Middle East Overview: October 2025
Military pressure in Gaza City escalated as a ceasefire outline emerged, renewed confrontations broke out between government forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces in northern Syria, and an uptick of Houthi attacks in Israel prompted Israel’s deadly retaliation this past month
Gaza: Military pressure in Gaza City escalates as ceasefire outline emerges
Gaza City was the site of around 60% of all Israeli military activity in the Strip in September. After weeks of operations in neighborhoods on the outskirts of Gaza City, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) officially launched its long-threatened major ground offensive on 16 September, pushing deeper into central and western parts of the city that had previously remained outside Israeli control. One of the highest monthly totals of Israeli shelling and aerial strikes on Gaza City since the start of the war took place in September, with about 400 strikes reportedly killing nearly 1,000 Palestinians. IDF ground troops advanced from the north into Shaykh Radwan and the al-Rimal neighborhood, as well as in the vicinity of Shati camp. In the south, they pushed into Tal al-Hawa and toward Shaykh Ijlin, aiming to cut the coastal road and re-establish control over the western section of the Netzarim corridor.
While Hamas has likely evacuated many of its remaining fighters to the south to preserve what remains of its strength, it has targeted Israeli forces in more than two dozen incidents in the past month alongside its allies, using roadside bombs, mortar shells, sniper fire, and RPGs. Beyond guerrilla attacks, armed clashes have thus far remained limited, with about a dozen incidents reported during the month. However, a Hamas cell injured 11 soldiers — five seriously — after infiltrating an army encampment and detonating two explosive devices against a tank in late September.
The IDF also continued demolishing buildings in Gaza City, a trend that has intensified significantly since April. Alongside controlled demolitions and a growing number of strikes on high-rise buildings following evacuation orders — which the IDF says Hamas uses as observation posts — Israeli forces have deployed explosive-laden unmanned vehicles. ACLED records over 110 incidents involving these vehicles across the Gaza Strip since May 2024, with more than one-third reported in Gaza City during September. Some of these so-called robots are repurposed armored vehicles fitted with remote-control systems and loaded with tonnes of explosives;1 smaller variants are used to carry charges into alleys, buildings, and tunnel mouths. Israel often detonates these devices between buildings, producing powerful blasts capable of destroying several structures. While Israeli media say the devices are used to clear areas ahead of infantry advances,2 critics allege they are also employed to frighten residents into evacuating, given the exceptionally loud explosions.3 Over 700,000 Palestinians in Gaza City are believed to have evacuated south in recent weeks.4
On the diplomatic front, September swung between setbacks and late momentum: Israel’s 9 September strike on Hamas figures in Doha undercut mediation, yet pressure on Jerusalem grew as several states recognized Palestine, mass protests in Israel pressed for a hostage deal, and a leaked IDF chief’s memo questioned the Gaza City push5 amid reports of waning patience in Washington. The month closed with renewed hopes after United States President Donald Trump unveiled a 20-point ceasefire plan on 29 September that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu endorsed, proposing an immediate ceasefire, phased Israeli withdrawal linked to Hamas’ demilitarization, a hostages-for-prisoners exchange, and a technocratic interim administration backed by an international stabilization force. Qatar said Hamas needed clarifications before responding. While the deal has broad Arab, Muslim, and Palestinian Authority backing, its vague provisions and Netanyahu’s last-minute edits preserving Israeli advantages6 leave Hamas’ acceptance, implementation, and long-term prospects highly uncertain.
Syria: Renewed confrontations break out between government forces and the SDF in northern Syria
In September, northern Syria experienced an upsurge in violent confrontations between government forces and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), particularly in frontline areas of the Aleppo and Ar Raqqa countryside. ACLED records 40 armed clashes, airstrike events,7 and shelling events in September, a significant increase from August when it records only 21 events. The confrontations resulted in more than 25 reported fatalities, including eight civilians who were killed in a suspected attack by regime forces in the village of Um Tinah in Aleppo province. The violence broke a four-month period of tense but relative calm that followed the signing of the March ceasefire agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF, which stipulated the integration of the SDF’s institutions and armed forces into the new Syrian government as part of a broader plan to bring Kurdish-led areas under the control of Damascus.8
The sudden surge of violence in northern Syria not only endangers the fragile ceasefire agreement between the Syrian regime and the SDF but also threatens to derail the progress of the bilateral talks between the Syrian government and the SDF. The negotiations, mediated by the US special envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack, aim to install an inclusive centralized government in Syria by the end of 2025.9
West Bank: Armed activity surges despite a crackdown
In the West Bank, armed activity involving Palestinian groups tripled in September compared to the previous month, as ACLED records over 30 incidents. While this remains far below the number of events before Israel’s crackdown on northern refugee camps during Operation Iron Wall earlier this year, it may signal a slow resurgence and regrouping of local groups. The majority of events involved local groups affiliated with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Jenin and Tulkarm, though new groups have also emerged in other areas, including Ramallah and al-Bireh. The use of roadside bombs was reported in nearly half of the events last month, including an attack claimed by Hamas and PIJ’s Katibat Jenin in which two soldiers were injured near a checkpoint in Tulkarm.
On 8 September, Hamas operatives also carried out one of the deadliest attacks on Israelis in the West Bank in recent years, when two gunmen from nearby Palestinian villages opened fire at a bus stop in East Jerusalem, killing six civilians and injuring 12 others. The attackers were killed at the scene. While local armed groups — especially those linked to the PIJ and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade — have been most frequently involved in the violence, Hamas operatives from the West Bank have consistently carried out the most lethal attacks against Israelis since the current wave of armed violence began in late 2021. In the following weeks, the IDF demolished one attacker’s home, with the demolition of the second attacker’s home scheduled to follow.10 In addition, Israel also revoked the work permits of another 750 Palestinians from these villages.11 The practice has drawn long-standing criticism as a form of collective punishment of Palestinians following violent attacks.
Despite the harsh IDF crackdown that contained armed activity after Operation Iron Wall, the steadily worsening economic situation, Israel’s policy of collective punishment, the unabated advancement of the settlement project, and the growing settler violence mean that the core conditions fueling instability remain unresolved — making it likely that violence involving Palestinians will continue in one form or another.
Yemen: Uptick of Houthi attacks in Israel prompts Israel’s deadly retaliation
Yemen’s Houthis and Israel intensified their exchange of long-range attacks in September to their highest recorded level. The latest escalation, beginning in late August, signals a new phase of this conflict that has become increasingly harmful to civilians in both countries, as the Houthis adapt their attacks to circumvent Israeli defenses and Israel expands its target range to include more civilian sites.
In September, Houthi forces launched 27 distinct attacks against Israel, the highest monthly number recorded by ACLED this year. Beyond the rise in numbers, the latest escalation is notable for the Houthis’ recent introduction of cluster warheads, which they deployed five times in September. The shift reflects an effort to overcome Israel’s missile defenses: While most Houthi missiles are intercepted, cluster warheads can still disperse and hit targets after interception, as demonstrated by an attack in August. Further, the Houthis have refocused their efforts from Ben Gurion Airport to the coastal city of Eilat, which they struck three times in September. The geographical location of Israel’s southernmost city, Eilat, renders it particularly vulnerable to low-altitude drone attacks.12 The last attack, on 24 September, caused 22 injuries — the highest number of Israeli casualties recorded by ACLED since the Houthis began their campaign against Israel (for more on Houthi strategies in attacks against Israel, see this report).
Meanwhile, Israeli strikes on the Houthis in Yemen increasingly targeted civilian sites, typically in retaliation for Houthi attacks that caused damage or casualties in Israel. In September, these strikes killed at least 73 people and injured over 520 in Sanaa, al-Hudayda, and al-Jawf governorates. On 10 September alone, strikes on Sanaa and al-Jawf killed 54 people, including 31 journalists — the highest journalist toll in a single incident in Yemen since ACLED began coverage of the country in 2015. In retaliation for the Houthis’ 24 September attack on Eilat, Israel launched extensive strikes on Sanaa the following day, dropping over 65 bombs in 15 raids.13 The increased ferocity of Israeli airstrikes, coupled with the targeting of civilian sites and infrastructure, underscores Tel Aviv’s inability to deter the Houthis from attacking Israel — for example, through a decapitation of the leadership — likely due to limited intelligence.14
Footnotes
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ACLED counts the number of “airstrike events,” rather than individual airstrikes. Per ACLED methodology, when several strikes hit the same location on the same day, they are coded as one event in the dataset. See the ACLED Codebook for more details.
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Ctech, “Israel weighs deployment of Iron Beam in Eilat after Houthi drone strike,” 25 September 2025
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For more on Israeli constraints on dealing with the Houthis, see April Longley Alley, “Israel and the Houthis Are Entering a Dangerous Escalation Cycle,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 5 September 2025