Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: January 2026

Colombia: An ELN armed strike highlights stalled peace talks amid growing external pressure

In protest against United States threats of intervention in Colombia, the National Liberation Army (ELN) enforced an armed strike, attacked state forces, and imposed a civilian curfew affecting 13 departments between 14 and 17 December.¹ Despite the strike, ELN commander Antonio García issued a statement indicating a willingness to resume peace talks with President Gustavo Petro’s government after negotiations collapsed in early 2025.² However, this gesture is unlikely to lead to renewed talks. Since 2024, the government has increased military pressure against armed groups that have shown limited commitment to advancing peace negotiations, particularly the ELN and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia General Central Staff. This shift is reflected in a 72% increase in violence between security forces and armed groups compared to 2024, with nearly 890 events in 2025.

In parallel, armed groups have bolstered their operational capacities, notably through the use of drones and explosives. On 18 December, the ELN carried out a major drone attack on the Capitán Antonio Ricaurte military base in Aguachica, Cesar, killing seven officers.³ In 2025, there was a fourfold increase in drone incidents compared to the previous year, with about 150 recorded events throughout the year. 

Despite heightened military pressure on armed groups, relations between Bogotá and Washington remain volatile. President Donald Trump accused Petro of collusion with drug trafficking organizations and warned that Petro could face US intervention after criticizing a US operation in Venezuela on 3 January, even though both lowered the tone after a phone conversation on 7 January. The diplomatic friction risks hindering ongoing negotiations with armed groups, as the country prepares for presidential elections in May 2026.

Ecuador: A massacre in the Machala prison underscores the rise in clashes between gangs

On 7 December, suspected Los Lobos Box gang members killed 13 Los Lobos gang members by suffocating them with plastic bags inside the Machala prison in El Oro. A couple of hours before, a man had detonated an artisanal explosive device one block away from the prison, leaving a pamphlet that contained death threats against the prison director. The episode illustrates a renewed surge of deadly gang violence in Ecuador’s prisons. Despite a significant decline in the number of violent events in prisons in 2025, ACLED records at least 115 reported violent deaths in prisons, more than triple the number recorded in 2024 and the highest since ACLED started coverage of gang violence in the country in 2023. 

The turf war between Los Lobos and Los Lobos Box for the control of the Machala prison and illicit activities in El Oro and surrounding provinces was the main driver of this uptick and is symptomatic of a broader escalation in gang-related violence.⁴ Los Lobos’s quest to expand into territories where Los Choneros has a strong presence, as well as internecine violence between increasingly fragmented organized crime groups, drove a 37% increase in clashes between gangs in 2025, leading the country to record the highest levels of violence in its recent history.⁵

For more, see the report on Ecuador in ACLED’s Conflict Watchlist 2026.

Haiti: Deadly anti-gang operations continue, but gang violence persists amid intra-coalition fighting

A rare instance of internecine fighting within the Viv Ansanm coalition points to the fragile nature of the criminal alliance. During the clashes, which broke out on 9 December, at least 49 members of the Bel Air gang were killed, after the gang refused to comply with coalition instructions to halt kidnappings.⁶ In recent months, gangs have stepped up kidnappings, which increased by 35% in the last quarter of 2025 compared to the previous three months. Several incidents occurred in Delmas in December, likely as some gangs attempted to bolster their income and offset anticipated increases in Gang Suppression Force (GSF) capacity.

While such incidents have been rare since the formation of the alliance in September 2023, they highlight the threats that gangs continue to pose to civilians across the country, despite a general intensification of anti-gang efforts. In December, the National Police of Haiti, supported by the GSF, launched several anti-gang operations, especially across the Ouest region. They targeted Kraze Barye in Tabarre and Torcel, Viv Ansanm in Archaie, and Bel Air in Port-au-Prince. The deadliest operation took place in Lafiteau, where security forces hit members of the Bèl Bòs gang with armed drones on 24 December, resulting in the killing of several dozen gang members. The incident reflects rising lethality in clashes between security forces and gang members in 2025, particularly since a task force began conducting drone strikes in March 2025, raising concerns over extrajudicial killings and civilian exposure.

Honduras: Electoral uncertainty fuels political tensions amid accusations of US interference

Delays in vote counting heightened tensions during December following the 30 November election, with the National Electoral Council only announcing official results on 24 December due to inconsistencies affecting more than 2,700 ballots.⁷ National Party of Honduras (PNH) candidate Nasry Asfura — endorsed by Trump on social media days before the vote⁸ — narrowly won the elections, garnering 40.3% of the vote, ahead of Salvador Nasralla of the Liberal Party and Rixi Moncada of the Liberty and Refoundation Party (LIBRE), who obtained 39.5% and 13%, respectively. 

Technical issues and irregularities prompted Nasralla to claim fraud, while Moncada denounced US interference in the electoral process. Incumbent President Xiomara Castro echoed Moncada’s claims. On 16 December, she called for demonstrations to protest the interference that she framed as an electoral coup attempt, citing alleged plans for former President Juan Orlando Hernández to return to Honduras after receiving a US pardon for his drug-trafficking conviction.⁹ LIBRE supporters mobilized in at least four municipalities, erecting roadblocks with burning tires. Although the National Electoral Council ratified the results on 30 December, and the Organization of American States’ Electoral Observation Mission found no evidence of electoral fraud, both Nasralla and Moncada refused to recognize the outcome, and Castro sanctioned a legislative decree ordering a full recount of the votes on 9 January.¹⁰ These events raise concerns over political stability as President-elect Asfura prepares to take power on 27 January with a weak congressional majority, a contested electoral mandate, and persisting security challenges.

Mexico: Violence escalates in Sinaloa, despite security actions and the arrest of criminal leaders

In 2025, the war between factions of the Sinaloa Cartel, which began in September 2024 following the arrest of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada, continued to drive elevated levels of violence. Sinaloa was the most violent state in 2025 and accounted for 17% of nationwide violence. In December, clashes between criminal groups increased compared to the previous month, particularly in the southern municipality of Escuinapa, where confrontations on 17 and 21 December resulted in at least six people killed and multiple roadblocks. Violence in the municipality intensified, which has been attributed to the Jalisco New Generation Cartel’s reported attempt to enter the state of Sinaloa from neighboring Nayarit state to support the Los Chapitos faction in its bid to challenge areas controlled by Los Mayos.¹¹

In response to violence in the state, the federal government deployed 330 military personnel between 20 and 22 December to reinforce local security forces.¹² Authorities also arrested two financial operators linked to Los Chapitos on 23 December: Mario Alfredo Lindoro Navidad and Mario Lindoro Elenes.¹³ The measures failed to halt gang violence; 32 events occurred in the final week of December, including drone strikes in Escuinapa on 26 and 28 December. The deployment of drones has become an increasingly common and deadly gang tactic. Drone strikes have been responsible for at least 50 deaths in 2025, accounting for a 35% increase in drone-strike fatalities compared to 2024.

Venezuela: US maritime seizures and drone strikes act as a prelude to Maduro’s capture

On 3 January, despite Nicolás Maduro’s expressed willingness to cooperate and negotiate an agreement to fight drug trafficking with the US,¹⁴ Washington launched a military operation in Venezuela, during which US forces captured him and his wife, Cilia Flores. The pair was taken to the US, where they face drug and weapons charges. Their capture marks the culmination of a series of escalatory measures by the US against Maduro’s government throughout December. 

On 10 December, US forces seized the oil tanker Skipper off the Venezuelan coast under sanctions enforcement — the first such capture of Venezuelan crude oil cargo amid broad pressure tactics targeting Caracas’s oil revenue sources.¹⁵ Following the incident, US authorities announced a total blockade on Venezuela‘s oil exports on 16 December, which they enforced through the subsequent seizure of several tankers in the Caribbean and even North Atlantic waters.¹⁶ 

In parallel with the targeting of Venezuela’s key economic assets, US forces stepped up military tactics as part of their stated campaign against drug trafficking. On 29 December, Trump publicly stated that US forces had struck a facility on Venezuelan soil, claiming it was used to load boats with drugs. This marked the first known US land strike as part of its intensified anti-narcotics campaign, a notable expansion of operational scope and prelude to Maduro’s capture.¹⁷ The attack is part of a broader campaign against alleged drug trafficking vessels in the Caribbean and Pacific. Since 2 September, the US has carried out over 30 strikes, which resulted in at least 114 people killed in 2025, including seven additional strikes conducted in the Pacific Ocean in December alone. 

For more, see the report on US hard power in Latin America and the Caribbean in ACLED’s Conflict Watchlist 2026.