YCO Situation Update: October 2023

Is the Houthi involvement in the Israel-Gaza conflict the start of a re-escalation in Yemen?

As with much of the region, Yemen has been quickly drawn into the conflict between Israel and Palestine, both directly through Houthi attacks on Israel, and indirectly with the diversion of military resources and local anger over events in Gaza. This report looks at how events in Gaza have contributed to a decrease in political violence in Yemen, but a surge in demonstrations. The pro-Palestine demonstrations occurred primarily in Houthi-controlled areas, as the group is using the conflict to bolster its support domestically in response to growing signs of discontent and confirm its role regionally as a formidable part of the Iranian-led ‘axis of resistance.’ The report argues, though, that the shifts witnessed in October are likely only temporary, driven by the confluence of regional developments and local sentiment, and the trends will not continue into the coming months.

Houthi forces launch attacks at Israel

After several weeks of threats issued by Houthi officials at Israel and the United States in the wake of Hamas’s surprise attack on southern Israel on 7 October,¹ the group followed through on their warnings, launching several barrages of missiles and drones toward Israel. In the first attack on 19 October, a US warship patrolling the north of the Red Sea intercepted four cruise missiles and as many as 30 drones. A fifth missile was also allegedly intercepted close to the Midi coastline by Saudi air defenses as they protected their airspace. Two more projectiles followed, crashing in Egypt on 27 October and injuring six people in Taba near the Israeli border. The Israeli Defence Forces announced the intercept of a third barrage on 31 October, shooting down two drones and a missile over the Red Sea with fighter jets and the Arrow missile defense system.

Although the attacks have been unsuccessful, Houthi officials have cited the barrages as evidence of the group’s military development, reaching targets almost 2,000 kilometers from Yemen, and role as a formidable part of the Iranian-led ‘axis of resistance.’² The Houthis have threatened more attacks on Israel as long as the military campaign in Gaza is ongoing, as well as warning the US against intervening in the conflict, and more launches should be expected in the coming weeks.³

The Houthis have a track record of cross-border drone and missile launches since the start of the current conflict in Yemen. This included attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as several targeting naval and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. The launch of cruise missiles at US naval ships in the Red Sea provoked the only instance of direct American targeting of the Houthi forces, destroying three Houthi-controlled radar sites on the West Coast in 2016. Given their failure to hit Israel, the Houthis could look at more achievable targets closer to home.⁴

Based on events in October, the Houthis will likely launch more drones and missiles toward Israel as they participate in the Iran-led axis of resistance, even as the attacks fail to reach their intended targets. The group has proven that it can reach targets in Israel, but not that it has the accuracy or capability to overcome the distance — or breach the network of air defense systems between the two countries, as shown by three different actors intercepting its attacks (see map below). However, the unsuccessful launches will not dissuade the Houthis from launching more attacks as part of a broader multi-directional air attack.

Pro-Palestine demonstrations spike across Yemen

Since 7 October, there has been a surge in demonstrations across Yemen in relation to developments in Israel and Palestine. ACLED records 548 pro-Palestine and anti-Israel demonstrations — more than the prior eight years combined. For comparison, in September, only one related demonstration was reported in Yemen. Notably, this marks the second surge in Israel-Palestine demonstrations this year, following the 132 events recorded in May. The previous spike coincided with rocket attacks from Gaza following the death of a prominent political prisoner affiliated with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and retaliatory Israeli airstrikes. Based on last year’s trends, frequent demonstrations can be expected throughout Yemen as long as the Israel-Gaza conflict is ongoing.

Overall, 84% of the demonstration events in October were in Houthi-controlled areas (see map below). Of the 548 related demonstrations, 431 can be classified as Houthi-sponsored events, typically being organised and including local Houthi-aligned officials. Frequent demonstrations were also reported in government — and Southern Transitional Council (STC) — controlled areas, 88 in total, but to a far lesser extent. This trend will hold as the Houthis use the domestic anger over the conflict to bolster their local support.⁵

Demonstrations in Yemen picked up sharply from 7 October. However, on a day-to-day basis, the intensity of the demonstrations did not appear to have correlated directly with events in Gaza. The only exception was on 13 October, which saw the most demonstrations in a single day in response to Israeli airstrikes that killed 45 people in a residential building in the Jabaliya refugee camp. The other consistent trend is that Fridays are the main day for the protests, with an average of 37 events. The demonstrations usually follow Friday prayers, with much of the preaching centered around the situation in Palestine. This was particularly the case in Houthi-controlled areas. 

Decreasing violence amid Houthi extra-territorial attacks

October saw the lowest number of political violence events in Yemen since the start of the current conflict in 2015, with 187 events — a 30% drop from September. Incident levels saw a gradual decline as the month progressed. The number of reported fatalities also reached its lowest point since the conflict began in March 2015, at 144, down from 207 in September. The level of incidents and fatalities are likely to remain relatively low in the coming month as the Houthis direct military resources toward Israel, but will possibly begin to slowly pick up again as attention begins to drift away from Gaza over time.

Hostilities between the Houthi and anti-Houthi forces hit a low as the usual Houthi attacks that have instigated much of the political violence between the sides since the United Nations-mediated truce subsided. Air and drone strikes also decreased, with the Houthis’ missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) instead focused on strikes against Israel. Incidents on the ground continued, but the lethality decreased in most governorates, especially in Taizz, as the fighting shifted from direct armed clashes to stand-off artillery fire and shelling. However, this was not the case in all governorates, most notably in Saada, where reported fatalities rose by 40% as the Houthis mounted hit-and-run attacks on Saudi and IRG border forces, potentially in response to the Saudi interception of a Houthi missile intended for Israel and the stalled peace talks.

However, the lull in political violence is likely temporary and will begin to fade in the coming month as attention on Gaza begins to drift and domestic concerns return to the fore. Given their failure to strike Israel, the Houthis could look for alternatives to prove their military strength and create leverage if truce talks resume. Regionally, the group has threatened to target Israeli and US assets in the Red Sea — which, if successful, could provoke reciprocal tit-for-tat strikes. Domestically, hostilities could heat up at key pressure points, whether on the Saudi border as part of their escalate-to-deescalate strategy or on a critical front such as Marib, where the group deployed their newly formed ‘al-Aqsa Flood’ Special Forces in early November. Even if these actions are more symbolic, rather than an intention to escalate the conflict once again, the increased military activity may lead to higher levels of violence in the coming weeks.

Looking forward

Based on developments in October, several trends may emerge in the coming months in relation to events in Israel and Palestine and a potential escalation in Yemen:

• As long as the Israel-Gaza conflict continues, more Houthi missile and drone launches toward Israel are expected. The group claimed three more attacks in early November, and a successful strike or increased attacks could prompt tit-for-tat retaliation.
• Houthi missile and drone launches on Israel have a low likelihood of success. This reality could prompt a shift to more realistic targets, including US assets in neighboring countries and American and Israeli vessels in the Red Sea. The Houthis have already downed a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over the Red Sea on 8 November, claiming it was conducting hostile surveillance over Yemeni territorial waters.
• Besides extra-territorial attacks, the Houthis have staged several domestic military exercises, also showcasing the al-Aqsa Flood Special Forces, a new unit named after the Hamas’ operation in Israel, which the Houthis may deploy in Yemen as a show of force for both domestic and regional audiences.
• Truce talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia have stalled since the Israel-Gaza conflict began. Although Houthi officials criticized Riyadh’s response to events in Gaza, there were no significant attacks within Saudi Arabia. However, recently increased military activity on the border may indicate a push for future talks and efforts to accelerate the lagging political process.
• Pro-Palestine demonstrations will likely continue at an almost daily rate across Yemen, especially in Houthi-controlled areas where the group may continue to use the public anger over the conflict to try to counter any domestic discontent.