Monthly regional updates Update

Middle East Overview: April 2026

On the heels of the US-Iran two-week ceasefire agreement, ACLED experts detail the impacts in the region, including in Lebanon, the Gulf, Yemen, Israel, and Iraq — and their outlook on what's to come.

8 April 2026

Authors: Luca Nevola

Senior Analyst, Yemen and the Gulf

Nasser Khdour

Middle East Assistant Research Manager

Muaz Al Abdullah

Middle East Research Manager

Gulf: Iranian retaliatory strikes target energy infrastructure

Since the onset of the conflict, Iranian retaliatory strikes have spared no Gulf country, targeting US facilities, energy infrastructure — including oil fields and processing sites — as well as ports, airports, residential areas, and landmarks, resulting in over 660 events and at least 41 people killed. The United Arab Emirates is the country most heavily targeted and has suffered the largest share of successful impacts, while Kuwait recorded the highest number of casualties. Oman, which maintains close diplomatic channels with Tehran, was the least targeted.

Overall, Iranian attacks on the Gulf have declined: Average daily attacks in week five of the war dropped significantly compared to the first week. In the same period, the proportion of strikes that were intercepted increased from 46% to over 70%, reflecting a reduced number of attacks and increased predictability of Iranian targeting. However, strikes specifically targeting Gulf energy infrastructure followed a retaliatory pattern — peaking both at the onset of the conflict and after Israeli strikes on Tehran refineries on 7 March and South Pars on 18 March. They then dropped after US President Donald Trump announced that negotiations were ongoing. In a later escalation toward the end of the month, the Iranian regime targeted aluminum factories in Bahrain and the UAE, in retaliation for Israeli strikes on steel plants in Iran. In the week leading up to the declaration of the ceasefire on 8 April, attacks intensified in the Gulf. Iranian strikes hit a desalination and power plant and the al-Ahmadi refinery in Kuwait, and a data center in Bahrain.

The conflict prompted several Gulf states to tighten domestic security. Waves of arrests in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE targeted individuals allegedly linked to the Axis of Resistance. Authorities in Qatar and the UAE also detained civilians for filming and sharing footage of Iranian strikes, while Bahrain carried out arrests linked to expressions of support for Iran, amid pro-Iran protests and demands to remove foreign military bases.¹

Iranian strikes harden GCC stance toward Tehran

Yemen and the Gulf Senior Analyst Luca Nevola

In the face of Iran’s sustained attacks, Gulf states have prioritized defense and damage control, advocating for an end to the war and a return to the status quo to preserve long-term coexistence with Iran.² This stance and accompanying reluctance to engage Iran militarily has persisted despite mounting economic costs. Projections suggest that, should the conflict continue through April, Qatar and Kuwait could see GDP contractions of up to 14%, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE may face declines of around 3% and 5%, respectively.³

Yet, Israel’s strike on the South Pars gas field — shared by Iran and Qatar⁴ — and Iran’s subsequent targeting of Gulf energy infrastructure marked a turning point in this approach. Iran’s retaliation on Gulf energy infrastructure on 18 and 19 March included a major strike on the Pearl GTL facility in Ras Laffan that knocked out roughly 17% of Qatar’s energy exports.⁵ The escalation prompted a diplomatic rupture between Doha and Tehran,⁶ pushing Qatar to step back from direct mediation and leaving Oman as the Gulf state most actively engaged in diplomacy.⁷

Speculation over possible Gulf intervention — particularly by the UAE and Kuwait — intensified after Trump issued a two-day ultimatum to reopen the Strait of Hormuz on 21 March. But Iran met the US’ threats to target Iranian power plants with warnings of symmetrical retaliation against the Gulf, pushing Washington toward negotiations.

Gulf states continue to favor de-escalation, and met the declaration of a two-week ceasefire on 8 April positively, even if the extent of Iran’s concessions remains unclear. Diplomatic statements welcomed the ceasefire as a positive development, but emphasized the return of the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and the cessation of attacks not only by Iran, but its proxies too.⁸

However, the Gulf’s position hardened in the run-up to the ceasefire announcement. There is growing convergence around the need to secure meaningful concessions from Tehran — particularly on its nuclear program, long-range capabilities, and control of the Strait of Hormuz.⁹ Some countries, like Qatar, even began demanding reparations from Iran for attacks targeting them, hinting at the Gulf’s intention to extract their own concessions from Iran separate from any deal with the US.¹⁰

Meanwhile, Iranian attacks continued even after the ceasefire was declared. Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE all reported attacks throughout the morning of 8 April 8 — well past the ceasefire’s official start — in response to the bombing of the Lavan oil refinery in Iran.¹¹

Iran: Strikes widened beyond core military and security targets before the ceasefire

Over the course of the war, ACLED records more than 3,000 instances of US and Israeli strikes across all of Iran’s 31 provinces. Geographically, Israeli strikes focused mainly on Tehran, its surrounding provinces, and Isfahan. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) also hit the western frontier heavily early in the war and later expanded northward, while US operations remained concentrated mainly in the south. US and Israeli targeting centered primarily on Iran’s military apparatus, including air force and missile-related facilities, underground infrastructure, and naval assets, alongside assassinations of political and military figures. Israeli strikes also targeted the regime’s domestic coercive apparatus early in the war, including Basij, police, and intelligence-linked units, but such attacks became less common later in the month.

Civilian harm has been serious, but much of it has remained localized around military, security, and state-linked targets rather than reflecting a broader pattern of indiscriminate urban bombardment. For much of the war, strikes on industry and critical civilian infrastructure were relatively limited. But in the days before the ceasefire, the campaign moved into a more expansive direction. Strikes increasingly pointed to a greater willingness to hit Iran’s economic and infrastructural base, even if many of these sites were still framed as dual-use. This included strikes on petrochemical facilities, alongside attacks on steel and metals plants, suggesting growing pressure on Iran’s industrial backbone. The US and Israel also carried out some strikes on railways, bridges, ports, and airports. Even after the ceasefire took effect, oil and petrochemical facilities on Lavan and Siri islands were struck, with Israel denying responsibility,¹² underlining how fragile the pause remains.

See our live Iran war page for daily updates on the conflict unfolding in Iran and the wider region.

The war in Iran has paused, but the conflict’s core strategic questions remain unresolved

Middle East Senior Analyst

More than five weeks after the start of the war in Iran, the US-Israeli campaign has stepped back from the brink of a more dangerous escalatory phase, but only into a fragile and conditional pause. After Trump threatened strikes on Iran’s infrastructure, the warring parties agreed to a two-week ceasefire tied to the resumption of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

This shift underscores that sustained military pressure has not produced the political outcome Washington and Jerusalem sought. Despite significant damage to Iran’s military capabilities, leadership, and key sectors of its economy, Tehran has entered this pause projecting endurance under overwhelming force, using the Strait of Hormuz as leverage, while showing no sign of internal unraveling. The far-reaching aims that appeared to underpin the war at the outset — ending Iran’s enrichment program, removing its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, and imposing significant curbs on its ballistic missile program — have not been achieved, despite evident US and Israeli tactical gains. What has thus far been secured instead is a controlled reopening of the Strait of Hormuz — a waterway that was not closed before the war — and the resumption of difficult negotiations in which Tehran may hold more leverage than its adversaries had expected.

The upcoming Islamabad talks, reportedly to be led by US Vice President JD Vance and Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, will open with significant gaps still separating the two sides over the terms of any lasting arrangement. It remains to be seen what Israel, which continues to see the Islamic Republic as a strategic threat, will consider as an acceptable negotiated outcome if diplomacy falls short of meaningfully rolling back Tehran’s core nuclear and military capabilities. Its support for the current pause is likely tactical rather than a sign of any change in its long-term goals.

For the regime, even if it secures a longer-term cessation of hostilities, the harder test may come afterward at home. The Islamic Republic will emerge from a war in a far more strained domestic environment, facing a heavier reconstruction burden, deeper pressure on energy and industrial output, and an economy already weakened by sanctions and years of mismanagement. Damage to major gas, petrochemical, steel, and other industrial sites will make recovery slow and difficult, while a less permissive regional financial environment — especially in the Gulf — is narrowing the channels Iran has long used to cushion sanctions pressure. Unless Tehran secures meaningful economic relief through negotiations, these pressures are likely to deepen. At the same time, the regime is hardening politically, doubling down on repression. That may help contain unrest in the short term, but it is unlikely to ease pre-existing grievances or stabilize the relationship between the state and wider society. The more important question may be not whether the system survives the war itself, but whether it can absorb the economic, social, and political pressures that follow.

Iraq: Attacks expand as Iraq becomes a more active front

Over the first month of the Iran conflict, Iraq shifted from a secondary zone of confrontation between US forces and pro-Iran militias to a much more active front in the wider regional conflict. In March, ACLED records more than 80 drone strike and shelling events carried out by different pro-Iranian militias, including the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI). Many more were intercepted. In over 20 events, US-linked facilities across Iraq were struck.

The scope of these attacks expanded to include energy infrastructure in northern Iraq, such as the Lanaz refinery in Erbil and the Sarsang oil field in Duhok. Pro-Iran militias also struck Syrian military bases, including Qasrak and al-Tanf, the latter of which hosted US forces before they withdrew in February 2026.¹³

The US has responded with around 100 airstrikes against Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) positions. Notably, US forces targeted Kataib Hezbollah and the Badr Organization positions, both of which are formally integrated into the Iraqi military but retain operational autonomy. The US response suggests it views these PMF factions as operationally linked to the groups publicly claiming responsibility for recent militia attacks. That places the Iraqi government in a difficult position, exposing the limits of state control over armed groups nominally under its authority at a time of domestic political uncertainty.

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Iraq.

Israel: Iran and Hezbollah continue strikes on Israel before the ceasefire

Iran and Hezbollah, which joined the war on 2 March, launched more than 850 missile and drone attacks on Israel during the month of March. Each side was responsible for a similar share of total firing incidents. Despite sharp daily fluctuations in Iran’s retaliatory attacks, incidents declined in the final third of the month, to intensify anew in the first week of April.

In the second week of March, Iran increased its use of cluster munition warheads. These missiles, which release dozens of small munitions, have changed Israel’s interception policy: They are less likely to cause harm if civilians are in shelters, so Israeli air defenses have chosen not to intercept some attacks.¹⁴ Overall, around 15% of Iranian missile attacks in March resulted in people killed or injured, another 17% caused property damage, and the rest were either intercepted or landed in open areas.

Iran’s missile attacks remained focused on highly populated areas of Israel, especially Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Though strikes have also expanded toward northern and southern areas, mainly targeting key energy and industrial infrastructure. Strike targets included the oil refinery in Haifa; the Dimona area, where Israel’s nuclear facility is located; a petrochemical plant in the industrial zone of Neot Hovav; and a power plant in the Hadera area. This pattern points to reciprocal targeting as Iran appears to be responding to Israeli strikes on a similar type of facilities inside Iran.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah relied on a mix of missiles and drones while mainly targeting the northern areas of Israel. Although these attacks caused less damage and fewer casualties than Iran’s, at least 23 of the strikes resulted in fatalities and injuries among Israeli civilians and soldiers, with at least three deaths recorded. Hezbollah’s attacks maintained pressure on northern Israel, however, forcing Israel to use air defense systems and requiring it to spread its resources across multiple fronts. In some cases, Hezbollah attacks appeared to have been coordinated with longer-range Iranian strikes.¹⁵

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Israel.

Lebanon: Israeli attacks intensify despite Iran ceasefire

In March, political violence involving Israeli military forces in Lebanon intensified. Violence in the country reached its highest levels since the November 2024 ceasefire, with over 2,300 recorded events. Around 100 airstrikes hit Beirut and its southern suburbs, targeting high-rise buildings and sites linked to Hezbollah, including command centers, infrastructure, communication equipment, commanders, IRGC liaison units, and financial institutions such as Al-Qard Al-Hassan. In southern Lebanon, Israel’s strikes focused on al-Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun, and Tyre, also destroying bridges along the Litani River. The IDF also issued evacuation calls south of the Zahrani River and in Beirut’s southern suburbs, displacing over 1 million people.¹⁶

Meanwhile, Israeli ground forces advanced into southern Lebanon, reaching up to 8 kilometers north of the Israeli border in some areas.¹⁷ Nearly 45 armed clashes between the IDF and Hezbollah took place across several locations. Most clashes concentrated in the eastern sector of southern Lebanon, especially around al-Khiam, Taybeh, and Deir Siriane. Clashes were also recorded in the western sector near Ras al-Naqoura, as well as in the central area of Bint Jbeil. The majority of confrontations between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, though, took the form of remote attacks, as Hezbollah targeted advancing troops with missiles, drones, and anti-tank rockets.

Since the start of the war on 2 March, Hezbollah has reportedly killed at least 10 Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon, including four killed in close-range clashes in Beit Lif on 30 March about four km from the Israel border.¹⁸ Israeli forces also claimed that they killed over 1,000 Hezbollah operatives over the same period,¹⁹ with total Lebanese fatalities reaching over 1,300.²⁰

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Lebanon.

Israel’s security zone in southern Lebanon risks a longer conflict

Middle East Assistant Research Manager Nasser Khdour

After the ceasefire was announced, Israel launched its largest wave of airstrikes since the operation began in March.²¹ The ceasefire reached between US and Iran has not stopped operations in southern Lebanon, where Israel seems set on continuing its campaign. Israel continues to treat Lebanon as separate from the regional conflict, making any meaningful de-escalation uncertain. Israel’s goal has been to push Hezbollah away from southern Lebanon, degrade its ability to target Israeli forces with anti-tank missiles or to fire rockets into northern Israel, and to destroy buildings in villages near the border.²² to maintain the buffer zone it has sought since the start of the conflict.

In parallel, the operations have created pressure beyond the battlefield. Large parts of the population in southern Lebanon remain displaced, with around 600,000 people forced to leave, most of them from Shiite communities.²³ This suggests that Israel is seeking to combine military pressure with social and political pressure on Hezbollah, the civilian population, and the Lebanese state in an effort to force disarmament.

Maintaining a buffer zone may allay Israeli concerns over the inability of the Lebanese government and army to disarm Hezbollah or prevent it from maintaining a presence in the south. However, a continued buffer zone is likely to work in Hezbollah’s favor politically. It gives the group grounds to sustain its resistance narrative and retain its weapons in the face of an ongoing Israeli presence. This remains important as much of Hezbollah’s infrastructure north of the Litani River remains intact, and it can fire toward Israel from deeper inside Lebanon, including areas north of the Litani and the Bekaa Valley.²⁴ Additionally, Hezbollah has redeployed its elite units to southern Lebanon and can rely on decentralized cells, ambush tactics, and anti-tank weapons to raise Israel’s cost.²⁵

A prolonged buffer zone might therefore sustain both the justification for continued Israeli operations and Hezbollah’s armed role despite the ceasefire with Iran.

Yemen: The Houthis prepare for Red Sea activity

The Houthis entered the Iran conflict with several strikes on Israeli territory in late March and early April, beginning with two attacks on 28 March. The first, a barrage of ballistic missiles, targeted military sites in Israel’s southern Negev region. The second, involving cruise missiles and drones, aimed at military and critical infrastructure. Both were intercepted by Israeli forces. A third drone attack was intercepted on 30 March, though the Houthis never claimed it, while on 1 April they claimed a fourth attack — coordinated with Hezbollah and Iran. The Houthis claimed two more attacks, both involving missiles and drones, on 4 and 6 April.

Throughout March, the Houthis appeared to be preparing for potential intervention in the Red Sea. By mid-month, they reportedly activated a central operations room to coordinate maritime forces, drone and missile capabilities, and intelligence. In parallel, they mobilized launch platforms along the Red Sea coast and prepared sea mines for deployment, while Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) advisers reportedly arrived in Sanaa.²⁶ Domestically, more than 300 pro-Iran demonstrations took place across over 100 locations in Houthi-held areas.

Front lines remained relatively quiet, with limited flare-ups in Abyan and Marib. In Marib, a Houthi drone strike on the Harib front followed the deployment of Shabwa Defense Forces to replace Southern Giants Brigades units, part of a broader restructuring of the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG)’s forces.

The Houthis’ entry into the conflict — combined with the end of the United Nations mission in al-Hudayda²⁷ — has fueled renewed speculation about a potential IRG offensive to retake the Red Sea port.²⁸

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Yemen.

The Houthis edge into the conflict, signaling red lines

Yemen and the Gulf Senior Analyst Luca Nevola

On 27 March, the Houthis announced their entry into the Iran conflict.²⁹ Their delayed intervention — more than a month after the conflict began — raises questions about their strategic calculus and next steps.

Throughout the war, Houthi rhetoric has remained largely consistent. The group has expressed solidarity with Iran while signaling that direct involvement would depend on developments on the ground. Yet, several potential tipping points failed to trigger intervention. Only once has Abdulmalik al-Houthi escalated rhetorically, saying “our fingers are on the trigger” on 5 March,³⁰ when the USS Gerald Ford was nearing the Red Sea.³¹

The timing of Houthi intervention — amid negotiation efforts — aligns with the group’s past behavior.³² Their threat appears aimed at constraining US-Israeli escalation while maximizing pressure on Washington to extract concessions. If talks beyond the ceasefire succeed, the Houthis can claim to have contributed to ending the conflict on favorable terms for Iran and the Axis of Resistance. Otherwise, they retain the option to escalate gradually, with Red Sea attacks as a further step.

The 27 March announcement signals a conditional entry into the conflict. For the first time, the Houthis are setting explicit red lines: Attacks will follow if “any other alliance” joins the war — a clear reference to Gulf states and any international coalitions to free Hormuz — or if operations are launched from the Red Sea.³³ Direct attacks on Yemen could also trigger a response.

At the same time, the group has defined boundaries: They will target US and Israeli assets while avoiding Muslim countries. This signals a willingness to keep channels with Saudi Arabia open, while continuing to frame the conflict primarily around Israel and support for Gaza — a narrative that domestically resonates better than overt alignment with Iran.

This framing also explains the decision to target Israel first, echoing the Houthis’ entry into the conflict in October 2023. While the 28 March attacks appeared largely symbolic, subsequent attacks hint at a controlled escalation that may invite Israeli retaliation and expand the conflict into the Red Sea — a risk that did not materialize ahead of the announcement of the ceasefire on 8 April. Although the Houthi-controlled parliament in Sanaa portrayed the ceasefire as a "historical victory for Iran and the Axis of Resistance” over the US and Israel,³⁴ Abdulmalik al-Houthi had not issued an official statement regarding the 8 April ceasefire at the time of publication.