Middle East Overview: June 2026

Gaza: Israeli forces increase attacks on Hamas and expand control west of the Yellow Line

In May, Israel stepped up pressure on Hamas in Gaza as stalled peace plan talks continued to limit prospects for de-escalation. Israel's protracted operations in the strip aim to weaken Hamas' civilian control, kill senior figures and commanders who took part in the 7 October attack, and keep pressure on the group to disarm. ACLED records more than 40 Israeli attacks on Hamas and its allied groups — the highest monthly total since the ceasefire took effect in October 2025 and around a 40% increase from April. Israeli airstrikes targeted and killed at least five senior commanders, including Hamas military chief Izz al-Din Haddad and his replacement, Mohammed Odeh, who were both involved in the planning and execution of the 7 October attacks. Other attacks targeted Hamas members, field commanders, police officers, and police stations. 

Meanwhile, Israel’s control in Gaza has increased from 53% since the ceasefire to around 60% according to Israeli official reports, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announcing his intent to expand control to 70%.¹ Israel’s expansion westward puts more pressure on Gaza’s civilian population, forcing them to leave areas where access to services is becoming limited due to Israel’s firing policy and restrictions on humanitarian operations. As ACLED data show, this expansion occurred amid Israel's continued attacks near the Yellow Line, where it has been using drone strikes, direct shooting, and sniper and tank fire, which has led to the killing and injuring of civilians, including women and children.

Israel is likely to continue applying pressure on Hamas through airstrikes and its westward expansion. While Israel now focuses on Lebanon and Iran, it is also likely to avoid large-scale military operations in Gaza. However, sandwiched between Hamas’ refusal to disarm and a highly contentious campaign ahead of the legislative elections scheduled for later this year, Netanyahu’s government might opt for a new military escalation, especially if the Trump administration lifts its restraining pressure on the Israeli government or Israel loses leverage in the conflicts in Lebanon and Iran.

Iran and the Gulf: Iran and the US negotiate with live fire as talks to finalize an agreement stall 

In May, Iran and its Iraq-based proxies attacked Gulf countries and maritime shipping in the Persian Gulf area in spite of the ceasefire, continuing the trend of selective escalation to maintain pressure on the United States and its allies. The United Arab Emirates was the most targeted country in May, followed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. While most attacks were intercepted without causing damage or casualties, Iran made it clear that its capability to disrupt regional energy infrastructure remains considerable, with high-profile attacks on the Fujairah Petroleum Industries Zone and the Barakah Nuclear Energy Plant in the UAE. Iran also targeted 14 commercial ships, killing at least one sailor and injuring six, while US forces intercepted Iranian missiles and drone attacks targeting warships on several occasions.   

Meanwhile, US forces continued to enforce the maritime blockade on ships entering and exiting Iranian ports, redirecting over 120 vessels and disabling another six.² After US forces disabled a ship that attempted to sail toward Kharg Island in early June, Iran expanded the scope of its response to US activity in the Gulf. On 3 June, the IRGC launched missiles and drones toward US-linked targets in Kuwait and Bahrain, including Ali al-Salem Air Base and the US Fifth Fleet headquarters, damaging Kuwait International Airport and killing at least one person. The IRGC also claimed it targeted the MSC Panaya container vessel at Khalifa Bin Salman port in Bahrain.

In calculating that the US is likely to focus on the upcoming World Cup and midterm elections, which reduces the likelihood of a broader war, Iranian decision-makers are signaling that Tehran’s response to US military activity will become more forceful. Neither side appears to want a full-scale war, but without a deal, continued friction risks spiraling into uncontrolled escalation. Meanwhile, despite late-May indications that a 60-day framework was within reach, the sides have yet to finalize an agreement. US media reported that Trump sought stricter revisions to the draft regarding nuclear terms and frozen funds, highlighting the intense domestic pressure to avoid appearing weak. Ultimately, the proposed Memorandum of Understanding would only temporarily pause immediate hostilities and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, while deferring the core disputes over Iran’s nuclear program and long-term sanctions relief to high-stakes follow-on negotiations.

Lebanon: Israel-Hezbollah fighting intensifies amid US-Iran diplomatic efforts 

The conflict between Hezbollah and Israel intensified in May as Israeli forces pushed north of the Litani River. ACLED data show that attacks carried out by Hezbollah and Israeli military forces in Lebanon increased by 10% in May compared to the previous month. The escalation occurred despite diplomatic efforts by the US and Iran to reach a deal, with Israel seeking to separate the Lebanon file from the Iran peace talks and Hezbollah pushing to include it in broader agreements. At the same time, Israel has increased military pressure on the Lebanese state toward making concessions as the US-sponsored negotiations continue.  

Israeli airstrikes intensified north of the Litani River, mainly in al-Nabatieh district, where Israeli forces expanded their ground presence and took control of strategic positions around the Beaufort Ridge and Wadi Saluki. These areas overlook Israeli towns in the Galilee Panhandle, as well as key areas in al-Nabatieh, one of Hezbollah’s main strongholds. 

The Israeli ground advance came as Hezbollah significantly increased attacks on Israeli forces inside Lebanon. In May, Hezbollah carried out over 260 drone, rocket, and anti-tank missile attacks, the highest monthly total since the war returned in March. Some attacks directly hit Israeli troops, vehicles, tanks, and military equipment. At the same time, Hezbollah’s strikes in Israel became more widespread and intense, hitting areas north of Haifa, Safed, and Tiberias for the first time since the ceasefire took effect on 17 April.³

Despite the US-brokered ceasefire agreement reached between the Lebanese government and Israel on 4 June and US pressure on Israel not to attack Beirut and its southern suburbs, fighting in Lebanon is set to continue. Hezbollah is likely to keep attacking Israeli forces in Lebanon, while avoiding attacks on northern Israel to limit the risk of Israeli retaliation against the southern suburbs and to deny Israel’s willingness to derail US-Iran talks. At the same time, Israel is unlikely to scale back its operations. Israel’s military pressure in Lebanon serves two purposes: first, weakening Hezbollah and preventing its recovery, and second, complicating any broader US-Iran understanding that restricts its operations against the group.

West Bank: Settler violence spikes as the EU sanctions settlers

Israeli settler violence in the West Bank has reached a new record high since October 2025. Settlers engaged in more than 380 violent incidents against Palestinians and their property in May. These incidents took place in 170 towns, villages, and agricultural communities across the West Bank. Of these incidents, 70% occurred in the governorates of Ramallah and al-Bireh, Hebron, and Nablus. Settlers attacked Palestinian farmers; stole livestock, crops, and farming equipment; razed land; grazed their sheep on Palestinian agricultural land; and uprooted olive trees. These activities are part of a broader effort to push Palestinians away from their farms in order to annex more territories. At the same time, wider regional conflicts have shifted international attention away from Israeli actions in the West Bank, allowing more settler attacks to continue. This is also happening alongside continued impunity for settler violence against Palestinians, as Israeli soldiers increasingly operate alongside settlers.

Against the backdrop of rising settler violence, the European Union sanctioned individual settlers and organizations that support outpost construction and youth community building in the West Bank.⁵ This move has brought international attention back to settler violence, although effective measures to influence Israel’s policy remain absent. Since taking power in 2022, the Israeli government has encouraged settlement expansion, including the establishment of unauthorized outposts built near Palestinian communities. These outposts have increased friction with Palestinian residents and created more space for violence.