Middle East Overview: November 2025

Gaza: Ceasefire holds as low-level violence continues

A ceasefire between Hamas and Israel took effect on 10 October. As a result, violence involving Israeli forces dropped by nearly 48% compared to the previous month, reaching its lowest level since February 2025. The ceasefire represents the first phase of US President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan to end the Gaza war. Under this phase, Hamas released all living Israeli hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, including 250 serving life sentences, and began to return the remains of deceased hostages. In turn, Israel withdrew its forces from parts of Gaza while maintaining control over more than half the Gaza territory beyond the “Yellow Line,” including southern Rafah Governorate, the eastern areas of the enclave, and parts of North Gaza.¹

Since the ceasefire began, Israeli forces have conducted about 190 operations across Gaza, killing more than 230 Palestinians. Nearly 70% of the events occurred close to the Yellow Line, as Israeli forces reinforced control over the area and targeted civilians attempting to return home or militants approaching the line. After three soldiers were killed in Rafah, and amid accusations that Hamas failed to return the expected number of bodies, Israel launched two waves of retaliatory remote attacks that led to the overwhelming majority of fatalities in October. Although Hamas denied involvement in the soldiers’ deaths, about 200 of its fighters remain trapped in tunnels in Israel-controlled areas, mainly in Rafah, amid Israel’s refusal to grant them safe passage to Hamas-controlled zones.² Israeli forces also continued demolishing infrastructure, including areas of Khan Yunis that were left uncleared in pre-ceasefire operations.

In parallel, intra-Palestinian violence increased after the ceasefire began (for more on Hamas’ domestic dominance, see this report). To consolidate its authority over areas Israel had vacated, Hamas and its affiliated forces, Sahm and Radea, launched a campaign that resulted in the deadliest month of intra-Palestinian violence since the Gaza war began, with 60 Palestinians killed, including several publicly executed by Hamas. The campaign targeted at least three major clans that the group accused of collaborating with Israel or looting aid. Hamas forces also clashed with four other Israel-backed militias operating across four of Gaza's governorates in Israel-controlled zones. As internal violence later declined, Hamas regained control west of the Yellow Line and deployed about 7,000 fighters and police officers to restore control.³

Iraq: Localized violence and political fragmentation ahead of the November elections

In October, Iraq witnessed a rise in targeted violence amid heightened political competition ahead of the 11 November parliamentary elections (for more, see this report). The assassination of Safaa al-Mashhadani, a Baghdad Provincial Council member and Sunni candidate from the Sovereignty Alliance, underscored persistent security risks surrounding the vote. Mashhadani was killed by a magnetic bomb planted under his car in Tarmiyah on 15 October that also injured three of his bodyguards. Days later, unidentified gunmen attacked the office of another Sovereignty Alliance candidate south of Baghdad. Both figures had been vocal critics of expanding militia influence, suggesting these attacks were intended to silence opposition to Iran‑aligned factions’ growing control.

Following the weakening of Iran-led Axis of Resistance amid the conflict with Israel, increasing US sanctions and growing diplomatic pressure have pushed Baghdad to curb the autonomy of militias, stalling two draft laws that would have further institutionalized the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) within Iraq’s security apparatus.⁴ This struggle has become central to the pre‑election landscape: Within the Shiite Coordination Framework, the ruling alliance of Islamist parties that includes PMF representatives, divergent electoral agendas have emerged over the future of arms. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al‑Sudani has cautiously aligned with calls for gradual demilitarization and state control as he seeks a second term, while militia-aligned factions resist such efforts, viewing them as capitulation to US influence.⁵ The result is a fragmented Shiite camp competing under separate electoral lists and signaling the potential for renewed confrontation should the vote fail to safeguard militia interests. Iraq’s stability ahead of the elections thus rests on a fragile equilibrium between state assertion and militia deterrence that is likely to be tested once ballots close.

Lebanon: Ceasefire approaches one year under strain 

Tensions remain high almost a year after the US- and France-brokered ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel went into effect on 27 November 2024, amid continued Israel Defense Forces (IDF) daily strikes on Lebanon. The number of Israeli strikes in October remained similar to the month prior, with over 130 shelling and aerial strikes, mainly in the south but also at least 16 in the Bekaa Valley. Raising fears that Israel may be shifting its focus to Lebanon once more after the Gaza ceasefire was reached, the IDF conducted intense airstrikes on 11 October that hit industrial facilities and heavy-equipment yards in the southern village of Msayleh, which killed one Syrian and injured seven other people, including two women. A few days later, on 16 October, the IDF struck cement factories, industrial workshops, and a fuel depot. The attacks on industrial facilities in October followed similar strikes in Ansariya in early September. While the IDF continues to claim it struck Hezbollah sites to prevent the group from rebuilding, critics argue that Israel is attempting to cripple the reconstruction and the economic recovery of the south and prevent the return of people, many among the Hezbollah support base, to southern villages.⁶

Further fueling tensions, Israeli infantry forces launched a raid on the town of Bilda on 30 October, targeting a municipal building and killing a cleaning worker in his sleep, claiming that they opened fire to “eliminate” a “threat.”⁷ While the IDF, which maintains five border outposts in southern Lebanon, has continued to raid neighboring villages overnight to demolish buildings — including on nearly 10 occasions in October — the incident in Blida was the first killing during such incursions. Following the attack, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun ordered the Lebanese army to confront any future Israeli incursions into Lebanese territory.⁸

Syria: Revenge killings targeting minorities continue to rise

Sectarian violence against religious and ethnic minorities escalated in Syria in October, despite a general reduction in overall violence levels across the country. Violence against members of the Alawite sect, which continues to be associated with the former regime of Bashar al-Assad, increased from 19 events in September to 30 in October. At least 23 people were reportedly killed in the attacks, which predominantly took place in the northwestern provinces of Hama, Tartous, Lattakia, and Homs, home to large Alawite communities. Most attacks were carried out by unidentified armed groups who did not claim responsibility.

In March, approximately 1,400 people were killed at the hands of pro-government militias after clashes broke out between government forces and Assad loyalists.⁹ Hundreds reportedly belonged to the Alawite community, which makes up 10% of Syria’s population and was the backbone of Assad’s regime. According to the United Nations, the massacres — which included summary executions, torture, and widespread property destruction — may amount to war crimes.¹⁰ Rights groups demand that Syria’s transitional authorities investigate violations and hold military commanders and officials accountable for their role in enabling the killings.

West Bank: Settler violence against olive harvesters reaches record high

In October, settler violence in the West Bank rose sharply, reaching the second-highest monthly level ever recorded by ACLED, with over 400 incidents — just slightly below the peak in October 2023. Nearly half of these incidents targeted Palestinian farmers and their olive groves, making this year’s olive harvest by far the most violent since ACLED began collecting data in Palestine a decade ago. 

Across over 80 villages and towns, settlers assaulted Palestinian farmers, as well as solidarity activists, beating them, throwing stones, cutting down trees, stealing crops, and setting fire to agricultural land, vehicles, and homes. On several occasions, armed settlers or members of settlement security squads fired shots, often to intimidate Palestinians, while masked men continued to take part in attacks despite an IDF ban on the use of face coverings introduced in July.¹¹ In one of the most violent incidents, two groups of more than 80 settlers — including masked and armed individuals¹² — attacked Palestinian olive harvesters near Bayta village in Nablus on 10 October, injuring a dozen, including a journalist.¹³ In another violent incident captured on video, a 55-year-old woman picking olives in Turmus Ayya was beaten unconscious by a masked settler with a club, after a group of 15 attacked Palestinian olive harvesters and their supporters.¹⁴

The olive harvest provides the primary livelihood for tens of thousands of Palestinian families, and seasonal settler attacks inflict both immediate economic harm and lasting damage to olive groves that represent decades of intergenerational investment. Although violence against Palestinian farmers is long-standing, it has steadily intensified, driven in part by the rapid expansion of illegal settlement outposts — with 114 new outposts established across the West Bank since October 2023, representing nearly a 60% increase.¹⁵ In these areas, beyond direct attacks by extremist settlers, the increased settler presence has prompted the IDF to issue closed-military-zone orders that prevent Palestinians from accessing their olive groves,¹⁶ resulting in significant economic loss.¹⁷

Yemen: Houthis cease attacks against Israel and escalate against the UN in Sanaa

After a record escalation in September, the Houthis ceased all attacks on Israel in October after the ceasefire went into effect in Gaza on 10 October. While ACLED records five Houthi attacks targeting Israel in October, the last took place on 8 October. All the attacks — one using a missile and four using drones — were intercepted by Israeli forces. The Houthis expressed “readiness” to resume attacks should Israel resume military operations against the group.¹⁸ 

Meanwhile, the Houthis carried out an arrest campaign in October targeting employees of the United Nations and other international humanitarian organizations in Sanaa, detaining at least 36 people. This is a significant increase compared to the total of at least 35 employees detained in the first nine months of 2025. The campaign targeted both foreign and Yemeni nationals, and included raids on both private homes of employees and offices of the UN special envoy to Yemen, UNICEF, the World Food Programme, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the UN Development Programme, and UNOCHA, among others. The Houthis claimed the detainees were part of a “spy network” used by Israel to carry out an airstrike that decimated the Houthi cabinet on 28 August (for more on the August strike, see this regional update). According to the UN, the arrests in October bring the total number of detained UN employees in Houthi-controlled territories to at least 59.¹⁹ While foreign arrestees were eventually released, the Houthis announced they would put 43 Yemeni UN employees on trial.²⁰

The Houthis first began systematically targeting employees of the UN and international aid agencies in June 2024, when they detained dozens for alleged membership in a “CIA-linked US-Israeli spy network.” 

Correction: A previous version of this regional update stated that Safaa al-Mashhadani, a Baghdad Provincial Council member and Sunni candidate from the Sovereignty Alliance, was killed by a car bomb. The update has been edited to reflect that he was killed by a magnetic bomb planted under his car.