Europe and Central Asia Overview: March 2026

Cyprus: Drone strikes on UK military base bring the Middle East conflict to Europe

The US-Israeli war on Iran reached Europe on 2 March, as a drone struck the United Kingdom airbase ⁠of Akrotiri, a British overseas territory on the Mediterranean island of Cyprus. The strike caused only limited damage to the runway and no casualties.¹ Later that day, UK forces intercepted two more drones directed at the base. According to a Cypriot news agency, the airbase was targeted by low-flying drones fired by Lebanese Hezbollah.²

The attack occurred after UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced the UK would allow the US to use UK bases for “defensive” strikes on Iran.³ On 2 March, a general from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned of intensifying attacks on the island to push US forces out.⁴ Following these developments, two Greek frigates, a British destroyer, and a French frigate, along with France’s aircraft carrier and its escort frigates, were deployed to the eastern Mediterranean.⁵ 

European countries have also been involved in the conflict since the first days of the war through the interception of Iranian drones and missiles in the Middle East. Two French bases in the region were also struck by Iranian drones. However, the strike on Akrotiri and the ensuing deployment of European navies in the Mediterranean signal a new phase of European engagement in the conflict. This deployment increases the likelihood that France, Germany, and the UK will act on their statement of readiness to strike Iranian drones and missiles inside Iran, despite all the risks of additional spillover outside the Middle East region that this carries.⁶ Meanwhile, the Spanish government has denied the use of its bases to the US to conduct strikes on Iran.⁷

See our live Iran crisis hub for daily updates on the conflict unfolding in Iran and the wider region.

France: Killing of French neofascist activist highlights polarization ahead of municipal elections

On 12 February, 23-year-old neofascist activist Quentin Deranque was violently beaten in a brawl in Lyon by at least six people with suspected ties to the far-left. He died two days later. The incident followed a protest organized by the far-right group Nemesis. Leading politicians, government officials, and far-right activists blamed Deranque’s death on the radical left party La France Insoumise (LFI) over its links to La Jeune Garde, a local antifascist group that was implicated in the brawl despite being dissolved in 2025.⁸ Jacques-Elie Favrot, a member of La Jeune Garde and assistant of LFI MP Raphäel Arnault, himself a co-founder of La Jeune Garde, was arrested alongside six other suspects on 19 February.⁹ 

In the aftermath of Deranque’s death, far-right activists and party representatives took to the streets in 22 instances in France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands to honor his memory and denounce “far-left terrorism.” In France, at least 17 different far-right groups mobilized across 16 demonstrations, pointing to intensifying cooperation between organizations that formerly avoided protesting together.¹⁰ More broadly, these demonstrations underscore the ties between radical networks across the continent and their ability to mobilize simultaneously. 

Next to peaceful gatherings, violent incidents occurred in Toulouse, where hooligans attacked the customers of a bar known for its leftist stance, and in Bordeaux, where a brick was thrown at the window of the office of an LFI politician. In Lyon, some protesters were seen performing Nazi salutes on 21 February. Deranque’s death highlights deepened polarization in France — and suggests a heightened risk of electoral violence as the country braces for highly contested municipal polls on 15 and 22 March. 

See more of ACLED’s coverage on France.

Russia and Ukraine: Belgorod faces rolling blackouts as Ukraine tries to mirror Russian strikes on energy infrastructure

Following a short-lived energy ceasefire between 30 January and 1 February, Russia conducted one of its most damaging waves of attacks on energy infrastructure in Ukraine over the first 10 days of February. The attacks destroyed and disabled the Darnytska thermal power plant in Kyiv for at least two months and disabled power generation capacity in Kharkiv, Odesa, Kherson, Dnipro, and Zaporizhia. Overall, however, Russian attacks on energy infrastructure decreased in February compared to January. 

Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy infrastructure, on the other hand, increased by around 30% in February. Ukrainian attacks spanned at least 14 regions, reaching as far as the oil refinery in Ukhta in the Republic of Komi, located around 1,700 kilometers away from the Ukrainian border. The attacks severely affected the city of Belgorod in particular, where rolling blackouts and long-term heating disruptions became the norm. While the Belgorod region has been subject to Ukrainian cross-border incursions and shelling, its eponymous city has also been a frequent target of Ukrainian strikes. This is due to its importance as a military logistics hub as well as its role as a launchpad for targeting the city of Kharkiv, which is situated at a similar distance from the border on the Ukrainian side. 

For more information, see the ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor. 

Ukraine: Ukraine and Russia push for territorial gains amid stalled negotiations

In February, United States-mediated talks between Kyiv and Moscow continued in the United Arab Emirates and in Switzerland. Following the negotiations, the parties exchanged prisoners of war and the bodies of killed soldiers. They continue to disagree on the core question of Ukraine’s territorial concessions in the Donbas and the status of the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, which is currently occupied by Russia. Although territorial concessions around the Donbas are no longer completely inconceivable in the Ukrainian public opinion,¹¹ the country’s political leadership insists on linking any deal on concessions to security guarantees. Whereas Russia previously rejected proposals including the deployment of Western troops to Ukraine, the Kremlin is reportedly considering accepting unspecified security guarantees proposed by the US.¹² However, as the US becomes more embroiled in the war in the Middle East, its involvement in the mediation and its commitment to ensuring a ceasefire in Ukraine may come into question. 

On the battlefield, Russia resumed its campaign of chaotic cross-border infiltration attacks in the northern Sumy and Kharkiv regions. Russia also continued advancing in the Donetsk region, toward the Kostiantynivka-Kramatorsk-Sloviansk agglomeration, as well as the Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions, seizing at least 13 settlements in February. 

Ukraine, however, regained control of a large share of Russian advances over the past year on the administrative boundary between the Zaporizhia and Dnipropetrovsk regions, retaking at least 10 settlements around 15 February. The Ukrainian military leadership put the February gains at over 400 square km, turning Russian net territorial gains negative for the first time since 2023.¹³ Ukrainian forces likely took advantage of chaotic communications among Russian troops after US-based company SpaceX cut Russian access to Starlink satellite terminals and the Russian government blocked the Telegram messenger application.¹⁴

For more information, see the ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor.