Middle East Overview: July 2026

Gaza: Israel consolidates control along the Yellow Line as Hamas faces mounting pressure 

In the shadow of the US-Iran ceasefire, Israeli military activity declined by around 20% in June, driven by a fall in shelling and artillery attacks. Israel’s operations, though, remained heavily concentrated around the Yellow Line, particularly in Shujaiyya, al-Maghazi, Bani Suheila, and al-Mawasi, indicating a strategic shift toward consolidating and enforcing its security zone. Several of the month’s deadliest incidents occurred in locations sheltering or serving civilians, underscoring the mounting humanitarian consequences of Israel’s strategy of maintaining pressure on Hamas while enforcing control over the buffer zone. 

At the same time, Israel continued its targeted decapitation campaign against Hamas’ leadership and efforts to weaken its military and governing capabilities. Israeli forces killed Hassan Labad, the deputy head of Hamas’ general security apparatus in Sheikh Radwan, on 4 June and struck Hamas’ financial networks, police stations, and military facilities.

Despite renewed ceasefire negotiations in Egypt in June, major issues remain unresolved, including Hamas’ disarmament, Israeli troop withdrawal, and post-war governance and security arrangements in Gaza. With both sides maintaining incompatible positions, the prospects for a durable ceasefire or political settlement remain limited. In the short term, Gaza is expected to experience continued Israeli strikes and enforcement of the buffer zone, as well as localized clashes between Hamas and rival armed groups. In the longer term, the lack of a political agreement is likely to exacerbate fragmentation within Gaza, prolong humanitarian pressure on civilians, and leave the conflict vulnerable to renewed escalation.

The Gulf: Hormuz dispute tests fragile US-Iran MoU

The 17 June memorandum of understanding between the US-Iran has not moved the conflict fully from war to diplomacy. The Strait of Hormuz has become the flashpoint where disputes over the agreement’s implementation are playing out through military pressure. While the agreement left some of the hardest issues, including Iran’s nuclear program, to be negotiated during a 60-day period, Article 5 required immediate movement on commercial transit through the Strait. But the sides have interpreted that clause differently: Iran claims it maintains operational oversight of Hormuz, while the US is requiring a return to unrestricted commercial navigation. This means that transit has not returned to pre-war levels, and commercial passage through the Strait remains constrained.

To facilitate the safe evacuation of thousands of stranded seafarers and ships, Oman, working with the United Nations International Maritime Organization, advanced an alternative southern route near the Omani coast. Iran strongly rejected the route, insisting that safe passage required coordination with Iranian authorities. On 25 June, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) struck the Singapore-flagged Ever Lovely as it exited the strait along the Omani coast, making clear that Tehran would contest any arrangement that reduced its control over the waterway. This triggered a four-day exchange of fire: The US struck Iranian coastal and military infrastructure in Hormozgan on 26 and 28 June; Iran launched drones and missiles toward US-linked military sites in Bahrain and Kuwait; and Iran also struck a second commercial ship, the Panama-flagged Kiku, on 27 June.

While both sides have since stopped the attacks to allow talks in Qatar to continue, the struggle over Hormuz remains a sticking point. Iran’s ability to disrupt traffic through the waterway has become critical leverage that it is unlikely to give up easily, while US officials continue to insist they will oppose any scenario in which Iran restricts or monetizes passage through the strait. This suggests that sporadic maritime pressure, including rerouting orders, harassment, or limited attacks near contested routes, remains likely during the negotiation period, especially if Tehran judges that the talks are moving toward prewar freedom of navigation without recognition of Iran’s role.

Iran: PJAK clashes with security forces across western border areas

Clashes broke out between Iranian security forces and Kurdish armed groups across western Iran in June, marking the first sustained escalation of Kurdish armed activity recorded inside the country since the start of the war in February. The initial confrontation was reported in the Marivan border area of Kurdistan province on 7 June, when Iranian forces used artillery and mortar fire against Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) positions. After a brief lull, hostilities resumed in late June near Baneh, where PJAK fighters attacked a checkpoint on the Baneh-Saqqez road, killing two Iranian security personnel, after a series of IRGC drone attacks. Iranian forces also expanded operations in West Azerbaijan province, where PJAK confirmed the deaths of four of its fighters. Separately, violence spread to Kermanshah province, where Khori Hiwa, a newly announced Kurdish armed group, claimed the killing of two local IRGC personnel.

Iranian forces and Kurdish armed groups have clashed intermittently for years. Since the start of the war, Iran and Iran-linked Iraqi militias have conducted hundreds of drone and missile attacks on Iranian Kurdish opposition camps and bases in Iraqi Kurdistan, particularly sites linked to KDP-I/PDKI, Komala factions, PAK, and Khabat. The campaign came amid reports that Iranian Kurdish groups had discussed opening a western front against Iranian security forces to complement US and Israeli strikes. PJAK, however, was largely absent from the Iraq-based camp-strike campaign, likely because its forces are less concentrated in exposed camps in the Kurdistan Region and are instead more embedded in mountainous areas, caves, and tunnel networks along the Qandil border, making drone and missile strikes less effective. 

Targeting PJAK also carried greater escalation risks for Iran, as the group has a stronger record of retaliating inside Iran than other Iraq-based Kurdish groups. In its latest statement, PJAK said it had maintained a “third line” during the wider war, neither siding with external actors nor attacking Iran while the state was under pressure, accusing the Iranian security forces of driving the latest escalation. Although the reported western-front plans did not materialize during the war, the June escalation suggests that Iran is now seeking to tighten control over the western border belt, limiting the ability of Kurdish groups to move fighters, recruit locally, and preserve networks that could support future attacks inside Iran.

Iraq: Shia militias take steps toward disarmament amid persistent obstacles

On 2 June, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Imam Ali announced plans to withdraw from the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and relinquish their weapons to the state. The announcements followed a similar move by the Sadrist Saraya al-Salam, which transferred part of its arsenal in Salah al-Din to the government. These moves came shortly after Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi took office, pledging to prioritize the disarmament of PMF factions, and amid mounting US pressure on Iraqi armed groups. 

Despite these developments, full disarmament of Iraqi militias may prove too ambitious. Several Iran-aligned groups, particularly Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, publicly rejected calls to disarm and reiterated their commitment to “resistance.” These groups often justify their arms by pointing to the presence of US troops. Yet, even with the US withdrawal from Iraq scheduled for September, Iran’s opposition and the factions’ domestic interests are likely to keep opposing disarmament.

Even for the groups that vowed to disarm, the mechanisms remain vague, and it is uncertain whether they intend to surrender strategic capabilities like drones and missiles or merely transfer selected weapons. Even if they give up long-range systems, they could retain enough small arms and organizational cohesion to threaten US interests and domestic political rivals. Integrating fighters poses another challenge, since personal loyalties and command networks are likely to remain intact.

Despite these challenges, the government continues to signal its commitment to arms control and has set a deadline in September for all groups to surrender their weapons. However, coercive enforcement would likely trigger clashes with militias and strain the governing coalition. Renewed US attacks also risk escalating regional confrontations involving Iranian-backed groups, and potentially Iran. Given these constraints, the most likely outcome is partial disarmament, with some heavy weapons surrendered while command structures and residual armed capacity remain intact.

Lebanon and Israel: Israel and Hezbollah scale back hostilities while maintaining military pressure

Remote violence events fell to their lowest level since the latest resumption of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, dropping around 35% compared to May in Lebanon and approximately 70% in Israel. This decline follows the announcement of an agreement to implement a ‌ceasefire, reached during negotiations in Washington on 3 June. Despite the reduction, Lebanon remained one of the region’s most active conflict zones, with ongoing exchanges of artillery and rockets demonstrating that the ceasefire has diminished, but not resolved, hostilities.

Israeli military activities in Lebanon remained concentrated in southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah maintains its primary military strongholds. The majority of Israeli strikes targeted the Tyr and Bint Jbeil districts, both south of the Litani River, as well as the al-Nabatieh region, north of the Litani River. Israel also announced in a statement on 11 June that, following days of clashes with Hezbollah, it had achieved operational control over Wadi Saluki, extending a security buffer around the Israeli communities of the Galilee Panhandle and Metula.

While Hezbollah attacks against northern Israel became less frequent, Hezbollah maintained sustained pressure on Israeli forces operating inside Lebanon in the Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun, and Tyr districts. The most significant incident occurred on 19 June, when Hezbollah launched a drone attack on an Israeli armored unit in Kfar Tebnit town, killing four Israeli soldiers, including the commander of the 401st Armored Brigade’s 52nd Battalion, and marking the deadliest attack against Israeli forces since the June ceasefire.

Diplomatic efforts gained momentum in late June, but the ceasefire remained fragile with repeated attacks by both sides. The US-Iran memorandum of understanding, signed on 17 June, helped to decrease regional tensions and was followed by a new round of Israel-Lebanon discussions in Washington on 22 June about withdrawal, border security, and Hezbollah's future role. While Israel has since lifted most civilian restrictions in northern Israel following the reduction in Hezbollah attacks, the current ceasefire is unlikely to evolve into a durable peace. Even under a broader political agreement, Hezbollah is unlikely to relinquish its military capabilities voluntarily, suggesting that Israeli military operations and localized hostilities in southern Lebanon are likely to persist.