Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: May 2026

Colombia: Violence surges in southwestern departments ahead of the presidential elections

Between 24 and 28 April, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)’s General Central Staff (EMC) dissidents launched a series of attacks in Cauca and Valle del Cauca. These included a drone strike in Timba using around 15 explosive devices, bombings of nearby military battalions in Cali and Palmira, and the detonation of a high-powered explosive device on the Panamericana Highway that killed at least 21 civilians. The EMC offensive contributed to a 44% monthly increase in reported fatalities related to armed group violence in Colombia. 

The escalation likely comes in response to heightened military operations against FARC dissidents in recent months, including an airstrike that killed senior dissidents in López, Cauca, early in April. The attack also likely aimed to taint President Gustavo Petro’s image and highlight the shortcomings of his Total Peace strategy. The attacks began the same day as Petro’s meeting with Venezuela’s Delcy Rodríguez on bilateral security cooperation and came a month before Colombia’s presidential election. The violence could impact the performance of the incumbent party’s presidential candidate, Iván Cepeda, as security remains a top issue for voters. 

As Colombia prepares for the first round of presidential elections, scheduled for 31 May, the EMC attacks have also raised questions about the state’s ability to guarantee the security needed for a credible electoral process. The government deployed 2,800 soldiers to Cauca and apprehended an EMC leader in early May,¹ suggesting that more violence, this time between security forces and FARC dissidents, is likely to escalate in the coming weeks.

Guatemala: Gang turf wars drive an increase in violence in the Guatemala department

Guatemala City was the site of an outbreak of violence, amid an escalation that authorities have attributed to the turf war between Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Barrio 18, and the Los Caradura gang over the control of extortion and drug peddling activities.² In a particularly deadly incident, on 20 April, two MS-13 members killed six people in a restaurant in Guatemala City, including a woman who was identified as a local leader of a drug-dealing group. Violence also spiked in municipalities near the capital city, including Mixco and San Pedro Sacatepéquez, where a clash between six MS-13 and Barrio 18 members resulted in three reported fatalities. Overall, in April, there were more than double the number of violent events recorded the previous month, and triple the related fatalities. 

The violence in Guatemala City comes amid a decrease in gang-related violence in the department in February and March, following the instatement of a 30-days nationwide state of emergency on 18 January and subsequent two states of prevention. In response to the escalation of gang rivalries in April, the government has continued to rely on this security strategy. On 21 April, it imposed a new state of prevention to expand state forces' powers to carry out security operations in Guatemala, Escuintla, Izabal, Huehuetenango, and San Marcos departments, and further extended it on 6 May.³ While these measures may temporarily disrupt gang violence, the recent uptick in gang rivalries has highlighted the limitations of emergency powers, making any lasting violence reduction unlikely.

The escalation of violence comes at a crucial time for the country, as President Bernardo Arévalo is set to appoint a new attorney general in May to replace María Consuelo Porras, a figure who has obstructed, rather than supported, his government and has been sanctioned by the United States for obstructing and undermining anti-corruption investigations.⁴

Haiti: Viv Ansanm gangs clash over Plaine du Cul-de-Sac and push into Sud-Est ahead of GSF deployment and elections

Between 15 and 22 April, rival Viv Ansanm-affiliated gangs clashed in Plaine du Cul-de-Sac, in the north of the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. At least 14 people were killed in the violence. The Chyen Mechan, Taliban, and 400 Mawozo gangs clashed with the Pierre 6 and Terre Noire gangs over the control of the area, long coveted by gangs as a strategic crossroads connecting the capital to the country’s north and east. Its dense population makes it a high-value hideout from law enforcement operations and a target for generating revenues.⁵ 

Gang-on-gang clashes within Viv Ansanm are not unusual, and these clashes are unlikely to lead to the alliance’s collapse. However, they highlight fragile territorial delimitation as gangs race to secure turf ahead of the elections and the full deployment of the Gang Suppression Force (GSF), with Chad deploying 400 of 1,500 pledged personnel in May.⁶

Elsewhere, gangs launched incursions in new territories, including in Macary and Seguin in the Sud-Est department, where violence has remained sporadic. Suspected Viv Ansanm members targeted a police station and clashed with security forces, resulting in at least 38 reported deaths, a record high for this department. Although security forces retook control, the spread of violence to new departments remains likely in the coming months as security operations in Port-au-Prince push gangs to seek shelter outside the capital.

Honduras: Cartel del Diablo attacks drive an increase in violence in the Yoro department

The Cartel del Diablo gang has emerged as a key violent actor in the area between Yoro, Comayagua, and Francisco Morazán in 2026, as it seeks to control drug markets, extortion, and drug trafficking corridors in rural areas that connect the capital to Honduras’ northern border.⁷ Its rise has contributed to an increase in gang violence in the Yoro department since the beginning of the year. Neighboring departments affected by gang and drug trafficking activities, such as Colón and Atlántida, have experienced a similar trend. President Nasry Asfura, who took office on 27 January, has faced pressure to address the violence. His security minister, Gerzón Velásquez, has attributed the trend to the reconfiguration of organized crime in the country, as traffickers face greater difficulties in accessing drugs by sea due to US operations in the Caribbean.⁸

On 20 April, suspected members of the Cartel del Diablo gang kidnapped an evangelical priest, killed him, and left his body in Yorito, Yoro. The crime, the latest of a string of violent attacks by Cartel del Diablo since February 2026, sparked public outcry. In response, the government launched a series of security operations to dismantle Cartel del Diablo, leading to the arrest of at least three of its members between late April and early May, including its logistics leader.⁹ Sustained pressure on the group may scale down its operations in the short term, but the rapid rise of Cartel del Diablo gang violence illustrates how the emergence or reconfiguration of organized crime groups will likely trigger new escalations of violence against civilians in rural departments, particularly if the groups continue to look for new trafficking routes or sources of income.

Mexico: Ongoing high-profile operations lead to the arrest of a CJNG regional leader as US-Mexico tensions mount

On 27 April, marine forces conducted simultaneous operations in Nayarit and Jalisco states that led to the arrest of Audias Flores Sila, known as “El Jardinero,” the regional leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) and among the likely successors to El Mencho.¹⁰ They also arrested financial operator César Alejandro Villaseñor Olivares, known as “El Güero Contra.” The operations did not result in armed confrontations. Still, the cartel responded with roadblocks, albeit fewer than during the cartel’s coordinated response after El Mencho’s arrest, and limited to Nayarit, likely reflecting El Jardinero’s regional power base. 

Mexican security forces conducted similar high-profile operations throughout the month, including the failed apprehension in Sinaloa of Aureliano Guzmán Loera, the brother of El Chapo and leader of the Gente del Guano faction of the Sinaloa Cartel. Since the beginning of the year, Mexican security forces have stepped up these operations, with the support of US intelligence, which was key to locating El Mencho and El Jardinero.¹¹ 

Although the operations represent a tactical blow to powerful criminal organizations such as the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel, they are unlikely to significantly weaken them as long as their financial structure, territorial networks, and logistic capacities remain intact. Still, the strategy carries a high risk of further shifting the power balance among criminal organizations and leading to factional violence. The taking down of cartel leaders contributes to fragmentation and internal competition among factions, as seen during the fracturing of the Sinaloa Cartel in 2024, while spurring rival groups to take over new territories. 

At the same time, US-Mexico relations have grown more tense: President Claudia Sheinbaum publicly reaffirmed Mexico's sovereignty over domestic security matters after two CIA agents died in an anti-drug operation in Chihuahua. The incident revealed the agents’ participation in law enforcement operations alongside state security forces without federal authorities’ knowledge. While the US and Mexico have cooperated and shared intelligence, the agents' presence in the raid raised questions about the extent of US activities beyond the scope authorized by the federal government. Meanwhile, a US indictment of Mexican officials it accused of ties to criminal organizations, including Sinaloa’s governor and members of the ruling National Regeneration Movement,¹² is likely to further strain relations between the two countries and could reignite a US push for unilateral military operations on Mexican soil. 

Peru: Concerns loom over electoral unrest amid delayed presidential election results and political fragmentation

On 12 April, Peruvians went to the polls to elect their next president and members of congress in complex elections marked by the introduction of the first bicameral legislative body in more than three decades and a slate of 35 presidential candidates.¹³ Logistical setbacks, including ballot shortages, forced a two-day extension of the vote in some areas and delayed publication of the first-round results to mid-May. Popular Force candidate Keiko Fujimori is leading and projected to compete in the second round of voting in June, but the narrow margin between left-wing candidate Roberto Sánchez (Together for Peru) and ultra-right Rafael López Aliaga (Popular Renewal)¹⁴ — who are trailing far behind Fujimori — has led Aliaga to claim electoral fraud, although he has not provided evidence.

In response to the alleged irregularities, top electoral official Piero Corvatto resigned on 21 April, despite electoral observation missions finding no indications of fraud. The electoral process remained largely peaceful, despite voter attempts to enter closed polling stations in Lima and protests involving supporters of Popular Renewal and parties eliminated in the first round to demand new elections or faster recounts in Lima and Tacna.¹⁵ ACLED also records demonstrations outside the house of the head of Peru’s electoral court. The official decried the demonstrations as attempts to intimidate and influence the results of an IT audit conducted by the institution and its final delivery of the first-round results. 

Despite the low levels of recorded violence during voting, unrest and violence around the announcement of the first-round results, and in the runoff, remain likely. Additional demonstrations and clashes between party supporters can be expected, compounded by fraud allegations by losing candidates and rising distrust in political and electoral institutions after the first round. Additionally, a runoff pitting far-right Fujimori against left-wing Sánchez could spark tensions reminiscent of the 2021 Fujimori-Pedro Castillo contest that led to large-scale demonstrations.