Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: December 2025

Brazil: Congress approves an anti-gangs bill as clashes between security forces and criminal groups become deadlier

On 18 November, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies approved an anti-gang bill, which toughens provisions aimed at combating organized crime. Originally designed to strengthen federal responsibilities and power, including the seizure of criminal assets, the opposition submitted multiple amendments that hardened the text. The bill prohibits prisoners from voting in elections, stiffens penalties for gang-related crimes, and adds new crimes to the penal code, including the use of novo cangaço tactics — when armed gangs raid small or medium-sized towns, often targeting banks, armored cars, and police stations —  and “structured social control,” which includes activities that support gangs.¹ 

The legal initiative was sped up after October’s deadly anti-gang operation in Rio de Janeiro that killed at least 122 people. The operation contributed to a 12% rise in the number of reported fatalities resulting from clashes between security forces and non-state armed groups in the first 11 months of 2025 compared to the same period in 2024. It also reignited the debate over shared security responsibilities between the federal government and state governments. Several states ruled by right-wing governors, including Sao Paulo’s Tarcísio de Freitas and Rio de Janeiro’s Cláudio Castro, took the raid as an opportunity to launch a state-led alliance to coordinate security operations under the so-called Consortium for Peace.² While the bill awaits a vote in Brazil’s senate, critics argue that it could lead to the criminalization of social movements, particularly through the vaguely defined new structured social control crime, and hamper law enforcement collaboration between state and federal forces.³ 

Colombia: Airstrikes against the EMC trigger retaliation and political backlash over child fatalities

In November, President Gustavo Petro authorized two airstrikes against the Central General Staff (EMC) in Arauca and Guaviare, intensifying the military offensive against the group.⁴ On 10 November, in rural Calamar, Guaviare, the Colombian Air Forces carried out the deadliest air operation since Petro took office, killing at least 20 combatants. Three days later, another airstrike in the rural area of Puerto Rondón, Arauca, resulted in at least eight additional fatalities. In retaliation, the EMC carried out at least 21 attacks against security forces in Cauca and Nariño, contributing to a 20% increase in violent interactions between the EMC and state forces nationwide compared to the previous month.

The offensive sparked widespread criticism against the government over its security policy and compliance with International Humanitarian Law after the Colombian Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences confirmed the deaths of eight minors as a result of the two airstrikes, adding to seven other forcibly-recruited minors killed in other military operations since August 2025.⁵ Days later, the EMC’s top commander, Iván Mordisco, released a video challenging Petro, condemning the airstrikes, and warning of potential repercussions ahead of the 2026 elections.⁶ These developments highlight the challenges for the government in containing armed group violence, protecting civilians, and implementing its Total Peace policy, while armed groups continue to recruit minors forcibly and put civilians at risk. 

Ecuador: A prison massacre underscores the limits of Noboa’s security strategy

On 9 November, armed clashes between Los Lobos and the dissident Los Lobos Box faction in El Oro province’s Machala prison left 32 gang members dead, making it the deadliest day for prison violence since ACLED started covering gang violence in Ecuador in 2023. In the early morning hours, Los Lobos members killed five members of the rival group in a planned attack. Hours later, 27 members of Los Lobos were found suffocated in a cellblock controlled by the Lobos Box group.⁷ In August, the military — which President Daniel Noboa had deployed to prisons in January 2024 — handed over control of the Machala prison and seven other prisons to civilian authorities.⁸ While militarization managed to curb violence inside prisons in 2024, the reorganization, fragmentation, and shifting alliances of criminal groups fueled renewed conflicts. 

The recent massacre in Machala underscores the limited effectiveness of Noboa’s tough-on-crime policies in containing organized crime group violence and comes at a time of popular dissatisfaction with his policies. His strategy was contested with a referendum vote on 16 November, when Ecuadorians overwhelmingly rejected his proposals for a constitutional assembly, which appeared to be aimed at reducing the institutional checks over the executive and allowing foreign military bases back in the country.⁹ The result, which has been viewed as a referendum on the overall government’s performance, represents a major political setback to Noboa amid increasing violence levels.¹⁰ 

Haiti: Anti-gang operations escalate in peripheral areas of Port-au-Prince amid political tensions 

In November, police forces carried out anti-gang operations with support from the Gang Suppression Force (GSF). This effort sparked an 80% increase in clashes between gangs and security forces, particularly in the communes of Tabarre, Croix-des-Bouquets, and Kenscoff. In Tabarre and Croix-des-Bouquets, security forces targeted the 400 Mawozo gang to regain control of the Marassa crossroad on National Road 3, which connects to the border with the Dominican Republic, resulting in the death of at least seven gang members.¹¹ In Kenscoff, authorities launched anti-gang operations against the Viv Ansanm gang coalition in the Furcy, Belo, Godet, Obleon, and Clemansso neighborhoods. In response to the renewed security forces operations, on 18 November, the leader of Viv Ansanm, Jimmy Chérizier, called on civilians to stay home, warning of an escalation in offensives against security forces.¹²

While these threats and security operations were ongoing, political tensions rose around the incoming electoral process. On 14 November, the Transitional Electoral Council presented a new electoral calendar that sets the first round of voting for August 2026, having acknowledged that elections cannot be held before 7 February 2026, when the Transitional Presidential Council (CPT)’s mandate ends. The new timeline has fueled divisions within the CPT, as some members want to remain in place until new authorities are elected, while the United States is increasing pressure to prevent the CPT from continuing beyond its term.¹³ Amid these tensions, US authorities sanctioned CPT member Fritz Alphonse Jean for allegedly hindering anti-gang efforts — an accusation he denies, claiming the move is aimed at preventing attempts by him and other council members to remove the CPT’s current leader, who is close to the US.¹⁴

Mexico: The mayor of Uruapan’s killing triggers protests and a renewed security response in Michoacán

On 1 November, armed men killed Carlos Manzo, the mayor of Uruapan, Michoacán, during a public event. Manzo was an independent politician who had called on federal authorities to take action against organized criminal groups in the state and, since December 2024, had received additional security due to threats from criminal groups.¹⁵ His killing sparked dozens of nationwide protests that demanded justice for the mayor and denounced insecurity. On 15 November, so-called Gen Z protesters clashed with security forces in Mexico City, leaving 120 people injured.¹⁶ 

Since the beginning of her administration, President Claudia Sheinbaum has maintained a strong focus on federal security operations in Michoacán, where clashes between authorities and armed groups have doubled in the first 11 months of 2025 compared to the same period in 2024. But the killing prompted Sheinbaum to announce a new security strategy for the state. Known as Michoacán’s Plan for Peace and Justice, it aims to strengthen security efforts with an emphasis on justice and social development.¹⁷ Since then, authorities have arrested over 120 suspected criminals, including a person known as "El Licenciado", who is accused of ordering the hit on the mayor. Authorities claim he has links with the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG).¹⁸ 

Despite the government’s efforts to weaken organized crime groups, these groups continued to carry out attacks on civilians, retaliatory attacks, and acts of intimidation against the state throughout November. For example, on 17 November, after authorities launched an operation to capture a regional CJNG leader in Salvador Escalante, the cartel responded by setting up blockades that paralyzed traffic in at least 16 municipalities across Michoacán. 

US and Venezuela: The Trump administration doubles down on its quest to overthrow Maduro

In November, the US administration stepped up diplomatic pressure against Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro, while reducing strikes on suspected drug-smuggling vessels. On 14 November, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth launched Operation Southern Spear to combat drug trafficking activities, coinciding with the arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford — the world’s largest aircraft carrier — in the Caribbean, formalizing the new US approach to drug trafficking in the region.¹⁹ President Donald Trump’s administration also issued several measures directly at Maduro’s administration. It designated Cartel de los Soles — an organization it claims to be led by Maduro²⁰ — as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on 24 November and declared the closure of Venezuela’s airspace on 29 November.²¹

The latest moves followed a call between Maduro and Trump on 21 November. According to major US media outlets, in the call, Maduro offered to resign in exchange for full legal amnesty for himself and his family, the lifting of US sanctions, and dropping a case he faces at the International Criminal Court. But Trump rejected, instead giving Maduro a one-week deadline to leave Venezuela.²²

Meanwhile, military action toward vessels subsided, following growing demands for accountability within the US. ACLED records six strikes leading to 21 fatalities in November, down from nine strikes resulting in 45 fatalities in October. No strikes were conducted after 15 November. This could be linked to the growing pressure from both Democratic and Republican members of congress questioning the legality of US military strikes, after reports that US officials ordered a follow-on attack to kill the survivors of a strike in September.²³