Cabo Ligado Monthly: May 2023

May At A Glance

Vital Stats

• ACLED records 19 political violence events in Cabo Delgado province in May, resulting in at least 19 reported fatalities
• Two battle events, in Nangade and Muidumbe districts, accounted for 14 reported fatalities
• Political violence events were concentrated in Macomia and Muidumbe districts, where seven and five such events were recorded, respectively. Other events took place in Mocímboa da Praia, Nangade, Meluco, and Ancuabe districts

Vital Trends

• Insurgents reappear in Nangade district
• Clashes continue in Muidumbe and Macomia districts
• TotalEnergies release human rights and humanitarian assessment

In This Report

• Conflict in TotalEnergies assessment of humanitarian and human rights issues
• A new horizon for the people of Palma?
• IESE Barometer reveals fear and anxiety in Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa
• Waiting for gas

May Situation Summary

May saw a notable increase in both recorded political violence events and reported fatalities in Cabo Delgado province. There were nearly five times as many recorded political violence events in May (19) as in April (four). Reported fatalities too rose, from 11 to 19. The return of insurgents to Nangade, their continuing freedom of movement in coastal areas of Macomia, and another IED incident remain causes of concern. However, sustained return in some areas, and a decrease in overall displacement figures are positive developments. Clashes remained concentrated in the lowlands in southern Muidumbe district, and in villages across the Messalo river in the north of Macomia district. As Defense and Security Forces (FDS) actions seem to be concentrated in that area, there was evidence of insurgents moving eastwards, likely to their base suspected to be at Namurussia in Macomia, thought to have been established earlier in the year.

People who had returned to their villages in east and southeast Nangade district moved back to the district headquarters following the return of insurgents to the district last month. Later in the month, the Rapid Intervention Unit killed five insurgents in an ambush near Ngangolo, including one alleged leader, Issa Wachio. May also saw the province’s third IED incident this year involving the insurgents, with all three occurring in Muidumbe district. The use of IEDs in the less populous lowlands of Muidumbe district limits their impact.

May also saw just six cases of violence against civilians in Cabo Delgado. Two of these involved Mozambican state forces, and one attack by Rwandan forces was also recorded. Of the two involving the insurgents, there was one killing in Muidumbe district, and the detention for a few hours of a dozen people in Nangade district. The number of incidents involving state forces reflects an emerging trend with the potential to undermine state-building in relatively secure areas. One of the incidents involving Mozambican state forces and the attack by Rwandan soldiers were in the strategically important district of Mocímboa da Praia.

Conflict in TotalEnergies Assessment of Humanitarian and Human Rights Issues

By Peter Bofin, Cabo Ligado

Jean-Christophe Rufin’s ‘Report on the socioeconomic, humanitarian and human rights situation in the Palma-Afungi-Mocímboa area’ gives some clues to TotalEnergies’ view of the security situation in the province, and how the firm relates to that. However, they are just clues, as the report pays little overt attention to security issues and their impact on the population. Just four pages are devoted to “conflict factors” and “current security and humanitarian situation.” In contrast, 15 pages are devoted to a review of project work in the community funded by the firm, and 15 to examining outstanding resettlement issues. Understanding the firm’s current posture in the province, as it may be influenced by the report, is hard to gauge. The terms of reference can only be guessed at, while there is a lack of clarity over how the report fits into the firm’s existing statutory requirements regarding business and human rights.

Rufin’s mission was initially described as being “an independent mission to assess the humanitarian situation in Cabo Delgado province,” and to “evaluate the actions taken by Mozambique LNG and … propose additional actions to be implemented if required.” In truth, the mission focused on Palma and Mocímboa da Praia districts, with some, if little, attention paid to Mueda. This reflects the remarks of TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné after a meeting with President Filipe Nyusi in Maputo in February 2022. At the time, he said that “[w]hen you see that life is back to normal, with state services and population, then the project can start over.” In his remarks, he referred to Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, and Mueda districts.

The inclusion of Mueda is puzzling. Between Palma and Mueda districts lies Nangade district, for which ACLED has recorded 155 incidents of violence targeting civilians since October 2017. For Mueda, by contrast, 12 such incidents have been recorded. The road back to normality is clearly longer in Nangade than in Mueda. Why conditions in Mueda district, far from the project site, and not Nangade, are so critical to TotalEnergies is not explained.

The report is notable for missing accurate data, as its impact is misrepresented. The report’s first paragraph mistakenly places the insurgents’ initial assault in October 2017 in Palma, not Mocímboa da Praia. The 1 January 2021 assault on the resettlement village of Quitunda, which sits just outside the project site, is not mentioned, though it led to the suspension of construction work and the evacuation of staff and contractors.

Data for more recent times, when the incident rate has subsided significantly, understates political violence. Recently, ACLED records 19 events, including one in Palma district, and three in Mocímboa da Praia district. Two of the incidents in Mocímboa da Praia were clashes between insurgents and Rwandan forces. The incident in Palma was a clash between insurgents and Local Forces. It is hard to determine how many of the 19 incidents were supply raids. At least two involved insurgents buying food from villagers in district.

While the conflict has subsided significantly, there have been significant changes amongst conflict actors since the international intervention in 2021. Local Forces and FDS remain the most significant actors. For five months of 2023, ACLED data show Local Forces directly clashed with insurgents 12 times. The FDS was involved in 20 clashes, spiking in May. Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) and Rwandan forces were involved in 11 clashes over the five-month period. The Rwandan presence in Palma and Mocímboa da Praia remains significant, yet how the firm manages its relationship is not addressed in the report.

The report identifies the relationship with Mozambique Defense Armed Forces’ Joint Task Force (JTF) as a significant risk for TotalEnergies, stating that any “permanent link” with the JTF could make the firm a party to the conflict under international law. However, the firm has obligations to manage its relationship with security actors. The firm manages human rights risks related to security through France’s Loi de Vigilance, or Vigilance Law of 2017, based on the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. TotalEnergies reports its obligations in detail. The firm is also committed to the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPHSR). Under the latter, the firm engages considerably with the FDS, reported on regularly.

A New Horizon for the People of Palma?

By Tomás Queface, Cabo Ligado

Jean-Christophe Rufin's report on Mozambique liquified natural gas (LNG) project's involvement in humanitarian and human rights issues explores sensitive issues damaging relations between local communities, government, and companies involved in the LNG project on the Afungi peninsula, Palma district, since 2013.

In particular, issues inherited from Anadarko's management of Mozambique LNG have driven conflicts within populations affected by the LNG project. The contested award of land use known as DUAT, to Anadarko, the mismanagement of compensation, slow resettlement progress, and problematic consent have stressed Palma district's people. The March 2021 attack on the town delayed resettlement further.

Many issues stem from the allegedly illegal award by the Mozambican government of the DUAT for 7,000 hectares on the Afungi peninsula, in favor of Anadarko, without community consent. Legally, the DUAT transfer from communities, based on customary laws, should have been a long, complex process, requiring community consultations, studies, and an environmental license. But the government bypassed customary laws, allocating the site in 2015 to Rovuma Basin LNG Land (RBLL), a special purpose company by Anadarko and Mozambique’s national oil company, Empresa Moçambicana de Hidrocarbonetos. An independent audit by civil society in 2015 concluded this process was illegal.

Moreover, neither RBLL nor Anadarko justified the need for such an extensive land area, suggesting Anadarko did not intend any relationship with the surrounding population.

Rufin questions why part of the DUAT area not needed for the LNG plant is not allocated to local communities for relocation or agriculture development.

The DUAT allocation to Anadarko led to another issue identified by Rufin, 733 households were to be relocated from the extensive DUAT through resettlement without land to establish new homes. They were placed in other communities, generating inter-community conflicts, pitting resettled people against hosts. For example, resettled were given houses of modern construction, contrasting with host communities' houses. Rufin suggests creating uniform housing conditions for both populations, aligning with community demands during consultations.

Anadarko and the government failed to identify alternative agricultural land for resettled communities, turning to Senga village to secure about 150 hectares already used for cultivation to compensate for the resettled farms. However, as the population grows, pressure on existing land increases. TotalEnergies and the government must find a long-term solution.

Rufin also addressed the problematic way the government and Anadarko obtained consent from local communities. For example, some families were allegedly coerced into signing documents proving an inventory of their property had been made, under the threat of not receiving compensation. In fact, inventories were not carried out in many cases. Rufin agrees community consultations lacked transparency and access to information, rendering them formalities. When communities are not informed properly, they cannot express concerns and priorities effectively.

The negotiation phase between the government and the company, and the communities, was a long process lasting about six years until resettlement began in 2019. Of 733 families, around 161 were resettled, but the process was suspended after Total’s 'force majeure,' leaving 572 families to be resettled. Since the inventory was done, populations cannot change house conditions or work on farms, challenging clarity. Also, former coastal DUAT inhabitants lacked clarity. Milamba, which relies on fishing, was displaced inland with boats, not relocated to other coastal areas.

Rufin's report reflects pressing concerns of those affected by the Mozambique LNG project, aligning with issues raised by civil society organizations during resettlement. Having mapped out problems, the key issue is how TotalEnergies addresses these challenges.

Rufin's recommendations already indicate ways forward, although some are vague. Updating of consent, inventories, prompt compensation, and agricultural land deserve attention. Fishing populations resettled inland must find a sustainable mechanism, historically dependent on fishing.

Rufin's points criticize the government's handling, where business prevails over communities. TotalEnergies' approach in Palma will also be guided by economic interests. But criticism of Anadarko and Mozambique's resettlement process may give TotalEnergies more autonomy in its development strategy. Success depends on its response to Rufin's recommendations.

IESE Barometer Reveals Fear and Anxiety in Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa

By Armando Nhamtumbo, MediaFax

Institute for Social and Economic Studies’ (IESE) Barometer of Social Cohesion surveys social cohesion in Angoche and Moma, Nampula, Chimbunila and Cuamba, Niassa, Chiure and Montepuez, Cabo Delgado. Over 600 citizens interviewed in each district, men and women, with young people as half the respondents. Conducted in 2022, results are forthcoming.

IESE defines social cohesion as the level of people’s trust in the government and collective willingness towards shared sustainable peace and development goals.

The instrument covers six dimensions: inclusion, security and protection, trust in others, trust in institutions, representation, and civic engagement. Security and protection findings show Cabo Delgado insurgency as a northern Mozambique fear source.

In Nampula, south of Cabo Delgado, Angoche on the coast, and Moma district, 100 km south of Angoche. Angoche findings show Cabo Delgado violence impacts security feelings. Local youth recruitment to ‘al-Shabaab’ ranks concerns them, with Sheik Ismaila enticing youths with Islam study promises.

Moma too appears as an insurgent recruitment area. It uses young artisanal fishermen migrating for fish quality declines.

Cabo Delgado conflict increases Moma distrust of displaced people. Those from insurgency areas draw suspicion and reporting to authorities.

In Niassa, Chimbunila district survey was conducted. Lake Nyasa shores lie over 500 km west of Cabo Delgado’s Pemba. Niassa saw no insurgent attacks since 2021 Mecula district violence, though residents remain fearful.

Cabo Delgado’s Chiure and Montepuez have particularities. Chiure saw early conflict violence in 2016, escalating insecurity and displacements. Montepuez acts as a displaced persons center, generating anxiety and fear.

Montepuez insecurity stems from prior insurgency violence, affecting trust and leading to thousands displaced.

Current and forthcoming studies indicate conflict human impact across apparently safe yet anxious populations.

Waiting for Gas

By Fernando Lima, Cabo Ligado

Jean-Christophe Rufin’s report on Cabo Delgado gas projects recommends strong social condition commitment. Land rights and TotalEnergies’ community, economic projects are main focuses.

Rufin advocates widespread provincial project impact. Meanwhile, TotalEnergies supports Palma and Mocímboa da Praia. Forms partnerships with NGOs, military, and overseas firms.

TotalEnergies supports small farms across villages for community-produced food diversity. Lucrative projects by SEBO, South African company, operate vegetables and protein development on Olumbe farms.

Hydroponic drip, boreholes on non-river adjacent farms address water issues. Agrarian specialists work directly with communities or via third parties.

Projects like Mute village aquaculture involve Mozambican army civic service, improving military image. ABC Primary School in Olumbe rebuilt by Defense Ministry, funded by TotalEnergies.

MASC provides Mocímboa da Praia returnees with seeds. Total ensures local fish purchase to support economy.

Quitunda village expands for relocated population. South African and Rwandan firms contribute new housing.

Coastal sand roads improve population connectivity, funded by TotalEnergies. Ensuring coordination among projects remains critical for better oversight.