Middle East Overview: May 2026

Gaza: Israel escalates attacks as Hamas refuses to disarm

April was the deadliest month in Gaza since January, with more than 140 reported fatalities related to Israeli violence. Israeli forces intensified their attacks, and the number of violent events increased by 35% compared with March. In around 30 incidents, Israel targeted Hamas militants, members of other armed groups, police officers and police stations, and security checkpoints. Israeli forces also carried out targeted assassinations, including the killing of the head of Hamas’ military intelligence, who was reportedly involved in planning the 7 October attack, as well as other members of Hamas’ elite forces. Most of the attacks took place west of the Yellow Line, which separates the Israel-controlled area from the Hamas-controlled areas west of Gaza. Shelling, drone strikes, and gunfire continued near the Yellow Line, targeting militants and civilians, including women and children, who approached soldiers. Since the ceasefire began in October 2025, Israel has gradually expanded the Yellow Line westward. It now controls about 58% of Gaza, compared with 53% under the original ceasefire map.¹ 

In mid-April, Hamas rejected the Board of Peace’s disarmament plan, which would have required it to hand over its heavy weapons and maps of its tunnel network within three months.² Hamas later submitted a counter-offer to the Board of Peace, tying any disarmament to guarantees for establishing a sovereign Palestinian state, a halt to Israel’s westward expansion in the Strip, and an end to attacks on its fighters with a complete ceasefire.³ In turn, Israel informed the Board of Peace that it would not be withdrawing from the Yellow Line and its cabinet was considering the possibility of resuming operations in the Strip.⁴

Israel is now weighing wider military action against Hamas, but this option remains unlikely without US approval. Washington still prefers to preserve stability in Gaza, while Hamas is using disarmament talks with the Board of Peace to delay escalation and buy time before Israel’s October elections. Israel may avoid a full-scale operation for now, but it is likely to increase targeted attacks on Hamas to pressure it into disarmament.

The Gulf: Iranian attacks in the Gulf subside, but wartime security remains tight

On 4 and 5 May, Iran targeted the United Arab Emirates in response to Washington’s Operation Freedom for the first time since the 8 April ceasefire between Tehran and Washington took effect. The attacks ignited a fire at the Fujairah Petroleum Industries Zone and injured three Indian nationals. A parallel strike hit a residential area in Oman, injuring two expatriates. Although the Oman strike appears to have been coincidental, Iran’s targeting of the UAE reflects Abu Dhabi’s alignment with Israel and the United States and its prominence as a target throughout the conflict. The attacks signal that the balance of power in the Strait of Hormuz remains tipped in Iran’s favor, as Tehran signals that it will deter maritime pressure through strikes on Gulf states — particularly the UAE.

Prior to the ceasefire, Oman was spared from direct Iranian attacks, reflecting its continued diplomatic proximity with Tehran. By contrast, the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain have remained the most targeted of the Gulf states, with strikes expanding beyond energy infrastructure to include major tech and telecom companies. The ceasefire began amid a sharp escalation of attacks on 8 April, when Iran targeted energy infrastructure across all Gulf countries except Oman. Marking a shift in tactics, Tehran focused particularly on Saudi Arabia, striking Petroline — the east-west pipeline linking oil fields to the Yanbu terminal — in the largest coordinated attack on oil infrastructure since the conflict began, signaling that any renewed escalation would likely prompt Iran to directly target regional energy infrastructure. 

While Iran has carried out limited direct attacks since the ceasefire, several trends point to lingering confrontations in the Gulf. Notably, Iraqi Shiite militias carried out attacks against Kuwait and Bahrain until mid-April, with a final incident in Kuwait on 24 April. Meanwhile, Gulf countries have intensified domestic repression of people deemed to be linked to Iran. In Bahrain, security forces arrested at least 291 individuals, including people it alleged were Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps affiliates and demonstrators. One detainee died in custody after being tortured.⁵ Kuwait and the UAE also carried out arrests, while Kuwait revoked the citizenship⁶ of over 2,000 people. Bahrain revoked the citizenship of 69⁷ people and expanded denaturalization powers on security grounds.⁸

Iran: The US blockade raises the cost of Tehran’s leverage over Hormuz

The ceasefire has paused the US and Israeli air campaign inside Iran, but the main pressure point has shifted from the air to the sea. Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz gives Tehran significant leverage over Washington and the global economy. In response, the US blockade of Iranian ports, imposed on 13 April, is designed to turn that leverage back on Tehran by restricting Iran’s own maritime access and raising the economic cost of the standoff.

The blockade has since severely curtailed Iran’s ability to move new oil cargoes. US forces seized one Iranian-flagged vessel near the blockade zone on 19 April and interdicted at least two Iran-linked tankers farther afield in the following days. They have also reported dozens of interceptions or forced turnarounds of vessels linked to Iranian ports or cargo. Public shipping data point to a major decline in traceable exports, but the blockade has not produced the rapid production shock some early timelines implied.⁹ Iran can still push crude into storage, disable tracking, and rely on parts of its shadow fleet system, even if it does so at higher cost and risk. More serious production strain may take weeks or months to materialize.

Yet, this timeline is difficult for the US to sustain, given the negative impact of the maritime standoff on global oil markets, especially as there is no guarantee that waiting for the full economic impact of the blockade on Iran will deliver the concessions Washington seeks. The recent US initiative, Project Freedom, appears to have been an attempt to break the impasse and restore commercial passage through the strait while maintaining the blockade of Iranian ports. Framed as a “defensive and humanitarian” operation,¹⁰ it stopped short of a full escort mission, instead allowing US naval forces to operate nearby and provide routing guidance to commercial vessels. This more cautious approach was designed to reduce the risk of direct confrontation, but it was doubtful that it would be enough to reassure shippers and insurers.

Only two days after the operation’s launch, Trump announced that the initiative would be paused to facilitate negotiations. Some reports suggest that the US and Iran may be close to reaching a framework agreement.¹¹ But if talks again fail to deliver results, the US is likely to reapply military pressure on the economic campaign, either by resuming airstrikes or by taking more direct kinetic action in the Strait of Hormuz.

Inside Iran, the Islamic Republic has continued to carry out arrests, executions, asset confiscations, and national security prosecutions, using wartime conditions to intensify pressure on people it alleges are spies, dissidents, and protesters, and on people accused of having links to hostile states. Economic pressure is also deepening. The blockade, sanctions, war damage, and internet restrictions have compounded pre-existing inflation, job losses, collapsing purchasing power, and the devaluation of the national currency. Still, there is no sign that these pressures are translating into internal unraveling of the regime.

Iraq: No ceasefire on the horizon for Iranian Kurdish groups in the Kurdistan region

While the US-Iran ceasefire¹² has halted most war-related violence in Iraq, attacks against Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in the Kurdistan region resumed within a week of the ceasefire. 

Although the attacks initially mirrored wartime patterns, emerging shortly after the outbreak of war and subsiding with the ceasefire, they took on a trajectory of their own in the second half of April, with ACLED recording 28 drone and missile strikes by Iranian forces and pro-Iran militias in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. While some of these attempts were successfully intercepted, the majority struck their targets. The strikes targeted several Iranian Kurdish opposition groups, including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, hitting offices, combat positions, and camps housing members and their families. The attacks resulted in at least four fatalities among opposition members and affiliated civilians, compared to at least three fatalities recorded among Iranian Kurdish groups from the start of the war until the ceasefire.

Since the ceasefire, Iranian security forces have launched over 20 drone and missile strikes on Iraqi territory, while the origins of another six incidents remain unclear. The strikes, which are ongoing at the time of writing, mark a shift from the initial wartime period, when most attacks reportedly originated from within Iraq.¹³ Iran claims that the attacks constitute acts of self-defense, asserting that the area is used to stage attacks against Iran and to recruit and train Kurdish armed groups — allegedly with the involvement of Israeli intelligence — for operations targeting Iranian territory.¹⁴ 

These claims follow earlier reports of US and Israeli plans to support ground operations against Iran led by Iranian Kurdish groups based in Iraq, as well as statements by Trump indicating that the US had provided support to Iranian dissidents through Kurdish intermediaries.¹⁵ Nonetheless, US officials, Iranian Kurdish parties, and the Kurdistan Regional Government have denied these claims.¹⁶

Lebanon: Hostilities continue in southern Lebanon despite the ceasefire

Violence in Lebanon declined after the US-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah took effect on 17 April, despite the persistence of hostilities in southern Lebanon (see graph below). While violence levels increased after the US announced a three-week ceasefire extension on 23 April, they remained below pre-ceasefire levels. 

Between 17 and 30 April, Hezbollah and Israel conducted nearly 360 remote attacks against each other. According to the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, Israeli attacks killed nearly 300 people during the same period.¹⁷ Most incidents occurred near the Yellow Line of the security zone south of the Litani River, in the districts of Bint Jbeil, Marjayoun, and Tyr. However, Israeli strikes also attacked targets north of the Litani River, mainly in the al-Nabatieh area, including Hezbollah rocket launchers and operatives.

During this period, Hezbollah conducted nearly 30 drone attacks in at least 14 locations, killing at least two soldiers and a defense civilian contractor. In one incident, 12 soldiers were wounded after a Hezbollah FPV drone struck armored military vehicles near the Israeli border town of Shomera on 30 April.

At the same time, Israeli forces intensified demolition and destruction operations in about 30 villages and towns to form the security buffer zone, including Ras al-Naqoura, Bent Jbeil, and Khiyam. Israel also issued evacuation orders for dozens of towns in southern Lebanon, including villages north of the Litani River, claiming Hezbollah uses these villages to launch attacks against Israel.¹⁸

Yemen: The Houthis exercise restraint while intensifying domestic repression

Houthi attacks against Israeli territory — framed as a response to US-Israeli strikes on Iran — continued between 28 March and 6 April and ceased entirely following the ceasefire. Despite their limited operational impact, the group portrayed its intervention as a victory.

Following their conditional entry into the conflict on 27 March, the Houthis claimed a total of six attacks, all targeting Israeli territory, and refrained from escalating attacks in the Red Sea as their stated red lines were not crossed. The group deployed drones, as well as ballistic and cruise missiles, to target southern Israel, the Jerusalem area, and Ben Gurion Airport, causing no damage or fatalities. However, the group’s leverage successfully limited US activity in the Red Sea, forcing the USS George H.W. Bush to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope²¹ — an act portrayed by Abdulmalik al-Houthi as a victory.²² The group also claimed to have achieved “unified fronts” across the Axis of Resistance, arguing that coordinated intervention enabled a broader regional deal encompassing multiple fronts — notably Iran and Lebanon.²³ Houthi restraint was welcomed by US Defense Minister Pete Hegseth,²⁴ while the group appeared open to de-escalating by participating in a United Nations-coordinated meeting in Amman with Saudi Arabia.²⁵

Despite having ceased their strikes, Houthi authorities have signaled their readiness to respond to any new escalations in the war, sparking a new wave of domestic repression amid fears of Israeli retaliation. Most notably, they have tightened security in Sanaa²⁶ and arrested several individuals on 4 April for alleged espionage and launching media campaigns warning against Israeli recruitment methods.²⁷ In recent years, the Houthis have routinely clamped down on civil society and political parties, in a prolonged effort to prevent opposition movements from coalescing.