Yemen Situation Update: March 2024

Unilateral road openings more likely to reopen hostilities than critical routes

With the unofficial truce still holding in the broader conflict and the UN-led peace talks stalled by the escalation in the Red Sea, the Yemeni parties each announced unilateral initiatives for Ramadan, including infrastructure projects and financial disbursements, as a means of boosting local support. Among these unilateral proposals have been a series of reopenings of stretches of the main roads on either side of the frontlines. However, the one-sided moves have not only failed to open critical routes but have, in some cases, become a potential flashpoint between the warring parties.

Armed clashes have increased on some of the roads proposed for reopening, resulting in increased fatalities and ongoing fighting. In the absence of any discussions or mediation, one-sided announcements are unlikely to lead to any meaningful progress in the peace process and may instead precipitate more incidents.

IRG and Houthis trade road opening proposals

Beginning in late February, the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) and the Houthis announced a series of unilateral openings of some of the main roads that have been closed by the ongoing conflict. Sultan al-Arada, Marib governor and vice president of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), led the way, announcing on 22 February that the stretch of the northern route between Marib city and Sanaa city would be reopened (see map below).¹ Al-Arada called on the Houthis to take a similar step on their side of the frontline to help alleviate the suffering of people in Marib.

However, the Houthis stated they would only open the route under two conditions: the release of all detainees arrested at security or military checkpoints in Marib and an agreement that no one using the road would be arrested at checkpoints on the route in the future.² The following day, Houthi forces shelled an IRG checkpoint on the road linking Marib and Sanaa, killing one soldier and injuring three others, in a rare attack in that previously quiet part of the Marib front.³ Shortly afterward, the Houthi leadership proposed their own road opening, but on the other direct route connecting Marib and Sanaa city (see map below), demanding that the IRG reciprocate on their end of the road.⁴ Both routes, however, remain closed.

Similarly, an IRG committee stated on 2 March that it would open two roads in Taizz city, to which the Houthis responded by declaring the unblocking of a disconnected side road to the north of the governorate capital and a road in the south of the governorate linking to Lahij.⁵ However, as with Marib, neither side has shown any inclination to open the adjoining parts of any of the routes, and the roads are all still closed to commercial traffic.

Meanwhile, the Houthis began preparations for their own one-sided road openings ahead of Ramadan. In early March, the group began preparations to clear a section of the main north-south road in al-Dali that runs between Sanaa and Aden.⁶ An attempt by a Houthi committee, accompanied by an armed convoy, to remove a roadblock in the north of the governorate on 12 March devolved into clashes with Southern Transitional Council (STC)-affiliated forces, who accused the Houthi forces of instigating the firefight.⁷ STC officials said the reopening should have been coordinated with all parties and laid out their conditions that any future openings should be linked to the UN-led political roadmap and carried out under international supervision.⁸

Efforts led by local authorities and tribes to clear the Sanaa-Aden route that runs through al-Bayda, which has been cut off in the south of the governorate, were also reportedly ongoing during Ramadan.⁹ The road crosses an active frontline at the Aqaba Thira mountain pass on the border between Houthi-controlled al-Bayda and STC-held Abyan. So far, though, the discussions have failed to convince the warring sides to demilitarize the route.

Houthi forces militarily respond to road-opening efforts

Although none of the unilateral road openings has led to any movement on any of the proposed routes, the heightened political activity has had a mixed impact on the ground. Most notably, fighting has increased in al-Dali following the failed road opening in mid-March. In response to the shooting, Houthi forces mounted a series of attacks across the front, hitting most of the active frontlines in the west of the governorate.

Since 12 March, 11 incidents were reported in the districts surrounding the road proposed for reopening, including 10 in Qaataba and one in Damt. As shown in the chart below, this is the highest monthly incident count in al-Dali since July 2023 and marks an uptick from the one event reported in February. Amidst the unrest, notably fierce hostilities were reported on the Qaataba frontlines in the second half of the month: 51 fatalities were reported in Qaataba district in March — the most in over two years. 

The other road openings, though, have not had the same impact on the frontlines. In Marib, other than the single shelling incident on the IRG side of the reopened northwestern road, limited hostilities were reported in March, marking a continuation of the typically low incident and fatality numbers seen in the areas around the westbound routes in Marib in recent months.

Conversely, although the frontlines in Taizz remained among the most active in the country (see map below), Taizz city saw a decrease in incidents of political violence and fatalities in March compared to previous months. Collectively, the three districts where the two parties reopened roads saw the lowest incident count this year and the lowest fatality numbers since November. Similarly, the already relatively quiet Aqaba Thira front between al-Bayda and Abyan witnessed no incidents or fatalities in March, a slight decline from the three incidents in the previous month.

Negotiations over road openings a long-term obstacle in peace talks

All of these roads have been closed for most of the nine years since the start of the current conflict. The reopening of these critical routes, in particular around the Houthi-besieged city of Taizz, has been a central tenet of the several rounds of peace talks in the last decade but has been caught up in the wider paralysis that has beset the UN-led negotiations.¹⁰ Local efforts to de-link the process from the stalled national-level discussions have also repeatedly failed to make headway, stymied by the parties to the conflict and their territorial divisions.¹¹

Through all six rounds of peace talks, road reopenings have been part of the discussions between the IRG and Houthis, but all have failed to get off the ground. In 2018, as part of the UN-mediated talks that led to the Stockholm Agreement, the office of the UN Special Envoy for Yemen brokered a statement of understanding on Taizz that was aimed at reaching a deal to lift the siege on the governorate capital.¹² However, there was no follow-through on the arrangement.

The most recent UN-brokered truce, from April to October 2022, also included an aspect on road openings. As with previous talks, the openings did not advance beyond the discussion stage and were the only unimplemented element of the nationwide truce agreement.¹³ The IRG and Houthis have accused one another of obstructing the process, allegations that have continued into the March reopenings. The IRG has accused the Houthis of hypocrisy, drawing parallels between Israel’s siege on Gaza and the group’s ongoing blockade of Taizz.¹⁴

Unlike the previous road opening efforts, which were affected by the heavy fighting and airstrikes on most of the frontlines, the latest proposals have come as the conflict has de-escalated into a low-intensity war. However, despite the more favorable context, the decrease in hostilities has not been sufficient to overcome the warring parties’ unwillingness to reach a compromise arrangement.

Instead of opening the long-closed roads, the unilateral measures have increased tensions on several fronts and set off some of the most intensive clashes in the past year, especially in al-Dali. Future one-sided, uncoordinated attempts to reopen roads risk provoking further fighting at these critical points on the frontlines, as maintaining their hold over the routes provides the Houthis and IRG with territorial control and a source of revenue from checkpoints.¹⁵ With national-level negotiations on hold, there is little incentive for the warring sides to make the necessary concessions at the local level to lift the roadblocks despite the humanitarian and economic costs for the rest of the country.¹⁶

Looking forward

• The proposed road reopenings for Ramadan have failed to open critical routes and have instead become a potential flashpoint between the warring parties. Both sides are issuing unilateral announcements without engaging with the other party to coordinate or discuss their activities, resulting in parallel and unconnected routes and the potential for misunderstandings on the frontlines.
• Given the pause in truce talks, any local initiatives are unlikely to advance independently and may create more tension than any local relief. Efforts to begin talks about road openings or other negotiating tracks remain on hold due to the Houthi Red Sea attacks and the broader regional situation and will not move forward until these are resolved. The UN-proposed roadmap is paralyzed by the circumstances, and linked tracks will remain at a standstill until the broader talks can start moving again.
• Regarding the Red Sea crisis, despite the deadly Houthi attack that killed three sailors, there has been no significant escalation from either side. Houthi drone and missile launches have kept a steady pace, although the success rate remains low. The defensive naval missions deployed in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden by the US and the EU are managing to intercept most of the projectiles, which is diminishing, but not removing, the threat to commercial ships.
• The US-led strikes are seemingly decreasing the number of Houthi attacks but not halting them or reducing their impact on global shipping. Most vessels are still being diverted away from the high-risk Red Sea area. The targeting of the US strikes remains narrowly focused, which has limited the casualty toll and civilian impact but also allowed the Houthis to keep their weapons stockpiles intact and continue the maritime attacks.
• Outside the maritime theater, the conflict remains low-intensity and, despite the wider regional escalation, does not seem likely to reignite in the short term. Periodic skirmishes and standoff fire will most probably be the primary incidents across the active frontlines, with the associated casualties and civilian impact, but at a similar level as in recent months.