Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: February 2026

Bolivia: Paz faces unrest and internal political divisions over economic policies

Between December and January, the government of newly installed President Rodrigo Paz has faced a wave of unrest sparked by a decree issued in mid-December that eliminated fuel subsidies, among other economic adjustment measures. With the implementation of the decree, gasoline and diesel prices increased by 86% and 162%, respectively.¹ Although protests started in December, they increased in January, driving a 63% rise in demonstrations. ACLED records almost 270 demonstrations in January, the second-highest level of recorded mobilizations since ACLED started coverage of the country in 2018. The demonstrations, led by the Bolivian Workers’ Center (COB) union, were mostly peaceful and took place across eight departments, with almost half occurring in La Paz. Protests subsided after the government and the COB reached an agreement to suspend the decree and issue a new one on 11 January, though maintaining the elimination of fuel subsidies.² 

Paz’s policies to stabilize the economy, which is affected by high levels of inflation, as well as dollar and fuel shortages, are central to his government agenda.³ However, they have faced resistance from segments of the population and have deepened internal divisions within the government. Paz’s vice president, Edmand Lara, publicly decried the elimination of the fuel subsidies and declared his opposition to his own government, posing a challenge to the executive’s governability.⁴ 

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Bolivia. 

Colombia: A deadly clash between FARC dissidents threatens to escalate conflict in Guaviare 

On 16 January, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents from the Estado Mayor de Bloques y Frente (EMBF) led by Alexander Díaz, known as “Calarcá,” killed at least 26 members of the rival Central General Staff (EMC) led by Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, known as “Iván Mordisco,” in a rural area of El Retorno municipality, Guaviare. The clash was the deadliest single event in the department since ACLED started covering the country in 2018. The bodies showed signs of execution, and according to authorities, four minors were among the deceased.⁵ The attack was part of the EMBF’s plan to overtake EMC-controlled territory in Guaviare, which is strategic for illicit economies such as drug trafficking and extortion, as well as the social control of the population.⁶ 

The EMBF emerged as a splinter group of the EMC in April 2024 following internal disagreements between Mordisco and Calarcá, and clashes between the two groups had already broken out in January 2025.⁷ Following its separation from the EMC, Calarcá’s faction continued peace talks with the government, and both parties reached agreements in the last round of negotiation in November 2025, including commitments to de-escalate the conflict.⁸ However, the latest clash suggests that the EMBF prioritizes the confrontation with the EMC over peace negotiations with the government, which endangers an already fragile peace process and raises the cost for civilians caught in the crossfire. 

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Colombia. 

Guatemala: The Government imposes a state of emergency after Barrio 18 gang members kill 11 police officers 

On 17 January, Barrio 18 (B-18) gang members carried out coordinated riots in three prisons, taking guards as hostages and demanding the transfer of their leader, Aldo Dupie Ochoa Mejía, known as “El Lobo,” from the maximum-security prison Renovación I to a lower-security facility.⁹ Gangs had already launched simultaneous mutinies in prisons in August 2025, but this time, violence escalated further. The following day, after authorities regained control of the prisons, B-18 members launched coordinated attacks against police officers in Guatemala City and neighboring municipalities, contributing to around a 28% increase in gang violence events compared to the previous month. The attacks resulted in the deaths of 11 officers and several others being injured, turning 18 January into the deadliest day for clashes between gangs and security forces since ACLED started coverage of the country in 2018. 

President Bernardo Arévalo’s government attributed the attacks to current opposition figures attempting to destabilize the government, presumably hinting at links between B-18 and opposition National Unity of Hope leader Sandra Torres, whose niece is El Lobo’s partner.¹⁰ In response to the incidents, Arévalo declared a 30-day state of emergency, which suspends certain citizen rights and enables armed forces to support police in maintaining order in prisons and carrying out raids and arrests, even without warrants.¹¹ As of 27 January, the government claimed to have detained over 1,100 people — of which 44 are gang members — and seized three tonnes of cocaine under state of emergency measures.¹² 

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Guatemala. 

Haiti: Security forces step up operations in gang-controlled areas in Port-au-Prince

In January, police forces and a special task force reporting to the prime minister’s office targeted gangs’ strongholds in Port-au-Prince, particularly in neighborhoods close to the coast and the city center. Although the number of clashes between security forces and gangs was similar to the number recorded in December, these clashes were much deadlier and resulted in 140 reported deaths — double the number of fatalities recorded the month prior. They also forced more than 5,000 residents to flee several neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince.¹³ Amid these clashes, security forces targeted three houses belonging to the leader of the Viv Ansanm coalition, Jimmy Cherizier, in Delmas 6. This was the first police operation in the neighborhood since March 2025. 

Despite the escalation in operations — sometimes supported by self-defense groups — a task force operative emphasized the need to add more police and deploy officials from the Gang Suppression Force, which is expected to start operating in April, in order to establish a more permanent presence in newly cleared areas.¹⁴

Meanwhile, the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) remains plagued by internal political tensions. On 23 January, some TPC members announced plans to remove Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé ahead of the scheduled end of the TPC’s mandate on 7 February. The initiative failed on the back of the United States imposing visa restrictions on four TPC members, and further threatening to sanction those who sign the resolution.¹⁵ 

See our latest report, Last line of defense? How vigilante groups are transforming Haiti’s security landscape, and more of ACLED’s coverage on Haiti.

Mexico: Cartel violence rekindles in Guanajuato and Sinaloa amid a US push to intervene

Emboldened by its intervention in Venezuela, the US government increased pressure on Mexican authorities to allow US security and intelligence forces to carry out joint operations against drug-trafficking groups in Mexican territory.¹⁶ President Claudia Sheinbaum rejected this proposal but continued to offer security cooperation: On 21 January, Mexican authorities extradited 37 members of organized crime groups to the US and signed an agreement to further accelerate extraditions on 25 January.¹⁷ 

Yet, recent high-impact cartel violence illustrates the power organized crime groups still hold in Mexico. On 25 January, suspected members of the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel shot and killed 11 people, including five suspected members of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), during a football match in Salamanca, Guanajuato. Salamanca is located close to the border with Michoacán and is a key disputed area for oil theft, as it is crossed by oil pipelines and refineries, as well as drug trafficking and extortion activities.¹⁸ The targeted attack against CJNG members contributed to an increase in violence in this municipality in January, which recorded the highest number of organized criminal violence events since February 2019. Meanwhile, in Sinaloa, authorities deployed 1,600 military forces on 29 January, after the Los Chapitos faction of the Sinaloa Cartel abducted 14 miners in Concordia and attacked two state deputies from the Citizen Movement party in Culiacán.¹⁹ 

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Mexico. 

Venezuela: US intervention prompts a new chapter in Venezuela’s domestic and international relations

Since the capture of Nicolás Maduro on 3 January, relations between the US and Venezuela’s interim government have shifted toward pragmatic engagement. Washington has begun acting as an intermediary in the sale of Venezuelan oil. A first sale worth USD 500 million has been credited to a Qatar-based account under US oversight and earmarked for Venezuelan payroll, services, and imports.²⁰ On 30 January, the National Assembly approved a Hydrocarbons Law reform that lowers royalties, reduces the legislature’s oversight on new contracts, grants operational and sales control to joint ventures’ minority partners, and allows disputes to be settled by international arbitration.²¹ 

In exchange for Venezuela’s economic opening, the US handed one of the five oil tankers it seized in January over to Venezuelan authorities,²² announced the reopening of Venezuelan airspace, and issued a general licence expanding the ability of oil companies to operate in Venezuela.²³ At the same time, it further increased pressure on one of Venezuela’s closest partners in the region, Cuba, issuing an executive order sanctioning any country that provides oil to the island.²⁴

Domestically, the interim government is attempting to preserve cohesion within the Chavismo movement while making some concessions to open political space. On one hand, the government has kept an assertive nationalistic messaging and reshuffled the military leadership, likely in an effort to consolidate interim control over the armed forces.²⁵ On the other hand, acting President Delcy Rodríguez has overseen a massive release of political prisoners and even announced plans to issue a general amnesty.²⁶ The government argues that it has released over 800 political prisoners since December, but the NGO Foro Penal could only confirm around 340, as of early February.²⁷

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Venezuela.