Europe and Central Asia Overview: April 2026

Europe and the Caucasus: War in the Middle East spills into Europe with Iran-linked attacks

Following a fatwa issued on 1 March by Grand Ayatollahs Naser Makarem Shirazi and Hossein Noori Hamedani calling to avenge the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, at least 14 events targeted Jewish sites and Iranian dissidents in Europe and the Caucasus. European authorities are investigating possible Iranian involvement in the incidents.

Among these events, which largely occurred in Belgium and the Netherlands, were the detonation of incendiary and explosive devices outside synagogues, Jewish schools, and other sensitive targets in Liege, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, and Antwerp between 9 and 16 March. A man of Iranian descent who was critical of the Islamic Republic was shot in the Dutch town of Schoonhoven, South Holland, on 19 March. 

Other attacks targeted Jewish, Israeli, and American interests. In Azerbaijan, State Security announced it had defused two bombs hidden in containers by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in an attempt to target the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Israeli embassy, and Jewish leaders.¹ An explosive device was detonated outside the US embassy in Oslo on 8 March, damaging its entrance, and ambulances belonging to Jewish charity Hatzola were set ablaze in London on 23 March. In Paris, French police arrested a 17-year-old boy planting a makeshift bomb outside the Bank of America headquarters on 27 March. In Norway, the United Kingdom, and France, authorities have linked these attacks to Iranian intelligence.² 

Taking place overnight and involving unsophisticated weapons, these incidents were likely intended to inflict psychological harm rather than result in casualties.³ Most of them were claimed by Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiya (the Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right), a previously unknown group, on pro-Iranian Telegram channels. 

In a pattern echoing Russian covert operations and suspected sabotage in Europe since 2022 — including arson attacks and assassination plots — the perpetrators have mostly been teenagers recruited online by the IRGC in exchange for money, according to Dutch and Scandinavian law enforcement officials.⁴ The youth arrested in Paris claimed that he had been offered 600 euros (roughly $700 at the time) on Snapchat to carry out the bombing.⁵ European intelligence services had long warned of Iranian covert operations on the continent, pointing to the intensifying cooperation between Iranian intelligence and criminal groups to target Jewish communities or Iranian dissidents.⁶ Confirming those fears, British police arrested six individuals suspected of spying on behalf of Iran in March, four of whom were conducting surveillance of Jewish sites in London, while two others tried to break into the nuclear submarine base Clyde. 

See our Iran war updates page for daily updates on the conflict unfolding in Iran and the wider region.

France: Violence against politicians increases around the municipal election

ACLED records eight acts of violence perpetrated against local elected officials and candidates who contested municipal elections in France during March. In the majority of these events, left-wing politicians were the targets, though representatives on all sides were exposed to violence. On 6 March, around 15 suspected far-right activists assaulted the La France Insoumise (LFI) mayor of Faches-Thumesnil and a national deputy. In Bordeaux and Sorede, the premises of left-wing candidates were attacked, while an explosive device destroyed the front door of the far-right Rassemblement National representative’s home in Alenya. On election night, 15 March, an unidentified individual shot at the car of a local elected official in Aleria. On 27 March, around 20 hooded individuals ransacked the town hall of Fresnes ahead of the mayoral vote scheduled for the next day. 

The municipal elections come at a time of increased tensions over the death of neofascist activist Quentin Deranque in Lyon in February. The Minister of the Interior said that authorities had opened 120 cases related to violence, intimidation, and insults against politicians, especially in localities where the LFI won.⁷ Fueled by deep polarization across the French political landscape, violence against elected representatives is likely to persist, especially as the country heads to the polls to elect a new president in 2027.

Russia: Ukraine strikes Baltic oil ports, halting 40% of Russia’s crude exports

In March, Ukraine increased its drone and missile strikes on Russian territory, both in quantity and geographical reach. ACLED records at least 1,600 air- and drone strike events carried out by Ukrainian military forces across 27 regions in Russia, compared to 1,314 in February and 984 in January. 

These strikes targeted a wide variety of military sites. Moscow city experienced an unprecedented attack over the weekend of 13 and 14 March, as 250 drones were reportedly intercepted on approach.⁸ Also on 14 March, Ukrainian strikes dismantled Russia’s last two operational Black Sea rail ferries in the Kerch Strait. Then, on 25 March, Ukrainian forces conducted their first successful attack on a Russian military vessel in the Baltic Sea, around 1,000 kilometers from Ukrainian territory. The ship partially sank at the Vyborg shipyard.⁹

In parallel, Ukraine escalated its attacks on Russian oil and gas infrastructure. On 14 March, Ukrainian forces hit oil depots in Tikhoretsk and Labinsk in Krasnodar, as well as the Afipsky oil refinery and port infrastructure at Kavkaz on the Kerch Strait. In the final week of March, Ukraine targeted Russia’s Baltic Sea oil export infrastructure in the Leningrad region and hit two of Russia’s largest crude oil terminals in the ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga, as well as the Kinef oil refinery in Kirishi.¹⁰ During these attacks, at least six Ukrainian drones strayed and eventually landed in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland, inflicting limited or no damage. Ukraine apologized for the incidents.

The increase in Ukraine’s strikes on oil infrastructure is part of an effort to offset Russia’s increased budget revenue resulting from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the US’ temporary waivers on Russian oil. As a result, an estimated 40% of Russia’s crude export capacity was temporarily shut down.¹¹ In a sign that these strikes are having their desired effect, Russia announced a four-month ban on all gasoline exports from 1 April, citing a reduction in refinery output levels.¹² 

For more information, see the ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor. 

Ukraine: Russia launches a record drone attack as its spring offensive begins

Russia’s aerial campaign in Ukraine continued to escalate, surpassing 3,500 air- and drone attacks in March, compared to 2,712 in February and 2,688 in January this year. On March 23 and 24, Russia launched 948 drones at Ukraine during a 24-hour period. This was the largest such attack since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion.¹³ The strikes reached deep into western Ukraine, hitting cities far from the front line, including Lviv’s UNESCO-listed historic center, as well as Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, and Vinnytsia. 

The strikes also severed Moldova’s Isaccea-Vulcanesti high-voltage line, forcing Moldovan authorities to enact a state of energy emergency amid threats of mass power outages. Ukrainian energy workers restored the integrity of the line on 28 March, but the risks to energy security remain. In early March, Moldova’s water supply security also came under strain when a Russian combined strike on Ukraine’s Dniester hydropower complex spilled oil into the river that feeds nearly 80% of the country’s freshwater supply. 

This escalation in strikes accompanied the beginning of Russia’s spring-summer 2026 offensive against the Donetsk Fortress Belt, a 50-km chain of fortified cities from Sloviansk through Kramatorsk and Druzhkivka, leading to Kostiantynivka.¹⁴ The main target of Russia’s offensive was in the Lyman direction, where Russian forces conducted a battlefield air interdiction campaign, striking dams near Sloviansk with glide bombs and logistics routes on the H-20 highway between Kostiantynivka and Sloviansk with drones.¹⁵ Pressure intensified toward Kramatorsk and Kostiantynivka from the south, where Russian forces increased their artillery and tactical aviation strikes and deployed armored vehicles. Despite these efforts, Russian forces made only minor gains.

For more information, see the ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor.