Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: August 2025

Bolivia: Mobilizations in support of Morales subside, but tensions persist ahead of the election

July saw a 67% decrease in the number of demonstrations in Bolivia compared to the previous month. In June, former president Evo Morales’ supporters set roadblocks nationwide to demand his inclusion in the race for the 17 August presidential election. After clashes between Morales supporters and security forces left eight people dead between 10 and 11 June, the roadblocks were lifted and demonstrations subsided. On 8 July, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal ratified Morales’ exclusion from the race,¹ despite his repeated attempts to force his way into the competition.² 

Even though Morales’ supporters suspended mobilizations, some called for a null vote and others even threatened to use violence on the day of the vote³ — raising fears of a new escalation of violence around the election.⁴ In July, these tensions led to at least two violent incidents. On 12 July, Morales supporters clashed with supporters of Andrónico Rodríguez — a former member of the Movement for Socialist party (MAS) now running for the Popular Alliance coalition — in Villa Yacapaní, Santa Cruz, destroying his campaign headquarters and injuring two people. On 23 July, other Morales supporters stormed a campaign event of MAS presidential candidate Eduardo del Castillo in Caranavi, La Paz, forcing him to flee the premises. As the 17 August election approaches, it is likely that Morales supporters could actively obstruct the process.

For more on violence around the elections, see ACLED’s report Bolivia braces for tense elections as ruling party implodes

Ecuador: Arrest of Los Choneros leader triggers deadly dispute in Manabí

On 20 July, authorities extradited Los Choneros leader José Adolfo Macías, known as “Fito,” to the United States, where he faces drug and arms trafficking charges.⁵ His capture in the city of Manta on 25 June and subsequent extradition appear to have fueled the deadly escalation of a pre-existing dispute between Los Lobos and Los Choneros over the control of criminal economies such as drug trafficking and extortion in the Manabí province.⁶ Los Choneros’ line of succession is contested,⁷ and Los Lobos may have seen their rivals’ current leadership vacuum as an opportunity to expand their control in the province, a longtime Los Choneros stronghold.⁸ 

Amid heightened competition between the two groups, ACLED records 101 reported fatalities in Manabí in July — almost triple as many as in June — making it the most lethal month in the province since ACLED started covering gang violence in Ecuador in January 2023. This deadly violence included Los Choneros’ killing of a Los Lobos leader, Flavio Leonardo Briones, known as “El Mexicano,” his wife, and two of his bodyguards on 16 July in Manta, which led to multiple retaliatory massacres and killings in the following days.⁹ This latest escalation prompted the government to mobilize 2,000 soldiers to curb violence in the province, but this intervention is unlikely to curb the violent dispute between Los Choneros and Los Lobos any time soon.¹⁰

Guatemala: Nationwide teachers’ demonstrations drive the largest number of protests since President Arévalo took office

July saw a sharp increase in protests led by the education workers’ union of Guatemala (STEG). The mobilizations had been building since May 2025, when the union announced a national strike and started a sit-in protest in the center of Guatemala City to demand a 15% salary increase and a national dialogue around an agenda addressing broader social issues.¹¹ Arévalo’s government has been initially reluctant to negotiate with the union’s leader, Joviel Acevedo, who was sanctioned by the US Department of State in 2023 for engaging “in significant corruption by providing STEG’s political support in exchange for bribes from public officials”.¹² But in the absence of any government concession, the education workers’ union intensified their demonstrations and spread them throughout the country, leading to the suspension of classes in several schools.¹³ In July, ACLED records 76 protests, the highest monthly number since President Bernardo Arévalo took office in January 2024. The vast majority of last month’s protests were led by the education workers, in many cases joined by health workers.

While mostly peaceful, protesters set up roadblocks in 19 of the country’s 22 departments and clashed with security forces in Puerto Barrios, Izabal, leading to the arrest of one teacher. Arévalo criticized the roadblocks, accusing the union of obstructing aid delivery during recent earthquakes that left four people dead.¹⁴ The mobilizations were halted on 21 July after the government and the union agreed to initiate negotiations.¹⁵ Yet Acevedo has conditioned the resumption of classes on negotiations facilitated by Sandra Torres, the presidential candidate who lost to Arévalo in 2023.¹⁶ This suggests that further mobilizations could be used by opposition parties to weaken the government.

Haiti: Security forces try to push back the Viv Ansanm gang in Kenscoff while gang expansion increases violence in Artibonite

On 24 July, police and military forces, supported by the Multinational Security Support Mission, carried out a joint operation dropping explosives from drones and clashing with Viv Ansanm gang members in at least five communities of Kenscoff, Port-au-Prince. This operation took place in the context of renewed security efforts to regain control of the commune, a wealthy area where gangs made incursions at the beginning of 2025 but have yet to establish full control. In addition to the drone attack, security forces clashed 11 times with gangs in July, up from just two in June. The mayor of Kenscoff called on security forces to take measures to consolidate police presence in recovered areas to avoid losing positions.¹⁷

Clashes between gangs and security forces, sometimes supported by self-defense groups, also increased in Artibonite. Contrastingly, the increase was the result of a gang offensive to expand control over National Roads 1 and 11, which connect Haiti’s capital city, Port-au-Prince, to the north.¹⁸ There, ACLED records 13 violent events in July, up from six in June. Gangs attacked police stations in Dessalines and Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite, and killed three officers and a suspected police informant in Liancourt. This incident sparked outrage from the police workers’ union, which criticized the lack of resources to fight gangs and the poor coordination between the transitional government and the central police authority.¹⁹ But the most violent event took place on 19 July, when the Kokorat San Ras gang clashed with a local self-defense militia and police officers in the Kanpenyen community in L’Estère, leaving at least 18 people dead. 

Peru: Artisanal miners mobilize, demanding formalization from the government

On 7 July, informal and artisanal miners started a 12-day national strike, driving a 24% increase in demonstrations in July compared to the previous month. Miners took to the streets to reject a 5 July government resolution that prevented 50,000 informal miners from enrolling in the Comprehensive Mining Formalization Registry (Reinfo), leaving them outside formal regulatory frameworks.²⁰ They also demanded the approval of the Small-Scale and Artisanal Mining Law, which would automatically formalize artisanal miners without requiring registration in Reinfo.²¹ 

Nearly half of the over 150 demonstrations that ACLED records in the country in July were related to mining. The demonstrations took place across 10 regions — primarily in Arequipa — and were mostly peaceful. Nevertheless, a demonstrator was killed and at least 25 people were injured in clashes with police on 11 July in Chala.²² This is the second wave of mass miners’ mobilizations that the government has faced in the past year, after dozens of demonstrations with similar demands took place in November 2024.²³

Trinidad and Tobago: The government imposes a new state of emergency amid allegations of planned attacks against officials 

On 18 July, the government declared a 15-day nationwide state of emergency, which the parliament then extended for three months. Authorities justified the declaration based on intelligence reports indicating that incarcerated gang members were plotting attacks against security and judicial officials.²⁴ The move comes three months after the expiration of a prior state of emergency declared in December 2024 in response to a spike in gang violence and retaliatory killings. State of emergency measures provide police and military forces with enhanced powers, including the ability to conduct home searches without a warrant.²⁵ The government also took other measures to enhance the fight against crime, such as designating the Tren de Aragua gang as a terrorist organization on 1 July,²⁶ and advancing a proposal to loosen regulations on gun possession and use for self-defense.²⁷

During the 105 days of the first state of emergency, Trinidad and Tobago experienced a notable decrease in violence, with 33% fewer gang violence events than during the 105 days prior. Still, observers and politicians have cautioned that the measure often delivers short-term effects and must come with a more comprehensive approach to meaningfully curb crime and violence.²⁸ At the same time, the imposition of states of emergency has also prompted an increase in security forces’ use of deadly violence: Between January and July 2025, ACLED records 23 reported fatalities associated with clashes between security forces and gangs, equal to the whole of 2024. Although emergency measures seem to contribute to temporary decreases in levels of violence, concerns remain over the risks that looser checks on security forces’ actions can increase abuses of force by the latter.