Regional Overview: Africa | July 2023

Cameroon: Increased civilian targeting in the Extreme-Nord region

In July, violence targeting civilians rose in the Extreme-Nord region for the third consecutive month as the Lake Chad faction of the Islamic State West Africa (ISWAP) and Boko Haram (JAS) militants carried out numerous attacks in Logone-et-Chari, Mayo Sava, and Mayo Tsanaga departments. Although battles between Islamist militants and state forces with support from local self-defense militias continued in the Extreme-Nord region, most of the violence targeted civilians – which saw a 75% increase compared to last month. Amidst the attacks, insurgents looted goods and resources from civilians on numerous occasions. A pattern of insurgents stealing fertilizers raised concerns as they can be used to produce improvised explosive devices.¹ Thus far in 2023, ACLED records seven cases of remote violence in the Extreme-Nord region, already surpassing the total for 2022.

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Central African Republic: Rise in civilian targeting following Wagner troop rotation

Since the abortive Wagner rebellion in Russia, hundreds of Wagner mercenaries have withdrawn from Vakaga, Mambere-Kadei, Ouham-Pende, and Bangui prefectures.² CAR authorities claim the mercenaries were conducting a yearly rotation as new forces arrived to secure the constitutional referendum voting.³ The referendum would permit current President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to run for a third term in office and lengthen the presidential terms from five to seven years if the vote passes. The vote was held on 30 July, but the results are still unclear at the time of writing.⁴ However, the departure of Wagner mercenaries from several localities led some members of the CAR armed forces (FACA) soldiers to abandon their posts.⁵ Amidst the confusion surrounding the personnel changes, an unidentified armed group carried out an airstrike against a Wagner base in the town of Ndele on 12 July. 

Further, violence targeting civilians doubled last month across the country. Wagner Group mercenaries, FACA soldiers, and several other non-state armed groups carried out the majority of violence. Civilian targeting was widespread and may be linked with the referendum campaign in some areas, with reports of election violence and arbitrary arrests.⁶ In Am-Dafock, Vakaga prefecture, a mob attacked and seriously injured the Amdafock Referendum Campaign Director and his deputy.

For more on the Wagner Group, see ACLED’s most recent study, Moving Out of the Shadows: Shifts in Wagner Group Operations Around the World.

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Democratic Republic of Congo: Growing involvement of youth self-defense militias in combating the M23

In the Democratic Republic of Congo, political violence involving the March 23 Movement (M23) rose by over 40% in July compared to June amidst an overall rise in political violence in Nord-Kivu province. The increasing violence in Nord-Kivu was largely driven by the M23, along with increasing violence by local militias and military (FARDC) forces. M23 violence was concentrated in Masisi and Rutshuru territories in July. The increasing clashes against local militias largely included youth self-defense groups called wazalendo (meaning patriots in Kiswahili) or the Awakening of Patriots for the Liberation of Congo. Wazalendo clashes against M23 militants rose by nearly two-thirds last month compared to June. Despite the military forces also fighting against the M23, the FARDC and police have cracked down against the self-defense militias, leading to numerous clashes and arrests of wazalendo members. 

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Niger: Military coup by the presidential guard removes President Mohamed Bazoum

On 26 July, discontented presidential guards detained President Mohamed Bazoum and his family at the Presidential Palace in the capital, Niamey. The detention of the president culminated in a military coup wherein senior officers from different defense and security forces (FDS) branches formed a junta named the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland (CNSP).⁷ The coup came amid some reports that the coup leader, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, was going to lose his position as head of the Presidential Guard.⁸ This military junta follows previous coup attempts in 2021 and 2022. 

The coup led to widespread demonstrations – some in support of the coup and others condemning the military junta’s actions –  reflecting the divided public sentiment towards the ongoing political upheaval. Demonstrations favoring the newly formed junta turned violent, as rioters attacked the headquarters of the former ruling party Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS) Tarayya and assaulted several political party members. The coup evoked strong international condemnation, including mediation efforts, sanctions, and threats of military intervention from the West Africa regional bloc (ECOWAS).⁹ The governments of Mali and Burkina Faso, who were similarly installed after military coups in 2021 and 2022, pledged support to the junta, and warned against any foreign military intervention in Niger. Guinea’s military authorities also refused to apply sanctions and urged ECOWAS to reconsider its position.

For more on the military coup in Niger, see ACLED’s fact sheet: Military Coup in Niger.

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Zimbabwe: Escalating violence ahead of general elections

In Zimbabwe, political violence rose in the lead-up to the general elections scheduled for 23 August. Political violence events more than doubled in July compared to the average over the past year, primarily driven by a spike in attacks targeting opposition candidates and supporters. Civilians supporting the Citizen Coalition for Change (CCC) were particularly targeted in July, with numerous reports implicating supporters of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in these acts of violence. A ZANU-PF-linked group known as Forever Associate Zimbabwe has also become increasingly involved in election violence. The group is allegedly led by retired Brigadier-General Walter Tapfumaneyi,¹⁰ who holds the position of co-deputy director-general of the Central Intelligence Organisation. Ruling party MP candidates have also employed threats and manipulation to dissuade opposition supporters and community leaders from voting against them.¹¹ Additionally, police intervention has hindered the launch of the CCC’s election campaign and rallies in various provinces, with multiple instances of police-enforced meeting bans throughout the lead-up to the general elections.¹²

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Kenya: Police respond to a surge in Azimio Coalition opposition party demonstrations with deadly force

In Kenya, demonstrations spiked in July to more than double the monthly average over the preceding year following calls for mobilization by the Azimio Coalition opposition party over the high cost of living and new tax measures set by the government. Demonstrations coincided with the saba saba (seven seven) day commemoration, recalling the 7 July 1990 protests demanding democratic elections in Kenya.¹³ Around half of the demonstrations turned violent. Police officers have been accused of using excessive force, including the using live bullets against the demonstrators,¹⁴ and led to at least 30 reported fatalities. The latest surge in demonstration activity follows previous spikes in demonstrations against the current Kenya government by Azimio supporters in March and May 2023.

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