidents across the Highlands. Earlier this year, ACLED records similar incidents in Porgera, where informal miners at the local mine complex attacked security personnel, and in Kainantu, where locals stormed a police post in September.¹³ These incidents highlight the escalating security challenges posed by informal mining and the strain on law enforcement capacity.

South China Sea: ​​Chinese, Philippine vessels face off again amid renewed regional push for code of conduct

Tensions in the South China Sea flared in October as Chinese and Philippine vessels faced off anew, highlighting the continued volatility in the area despite a renewed regional push for a diplomatic solution to manage long-standing territorial disputes. On 12 October, a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel directed a water cannon at three Philippine vessels belonging to the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) off Pag-asa Island in the disputed Spratly Islands, before later ramming into one of the BFAR vessels, the Datu Pagbuaya.¹⁴ During the confrontation, China deployed a total of five CCG vessels, 15 Chinese maritime militia vessels, a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy warship, and a PLA helicopter within the vicinity of Pag-asa Island.¹⁵

Both sides traded condemnations accusing each other of unlawful conduct. The Philippines claimed that the BFAR vessels were anchored when they were confronted by Chinese vessels. The Philippines also claimed that the CCG vessel’s ramming of BFAR’s Datu Pagbuaya was “deliberate” and had inflicted “minor structural damage” on the ship.¹⁶ Meanwhile, China asserted that the presence of Philippine vessels in the area was illegal and posed a danger to their ships.

The standoff took place just weeks before the high-profile 47th Summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Malaysia from 26 to 28 October, which was attended by United States President Donald Trump.¹⁷ The US State Department had earlier condemned China for the 12 October incident and reaffirmed the US’ defense obligations to the Philippines.¹⁸ Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. repeatedly raised the South China Sea disputes during the ASEAN meeting, including in the ASEAN-East Asia Summit that Chinese Premier Li Qiang attended.¹⁹ ASEAN gathers multiple countries with overlapping claims to the South China Sea, but a proposed code of conduct (COC) to manage disputes in the contested waters has languished for two decades. Marcos has stressed that the Philippines will aim to finally conclude COC negotiations during its agenda-setting stint as chair of ASEAN for 2026, even saying the country is keen to host Chinese President Xi Jinping if the job gets done.²⁰