EPO Monthly: April 2021

April at a Glance

• Vital Stats- ACLED has recorded 134 total events and 556 reported fatalities in April.
• Vital Stats- Amhara region had the highest number of reported fatalities due to organized political violence in April at 172 fatalities. Oromia and Afar regions followed at 159 and 102 reported fatalities, respectively.
• Vital Stats- In April, the most common event type was battles, with 49 battle events and 317 fatalities reported. There were 29 events of violence against civilians which led to 216 fatalities. There were 39 peaceful protests.
• Vital Trends - Discontent is increasing in the Amhara region due to the Ethiopian government’s lack of action regarding the targeted killing and displacement of Amhara civilians by different actors throughout Ethiopia.
• Vital Trends - Deep divides have emerged between the Oromo and Amhara regional governments due to frustration towards the government’s lack of or delayed response to attacks on ethnic Amhara civilians throughout Ethiopia.

In This Report

• April Situation Summary
• Tigray Conflict Update
• Election-Related Disputes and Violence
• Monthly Focus: Protest Dynamics in Ethiopia Prior to the Election

April Situation Summary

Pressure is mounting on the central government of Ethiopia as multiple conflicts continue to rage throughout the country. In many of these conflicts, the Amhara ethnic group is targeted by different armed groups, often by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane. Discontent and frustration towards the government’s lack of or delayed response to attacks on ethnic Amhara, throughout Ethiopia, have led to deep divides between the Oromo and Amhara regional governments. This dynamic has given rise to ethno-nationalist calls on both sides. Continued violence targeting ethnic Amhara throughout the country is damaging to the Prosperity Party (PP)’s ability to retain voter confidence in the Amhara region for the upcoming general election.

Over 300 fatalities were reported in April due to battles between various armed groups in the Afar region. Most battles were between the Afar region special forces (accompanied by Afar ethnic militias) and Somali regional state special forces in Gewane, Hanruk, and Gelalu Woredas in Zone 3 of the Afar region. In early April, ACLED recorded 100 fatalities in a single week. Tensions between the two regional states increased after the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) listed 30 polling stations in Zone 3 of the Afar region under the Somali regional state. When the Afar regional state government disputed this decision, the NEBE decided to close the disputed polling stations and advised residents in the contested areas to register and vote in neighboring Kebeles. The Somali regional government rejected the NEBE’s decision. Tensions between the two regions are still high as the protests against the NEBE decision continue.

Tigray Conflict Update

In Tigray, violence levels have generally decreased throughout April. ACLED records more than 50 fatalities in Central and North Western Tigray. These numbers are likely a low estimate as access to the region – especially rural areas – remains poor. However, the clear decline in hostilities is a result of strategy shifts by the Tigray Defense Force (TDF), who have stopped attempting to hold territory and have instead begun engaging in hit-and-run attacks.

Nevertheless, civilians are still routinely falling victim to violent attacks by TDF, Eritrean troops, and Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF). Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) affiliated forces likewise killed civilians in April and burned ambulances, as well as private and government vehicles. On 8 April 2021, TPLF associated forces reportedly ambushed a convoy traveling between Adwa and Tembien towns (Central Zone), killing an unspecified number of civilians. Reports indicate that at least 33 civilians were killed by ENDF soldiers in Selekleka town, North Tigray. On 12 April 2021, Eritrean forces opened fire and killed at least nine civilians and wounded more than 12 in Adwa town until the Ethiopian National Defense Forces intervened and stopped the Eritrean forces. Even though both Ethiopia and Eritrea have agreed to the withdrawal of Eritrean forces from the Tigray region, Eritrean forces were still active in the Tigray region at the end of April.

Election-Related Disputes and Violence

As the election draws near, pre-election disputes are being adjudicated by the Ethiopian Courts. However, it is not clear how NEBE will implement these decisions as most of the rulings are repealing initial decisions made by NEBE. As candidate registration has ended, and the printing of the ballots is underway, electoral changes are occurring in an atmosphere of high uncertainty. Recently, court decisions repealed NEBE’s efforts to deregister the Oromo Gada Liberation Party – Gada Bilisuma and the Oromo Democratic Alliance (ODA). Similarly, the Federal Supreme Court rejected a decision taken by NEBE to prohibit Hararis living outside the Harari Regional State from voting for the regional National Assembly members. At the beginning of April, the Court upheld the decision of the NEBE to disqualify the Oromo Liberation Democracy Front (OLDF) as a party.

In April, a total of three electoral candidates were killed. A National Movement of Amhara (NaMA) candidate competing for state council in Wonbera Woreda, Metekel Zone of Bensishangul-Gumz region was killed on 9 April 2021 in the Karbar area of Metekel Zone. On 21 April 2021, another NaMA party member, a youth organization leader, was shot and killed in Metema (West Gondar, Amhara region). Around 16 April 2021, an Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA) party candidate for Eferatana Gidem woreda (North Shewa, Amhara region) was killed by an unidentified armed group in Ataye town during clashes between OLF-Shane (and local Oromo militias) and the Amhara regional special forces.

Monthly Focus: Protest Dynamics in Ethiopia Prior to the Election

Popular uprisings have played a major role in shaping Ethiopia’s contemporary political landscape. Anti-government demonstrations from 2014-2018 caused a reshaping of the ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Thus, the TPLF, which previously dominated the EPRDF, lost power to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his Prosperity Party.

Oromia Region: Spaces of low willingness, opportunity, and alignment

Despite having some of the highest levels of organized violence in the country, the Oromia region recorded only three demonstrations during the last month. This is due to a high threat of state violence against demonstrators, low willingness to mobilize, and low capacity among elite populations to organize large-scale protest events.

Oromia region has historically been the most active location in the country for protesters to mobilize. There are many reasons for this — among them are various Oromo ethno-nationalist organizations that provided financial and logistical help to Qeerroo youth who were able to enforce economic strikes, hijack government-sponsored events, and disrupt government activities on a regular basis. A combination of high willingness and opportunity produced an environment that was highly conducive to coordinated protests.

The trend can be explained by changes that occurred in Oromia’s political environment last year. Government troops cracked down hard on Oromo youth and their elite support following a series of deadly riots that occurred directly after the death of Hachaalu Hundessam, a popular Oromo Musician, in June of 2020. Hundreds of people were killed (including ethnic minorities killed by rioting mobs), and thousands jailed. Subsequent attempts to demonstrate have been largely unsuccessful due to the closure of political space – most attempts to demonstrate are met by swift government action.

Amhara Region: High opportunity, high willingness, mixed organizational capacities

In contrast to the Oromia region, where local officials are unwilling to allow protests to occur, the Amhara region was the site of a high number of demonstrations last month that demonstrated willingness, opportunity, and alignment. Still, protests were not nearly as large or as sustained as those that occurred prior to the transition period beginning in 2018. There were also elements of uncertainty during the latest round of protest, as not all factions agreed with the aim of the demonstrations. Different factions leveled accusations of “hijacking” and mixed messaging. This led to an economic strike being suspended early.

Unrest had been building in the Amhara region for months and was finally triggered by the violence occurring in Ataye city, located in the Wollo area, Amhara region. Demonstrators protested against the increasingly frequent violent attacks and displacement of ethnic Amhara from areas in Oromia, Amhara, and Benishangul/Gumz region. They chanted slogans expressing frustration at the government’s unwillingness to fulfill its responsibility to ensure the safety of citizens.

As noted above, demonstrations began on 16 April in Finote Selam, where rioters clashed with police and Amhara regional special forces, killing one police officer and wounding another. A truck driver was injured when rioters lit his vehicle on fire in the same area. Mobilization later spread to Dessie and Debre Markos, then every other major city in the region. Despite its violent beginnings, most of the demonstrations held across the Amhara region throughout the rest of the month of April were peaceful.

Conclusion

The cost of mobilizing people to demonstrate has risen in Ethiopia. In a country where one would expect that an electoral cycle would be accompanied by a high number of protests/riots, few have been reported. This is due to recent events where security forces have clearly communicated to protesters that demonstrations would be met by heavy repression. Movements that coordinated mobilization efforts in the past have been crippled by internal divisions and a lack of organizational structure. Given these facts, mobilization during the current pre-election cycle is not likely to reach levels experienced during the 2014-2018 period.