Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: March 2026

Colombia: Military airstrike on ELN sparks retaliation in Norte de Santander 

On 23 February, the National Liberation Army (ELN) declared a unilateral ceasefire ahead of Colombia’s 8 March legislative elections. The declaration closed out a month of violent escalation in the country’s northeast.

On 4 February, military forces carried out an airstrike against the ELN in Tibú municipality, Norte de Santander, killing at least 10 ELN members. The strike came a day after a meeting between the Colombian and United States presidents on 3 February, where they de-escalated tensions and discussed closer coordination against drug traffickers.¹ The ELN retaliated by targeting the Morichal police station with explosives. These attacks contributed to a 55% increase in violence in the department in February compared to January. The security operation comes amid rising violence in Norte de Santander since January 2025, spurred by a turf war between the ELN and the 33rd Front Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia dissident faction (FARC). Hostilities intensified in December, when at least 250 people were displaced.²  

Despite security efforts, concerns are mounting over the impact of armed groups’ activity on the upcoming legislative elections: The Electoral Observation Mission identified several municipalities in the Catatumbo region as facing a high risk of violence during the elections.³ 

The risk extends beyond the Norte de Santander department: The Electoral Observation Mission has warned that 339 municipalities across the country are at risk of electoral violence.⁴ On 5 February, the ELN shot and killed two bodyguards of a senator and legislative candidate in Arauca. On 10 February, armed men abducted Indigenous Senator Aida Quilcué, who is running for re-election in Cauca, holding her for several hours.⁵ Despite the ELN’s unilateral ceasefire declaration, concerns over electoral security persist.

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Colombia. 

Cuba: Concerns over humanitarian crisis mount amid US oil blockade, prompting negotiations

In February, as part of its ongoing campaign in the Caribbean, the US maintained heightened pressure on the Cuban government to introduce political and economic reforms. The US operation in Venezuela and the subsequent seizure of oil tankers — a key source of Cuba’s energy export — has significantly affected the island’s access to oil. The US intercepted an oil tanker coming from Colombia near the Cuban shores on 13 February. The US further issued a decree on 29 January, threatening trade tariffs on countries supplying oil to Cuba, including Mexico. 

The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concerns over a humanitarian collapse due to deteriorating access to essential services exacerbated by deepening fuel shortages.⁶ Amid these fears, Mexico sent humanitarian assistance to Cuba on 8 and 24 February, and CARICOM agreed to send support at the end of the month. Meanwhile, on 25 February, the US government announced arrangements allowing limited oil supplies to private sector actors on the island. 

The relationship between Cuba and the US has remained especially tense throughout the month, with US President Donald Trump speaking of a potential “friendly takeover” of the island.⁷ Fears of further escalation rose on 25 February, after the Cuban coast guard exchanged fire with Cuban exiles on a speedboat originating from the US. The situation was, however, defused after US officials denied that the vessel was part of any US operation. 

Despite these tensions, both sides have signaled willingness to engage in negotiations: US Secretary of State Marco Rubio held backchannel talks with Raúl Castro’s grandson, and President Miguel Díaz-Canel has called for urgent economic and social reforms. Rubio also signaled openness to gradual reforms, likely motivated by the risks of regional destabilization, humanitarian collapse, regional destabilization, and migration flows to the US. 

Ecuador: Los Lobos and Los Lobos Box turf war drives an uptick in violence in El Oro

The turf war between Los Lobos gang and Los Lobos Box, an offshoot group that separated from its main umbrella, further deteriorated in February following months of escalation in the El Oro province. ACLED records 53 incidents of gang-related violence in the province, 71% more than in January. In a deadly example of the Los Lobos and Los Lobox Box rivalry, on 15 February, unidentified armed men traveling in a fake police patrol vehicle and wearing police uniforms killed four people in Puerto Bolívar, El Oro, including a high-ranking member of Los Lobos Box gang. The groups are fighting over control of criminal economies in El Oro province, a key hub for drug trafficking, illegal gold mining, and arms smuggling. 

Although the split occurred in mid-2024, tensions between the groups escalated in late 2025, illustrated by a deadly clash in the Machala prison in November and the killing of a Los Lobos Box gang leader in late December.⁸ The escalation illustrates the limits of President Daniel Noboa’s strategy to tackle gang violence, which he has tried to revitalize under a new security plan launched in late January. On 4 March, the US military’s Southern Command announced joint US-Ecuador operations to fight “narcoterrorists,” which include Los Choneros and Los Lobos, according to the US list of foreign terrorist organizations.⁹

 See more of ACLED’s coverage on Ecuador.

Haiti: Prime Minister Fils-Aimé leads the political transition while security efforts continue

On 7 February, the Transitional Presidential Council’s mandate expired, leaving Prime Minister Alix Dider Fils-Aimé to lead the country on his own until the elections. The transfer of full power to Fils-Aimé was marked by political disagreements. Members of the opposition had proposed alternative transition plans such as the formation of a new presidential college.¹⁰ Fearing further destabilization, the US endorsed Fils-Aimé as the sole head of state and further deployed US military vessels in Port-au-Prince Bay. Heightened US military pressure comes on the back of sanctions against several TPC members,¹¹ a move that Haitian political leaders have criticized as infringing on Haiti’s sovereignty.¹² Following his appointment, on 23 February, Fils-Aimé presented the Pact for Stability and Organization of Elections, setting a roadmap of his upcoming functions. Key opposition groups have, however, refused to sign, complicating moves toward elections at the end of August.¹³ 

Despite the political discord, security operations against gangs continued throughout February. especially in the northeast and southeast of the capital. The operations targeted the 400 Mawozo gang in Croix-des-Bouquet and Viv Ansanm's positions in Godet and Wynn Farm, Kenscoff. Security efforts also aimed to tackle increasing kidnappings in Delmas, likely stemming from gang efforts to secure revenues ahead of the deployment of the United Nations-backed Gang Suppression Force. The Gang Suppression Force, which replaces the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission, is an international security mission to restore security and humanitarian access. It aims to come into full force before the elections.

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Haiti.

Mexico: The CJNG leader’s killing triggers nationwide violence and raises concerns over criminal realignment

On 22 February, military forces fatally injured the leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes, known as El Mencho, during a security operation in Tapalpa, Jalisco state. The killing of El Mencho prompted further clashes between state forces and suspected CJNG members in several states, resulting in the death of at least 30 CJNG members and 28 security personnel, as well as the arrest of 176 suspected cartel members.¹⁴ These clashes included an incident in Puerto Vallarta following the prison break of 23 inmates, and a clash with military forces in El Grullo, where a CJNG second-in-command, “El Tuli,” was killed. The death of El Tuli came after he ordered roadblocks throughout the country.¹⁵ The cartel launched retaliatory actions, burning stores and banks facilities, as well as setting roadblocks using burned vehicles in at least 23 states. While incidents were concentrated in Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, and Zacatecas states — where the cartel holds consolidated territorial control — their wide geographic spread is illustrative of the CJNG’s broader territorial reach and coordination capacity.

The operation against the CJNG marks an escalation in security efforts under President Claudia Sheinbaum, which have included increased intelligence operations, extraditions of hundreds of criminals to the US, and confrontations with criminal groups. In 2025, clashes between security forces and armed groups increased by 26% compared to 2024, and have continued at a high rate during the first two months of 2026. The uptick is partly driven by pressure from the Trump administration to curb drug trafficking and migration flows; the US provided intelligence support for the operation targeting El Mencho.¹⁶ 

The removal of El Mencho has raised questions about the likelihood of the CJNG’s fragmentation. The cartel’s immediate response suggested unity and cohesion. Despite its relatively vertical structure, however, the CJNG has also relied on local criminal cells to expand. This raises the risk of a reconfiguration of criminal actors at the local level, particularly in conflict hotspots that have involved multiple actors, such as Michoacán, where the CJNG has allied with Los Viagras against the United Cartels. A weakening of the CJNG could further shift the balance of power in the ongoing Sinaloa Cartel internal conflict, in light of a reported CJNG-Los Chapitos alliance against El Mayo. 

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Mexico. 

Venezuela: The government signs amnesty law amid US pressure, raising hope for political opening

On 19 February, the National Assembly approved the amnesty law to release political prisoners.¹⁷ The law comes amid sustained demonstrations calling for freedom for detainees and an end to political repression, which started in January in the aftermath of US strikes and continued throughout February. During this period, ACLED records nearly 460 demonstrations, over half of which are related to the release of political prisoners. Within two months of former President Nicolás Maduro’s arrest, demonstrations reached nearly two-thirds of the total recorded for all of 2025. This suggests a partial reopening of the political space, as public demonstrations and expressions of opposition are increasing after an intense wave of state repression that had curtailed them under Maduro.¹⁸ 

Yet, human rights organizations have warned that the Amnesty Law fails to adequately address the plight of political prisoners. They argue it excludes key categories of detainees, such as military and police officers; people who have promoted or acted in favor of foreign armed intervention; and those accused of corruption or drug trafficking.¹⁹ Further, it requires detainees to appear before the same judicial institutions that had politically persecuted them.²⁰ The re-arrest of opposition leader Juan Pablo Guanipa on 8 February, eight hours after his release, also illustrated the conditional and reversible nature of Venezuela’s political opening.²¹

These developments unfold amid ongoing US military pressure on governments in the region, aimed at countering drug trafficking networks and foreign influence. The US continued airstrikes on vessels accused of drug trafficking in the Caribbean and Pacific: At least seven additional strike events took place in February.

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Venezuela.