Latin America and the Caribbean Overview: November 2025

Brazil: A security operation against the CV leaves at least 121 dead in Rio de Janeiro

On 28 October, Rio de Janeiro’s Civil and Military Police launched Operation Containment in the Penha and Alemão complexes, strongholds of the Red Command (CV) criminal organization. The operation resulted in at least 121 reported fatalities, 113 arrests, and the seizure of 93 rifles,¹ making it one of the deadliest operations in Brazil’s history. Authorities initiated the raid to arrest CV leaders, including Edgar Alves de Andrade, the main target, and to weaken the criminal organization, whose expansion has contributed to rising violence across Rio de Janeiro state and beyond. Despite arrests of drug traffickers from Bahia, Ceará, Amazonas, and Pernambuco states,² Andrade managed to escape.³ In Rio de Janeiro state, the operation drove a more than three times increase in reported fatalities resulting from clashes between security forces and non-state armed groups compared to September, marking the highest monthly toll recorded in such clashes since ACLED began coverage of Brazil in 2018. The high death toll has reignited concerns over abuses by security forces and triggered demonstrations demanding accountability. 

The governor of Rio de Janeiro, Cláudio Castro, hailed the operation a success. He called for a broader “war on drugs” and fight against “narco-terrorism,”⁴ a framing that has gained traction given the United States’ influence in regional security. Yet, Brazilian federal authorities have rejected a US proposal to classify drug trafficking gangs as terrorist organizations,⁵ highlighting political tensions between federal and state governments.

It remains uncertain whether the operation will effectively curb violence. During the raids, the CV displayed significant firepower by deploying explosive-laden drones and erecting roadblocks.

Caribbean and Pacific waters: The US expands strikes against criminal groups to the Pacific

In October, US forces escalated airstrikes against vessels it alleges are used by criminal groups for drug trafficking in the Caribbean. These airstrikes form part of its counter-terrorism approach to fight organized crime, which has heightened diplomatic tensions in the region. Previously concentrated in the Caribbean Sea, the campaign expanded to the Pacific Ocean on 21 October when an airstrike in international waters off the Colombian coast left two people dead. Several more strikes followed in the subsequent days. Across September and October, ACLED records at least 61 reported fatalities in strikes across the Caribbean and the Pacific. A coordinated operation targeting four vessels off Mexico’s coast on 27 October is the deadliest strike to date and resulted in 14 reported fatalities, leading Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum to publicly decry the strike.⁶ 

In addition to an increasing number of airstrikes, the US deployed destroyers off Venezuela’s coast for joint military exercises with Trinidad and Tobago — a move viewed as an attempt to pressure Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro to step down. In response, Maduro accused US President Donald Trump of fabricating “a new eternal war.”⁷ Further, Venezuelan authorities declared Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar persona non grata and suspended a gas deal with the Caribbean island nation.⁸

The operation also strained US-Colombia relations. President Gustavo Petro condemned the strikes, calling them extrajudicial killings.⁹ This prompted Trump to accuse Petro of being an “illegal drug dealer.”¹⁰ The US added Petro, members of his family, and Colombia’s interior minister to its Treasury Department’s Specially Designated Narcotics Traffickers list.¹¹ It also announced partial cuts to anti-narcotics assistance,¹² a move that is likely to impact Colombia’s armed forces’ capacity to fight armed groups. 

Ecuador: CONAIE demonstrations over fuel subsidy end after deadly clashes with security forces

Nationwide demonstrations led by the National Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) against the end of a fuel subsidy continued through October, prompting President Daniel Noboa to declare a state of emergency in 10 provinces on 5 October. Mobilization almost doubled in October compared to September amid escalating tensions. Demonstrators and authorities clashed, including during an attack on a presidential caravan on 7 October in El Tambo, Cañar province.¹³ On 14 October, anti-riot operations further led to the killing of two demonstrators in Imbabura and Loja provinces, raising the total fatality count since mobilization started in mid-September to three. In addition, dozens of demonstrators and security officers were reportedly injured during clashes, and at least 142 people were arrested.¹⁴

After a month of mobilizations and despite failing to reach an agreement with the government, CONAIE called for an end to the national strike on 22 October amid fears of further repression and abuses by state forces.¹⁵ Although Noboa suspended the state of emergency, human rights organizations condemned the government’s use of excessive force and arbitrary detentions.¹⁶ As Ecuador prepares for a constitutional reform referendum on 16 November, rights violations raise broader concerns that the executive may seek to weaken institutional checks, including the power of the Constitutional Court, which has previously blocked several of Noboa’s reforms. 

Haiti: Gang attacks expand in Artibonite, while drone strikes fail to deter gang activity in Port-au-Prince

A year after the Gran Grif massacre in Pont Sondé, gangs pressed their territorial campaign further across multiple areas in the Artibonite, leading to at least 51 reported fatalities in October — more than double the previous month. Gran Grif pursued its own incursions by setting up barricades between Verrettes and Pont-Sondé and killing at least 12 people between 4 and 9 October. Meanwhile, the Taliban and 400 Mawozo gangs were active along National Road 1 near Montrouis and expanded operations along Road 11, launching their first offensive in Desarmes.

In response to increasing gang activity, police intensified anti-gang operations in Artibonite, supported by self-defense groups and reinforcements from the United Nations-backed Gang Suppression Force (GSF), whose mandate began on 2 October. The GSF’s capacity remains limited, despite the US delivering 20 armored vehicles and Guatemala pledging to send 150 military officers on 22 December.¹⁷ Although police pushed back gang offensives in Desarmes, at least four communities remain under gang control, and more than 8,900 people fled Verrettes in October.¹⁸ 

In the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, gangs launched several attacks, including in Turgeau and Pacot, prompting Doctors Without Borders to close one of its hospitals.¹⁹ Security forces responded to gang incursions across the capital with drone strikes attributed to a special task force linked to Erik Prince’s Vectus Global. As questions grow over the effectiveness of such operations, Prince reportedly told the Transitional Presidential Council that he intends to expand air and maritime deployments to reinforce security efforts.²⁰

Honduras: Targeted attacks against candidates increase a month before the general elections

In October, targeted attacks against political figures continued as gunmen carried out three separate attacks against candidates running in the upcoming general election on 30 November. Thus far in 2025, ACLED records about 30 violent incidents targeting political figures, including civil servants, their relatives, and party supporters, similar to levels recorded between January and October ahead of the 2021 elections. On 20 October, armed men shot and killed an opposition National Party of Honduras (PNH) councilor candidate in Trujillo, Colón. Mayoral candidates for the PNH and the Liberal Party of Honduras survived separate shooting attacks carried out in Yoro and Lempira departments during campaigning activities.

The upcoming elections are taking place amid tensions between political groups vying for control of institutions and local resources. On 29 October, the attorney general leaked audio recordings of the PNH-affiliated head of the National Electoral Council planning to destabilize the elections by declaring an early opposition winner and then delaying the transport of electoral material.²¹ A PNH congress member also involved in the recordings has claimed that these are fake.²² Ruling party lawmakers also installed a temporary congressional body to assume legislative duties ahead of general elections, provoking fears that the body seeks to replace officials in electoral institutions.²³ Finally, the head of the army requested that electoral institutions grant the military access to the tally sheets for the presidential election, raising concerns that such involvement could undermine electoral independence and recalling controversies over the military’s role in the transporting of electoral material during the primary elections held in March.

Peru: Jeri takes office amid concerns over human rights backsliding

On 10 October, Peru’s congress voted to remove President Dina Boluarte, formerly affiliated with the left-wing Perú Libre party, for “permanent moral incapacity.”²⁴ The decision came amid escalating tensions since Boluarte succeeded Pedro Castillo following his impeachment in 2022 and a record-low approval rating driven by rising criminality and a crackdown on anti-government demonstrations that has left dozens dead. José Jeri, the head of congress and a member of the center-right Somos Perú party, was sworn in as Boluarte’s successor on 10 October. However, he has faced continued anti-government mobilization and narrowly escaped a debate over a motion of censure²⁵ after police reportedly killed one demonstrator on 15 October during a demonstration calling for the government to curb insecurity. The incident raises concern that Jeri’s interim administration could contribute to the human rights backsliding initiated under Boluarte, including through state abuses during law enforcement operations. 

Shortly after being sworn in, Jeri declared a war on organized crime,²⁶ launched operations in prisons,²⁷ and declared a 30-day state of emergency on 21 October in the provinces of Lima and Callao. Thus far in 2025, the number of attacks against civilians perpetrated by state forces already exceeds that recorded in 2024. Jeri’s latest call for a tough-on-crime response could further intensify this trend, especially given signs that oversight mechanisms are weakening. This includes amnesty for security personnel accused of human rights violations during Peru’s internal conflict, as approved by Boluarte,²⁸ and a government proposal under her administration to withdraw Peru from the Inter-American Human Rights System.²⁹ 

With Jeri expected to remain in power until the general elections in April 2026, his emphasis on hardline security policies is likely to persist amid public pressure to curb rising crime, but risks entrenching state violence and shrinking civic space.