Middle East Overview: December 2025

Gaza: Violence declines as Hamas consolidates the areas it controls

In November, violence reached its lowest level since the February ceasefire, following the re-establishment of a ceasefire on 10 October. Nevertheless, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) were still involved in over 300 violent events and killed over 165 Palestinians. Most IDF-involved incidents occurred within Israeli-controlled areas or near the Yellow Line. Israeli forces continued operations against Hamas militants entrenched in a tunnel network east of Rafah amid failed negotiations for their surrender.¹ In Rafah, over 40 militants were killed, including the commander of Hamas’ East Rafah Battalion and his deputy, and several others were arrested.² Israel also conducted several attacks west of the Yellow Line, including a wave of strikes following a shooting attack by an unaffiliated gunman on an Israeli post. The strikes reportedly killed several militants and civilians, including a top Hamas commander involved in weapons manufacturing.³

Meanwhile, Hamas has strengthened its control over Gaza, and intra-Palestinian violence and aid-looting decreased during the month. After the last recorded looting incident, on 17 November, Hamas forces carried out an arrest campaign against those involved. Hamas has replaced all political, military, and administrative leaders killed during the war and established a “technical committee” to manage the handover of civilian governance to a newly appointed body.⁴ This development suggests that Hamas aims to continue managing Gaza’s affairs, as progress on the second phase of United States President Donald Trump’s peace plan remains uncertain. 

Iraq: A calm electoral cycle ahead of contentious negotiations

On 6 November, Iraq held its seventh parliamentary elections amid relative calm. Violence around the vote was significantly lower than in any recent election cycle as political parties channeled competition through judicial, institutional, and electoral means (see Iraq Election Watch). Nonetheless, low‑level violence persisted around the polls. The most notable election day violence occurred in Kirkuk, where clashes between Patriotic Union of Kurdistan- and Turkmen Front-aligned supporters occurred outside a candidate’s office, leaving two police officers dead and several civilians injured. Tribal fighting also occurred on election day near a polling center in Basra, and violent disputes broke out among rival candidates in Babil and Najaf.

A few weeks after the election, on 26 November, the Khor Mor gas field in Sulymaniyah in the Kurdistan region was targeted with a missile strike that hit a condensate tank and cut more than 80% of the region’s gas supply. While it is not yet clear who carried out the attack, which came days after an attempted drone attack on the field, early reporting has pointed to Iran-aligned armed groups.⁵ The period after Iraq’s elections has previously drawn in external actors who see government formation as an opportunity to press their interests or disrupt emerging alliances, and this attack may have aimed to put pressure on bargaining positions. In recent years, Khor Mor has been targeted repeatedly — at least seven times since 2023, usually during moments of heightened political tensions. With a recent expansion and new pipeline links coming online, Kurdish gas is becoming more central to Iraq’s grid and, over time, can undermine Baghdad’s reliance on Iranian gas.⁶ That evolution has made Khor Mor a focal point in the US-Iran struggle over Iraq’s energy future. 

Lebanon: Israel ramps up attacks targeting Hezbollah operatives 

Marking the first anniversary of the US and France-brokered ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel, November recorded an increase in fatalities from Israeli attacks, from 31 in October to 40 in November — the deadliest month since July. The rise in fatalities is part of an expanded Israeli campaign of targeted strikes against senior Hezbollah figures and Radwan Force infrastructure, including leadership decapitation operations.⁷ Among the strikes, two high-impact incidents resulted in multiple fatalities, including senior Hezbollah figures. On 1 November, an Israeli drone strike on the outskirts of Kfar Roummane, in the Nabatieh governorate, killed four Hezbollah members, including the logistics chief of the Radwan Force. On 23 November, Israeli warplanes struck a residential building in Haret Hreik, Baabda district, killing Hezbollah’s de facto chief of staff, Haytham al-Tabtabai, along with four other members, and injuring at least 28 other people who were likely civilians.⁸

On 2 November, the Israeli defense minister accused Lebanese authorities of delaying disarmament steps outlined in the post-ceasefire framework.⁹ United Nations officials have warned that repeated strikes on populated areas, including locations where Hezbollah operates alongside civilians, are eroding confidence in the ceasefire framework.¹⁰

Syria: Anti-government protests spread as Israeli operations escalate in the south

In November, demonstration activity increased by more than 40% in Syria on the back of increasingly vocal regionalized opposition to the state. In the country’s coastal and central provinces, demonstrators demanded decentralization, the right to self-determination, and the release of former members of the Assad regime from state prisons. On 25 November, ACLED records 20 protests in Lattakia, Tartous, Homs, and Hama after Sheikh Ghazal Ghazal, the head of the Supreme Alawite Islamic Council in Syria and the diaspora, called for demonstrations following tribal attacks on Alawite-majority neighborhoods in Homs.¹¹ A day earlier, in the latest episode of tensions in the south, protesters in al-Suwayda raised Israeli flags and portraits of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu amid calls from Druze leaders for secession from Syria and accusations that members of the al-Suwayda National Guard have committed violence against civilians. The surge in protest activity followed escalatory remarks by Mazloum Abdi, the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), during the Middle East Peace and Security Forum, held in Duhok in Iraq on 19 November, asserting that decentralization has become a fait accompli in Syria.¹² 

At the same time, Israeli operations intensified in southern Syria. On 28 November, clashes erupted in Beit Jinn in Rural Damascus between armed communal groups and Israeli forces after an Israeli convoy attempted to enter the town to make arrests. Six Israeli soldiers were injured. In response, Israeli forces carried out airstrikes and shelling, reportedly killing 15 civilians in a single day. The attack was a continuation of regular Israeli incursions into southern Syria following the fall of the Assad regime. Since January 2025, ACLED records more than 900 Israeli operations in the area, including 100 in November alone. The escalation in Beit Jinn came amid stalled US-mediated negotiations and followed statements by Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz saying he does not see a road to peace in Syria.¹³

West Bank: Israel steps up operations in the north 

In November, Israeli security forces were involved in over 350 violent events and reportedly killed 23 Palestinians, the highest monthly fatality count since February. Operations intensified against wanted militants, with armed clashes more than doubling compared to October. In Nablus and Jenin, Israeli forces reportedly killed the last remaining operatives involved in ramming and hammer attacks that killed Israelis in 2024.¹⁴ At the same time, Israeli Border Police reportedly shot dead two Katibat Jenin operatives after they appeared to surrender. Israeli forces also shot and killed at least nine Palestinian minors who attempted to throw stones or Molotov cocktails during raids or near settlements.

In Tubas governorate, Israeli forces launched a four-day campaign beginning on 26 November, dubbed Operation Five Stones, across five locations to degrade militant infrastructure and thwart regrouping efforts. The operation involved drone and helicopter strikes, destruction of civilian infrastructure, arrests, curfews, and physical assaults that resulted in dozens of injuries among civilians.¹⁵ Armed response has been limited, including from groups such as Katibat Tubas and other Palestinian Islamic Jihad affiliates, reflecting reduced militant capacity and sustained Israeli operational freedom in the northern West Bank. 

In parallel, settler violence fell after the olive harvest, dropping from more than 400 incidents in October to roughly 260 in November. In one incident, masked settlers, some armed with IDF weapons, raided the village of Khallet al-Louz in Bethlehem and shot and injured a young woman and injured others as Palestinians and settlers threw stones at one another.¹⁶ While Israeli forces have responded swiftly to militant activity and intensified the use of force against Palestinians, including increased shooting and attack incidents, settler violence remains largely unaddressed. Since 2005, only 3% of Israeli police investigations into settler violence have resulted in convictions.¹⁷

Yemen: Self-rule claims and regional competition drive erupting tensions in Hadhramawt 

Simmering tensions in Hadhramawt between the Saudi-backed Hadhramawt Tribal Alliance (HTA) and United Arab Emirates-backed forces of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) escalated in November. On 12 November, the UAE-backed Security Support Forces (SSF) led by Abu Ali al-Hadhrami¹⁸ attempted to establish a checkpoint in Humum tribal territory near Uqda — an area in the interior of the province where Saudi-backed forces dominate, including ones led by the HTA’s leader, Amr Bin Hubraysh.¹⁹ The attempt triggered clashes with pro-HTA local tribes that left 14 people injured. The STC redeployed units from Yafi and al-Dhali to Hadhramawt, heightening concerns over a potential move to assert control over the governorate’s interior.

In an attempt to defuse this explosive situation, President Rashad al-Alimi dismissed Hadhramawt’s governor, Mabkhut Bin Madhi, who had strongly criticized Bin Hubraysh.²⁰ Regardless, Bin Hubraysh moved the Hadhramawt Protection Forces, HTA’s military wing, to seize control of PetroMasila’s Sectors 14 and 53 — key oil fields located within Humum tribal territory — on 29 November.²¹ The situation exploded into large-scale conflict by the beginning of December. The STC launched a new military operation, dubbed “the Promised Future,” to seize the rest of the governorate from the rival forces. On 3 December, they successfully took over the major city of Sayun, in the center of the Hadramawt Valley region, after clashing with governmental forces from the First Military Region.²²

Demands for self-rule have been a sustained driver of HTA actions. Since July 2024, Bin Hubraysh and the HTA have escalated their demands through force, establishing armed checkpoints across Hadhramawt to block oil exports and extract concessions from the government.²³ Meanwhile, the oil-rich governorate has been plagued by a chronic lack of services, fueling widespread demonstrations that more than doubled by the end of November 2025 compared to the entire previous year.