How might the coronavirus influence political violence? Arguably, one of the countries where the coronavirus has altered patterns most severely is in Guinea. Since October 2019, Guinea has experienced large-scale, violent demonstrations against a proposed change of the constitution. The coronavirus outbreak has allowed the regime to silence protests, to push through constitutional changes, to elect and install a new parliament, to arrest opposition leaders, and to deflect international attention. Government ministers view the coronavirus as ‘Don de Dieu’: a gift from God.
How has the coronavirus pandemic altered Guinea’s political landscape – and how has it changed the trajectory of political violence in the country?
Constitutional changes and violent demonstrations
Constitutional changes were necessary. Guinea’s current constitution grew out of the political crises of 2008-2010 and was hastily put together (Niang, 2019). One element that particularly required reform was the composition of parliament – as Guinea’s ruling party, the Rassemblement du Peuple Guinée (RPG-Arc-en-Ciel), points out (Jeune Afrique, 2019). But both the opposition – united in the Front National pour la Défense de la Constitution (FNDC) – and independent observers (e.g. Bouchner, 2019) see in the revision a ploy by sitting President Alpha Condé to reset term limits and to stay in power. Indeed, by March 2018, Kelefa Sall, the head of the constitutional court, was removed likely as he opposed constitutional change (RFI, 2018). In October 2018, the Minister of Justice stepped down in protest (Jeune Afrique, 2019).
From early 2019 onward, the Condé regime has used a string of measures – such as intimidation, arbitrary arrest, and a protest ban – in an unsuccessful attempt to control unrest (HRW, 2019). Since October 2019, the FNDC has mobilized the streets, resulting in hundreds of violent demonstrations. Data from ACLED show at least 75 reported fatalities for this period.1Some sources — like the FNDC — report a lower death toll. The FNDC only counts fatalities that can be fully corroborated (e.g. for which it has phone numbers of family members) meaning it reports mostly fatalities in Conakry. ACLED records all reported fatalities across the country, which is why ACLED’s estimate is higher than that produced by the FNDC. For more on ACLED fatality methodology, see this primer.
The figure below presents ACLED data on political violence and protest events in Guinea since the middle of 2018. After Mali, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso, Guinea is the most disorder-affected country in West Africa, topping Niger. While there are various forms of political violence in Guinea, half of all events during this period relate to the proposed constitutional changes and referendum. The blue line in the figure represents the increase of large-scale riots and protests from October 2019 onward that are directly related to the constitutional change, leading to a total of over 350 distinct riots and protests, or approximately 65% of all events. It also shows that resistance abruptly ceased after 22 March.
The map below sheds additional light on resistance against constitutional changes. While overly simplistic,2Regime and opposition co-opt across all groups. it is helpful to think of Guinean politics in four ethno-regional blocs (McGovern, 2012): Fulani in the center-north, Malinke in the north (Upper Guinea region), Susu in the southwest, and a number of smaller tribes (Kissi, Toma, Kpelle, Guerze, Koniya) in the southeast (Forestiere region). The map below highlights how hardly any violence is reported in Condé’s Malinke/Upper Guinea base, but that all three other blocks have joined in opposition against the RPG – including various groups in the Forestiere region, Condé’s second base (Africa Confidential, 2019). After 22 March, political violence is confined to opposition areas.3With the exception of one land conflict in Condé’s base (Guinee Matin, 2020).
The coronavirus and political violence
The drop in political violence and protest events at first seems to be the result of a lost battle: the constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections took place on 22 March 2020. But in reality, it is primarily the coronavirus outbreak driving the decline. RPG-authoritarianism is Guinea’s first coronavirus survivor.
The outbreak impacted disorder trends in three distinct ways. First, it allowed the regime to mute the opposition. Leaders like Alpha Condé have survived decades of politics and mastered the skilful art of seizing opportunities (Lettre du Continent, 2012). The pandemic is a case in point. Until the 22 March referendum, just one coronavirus case was declared in the country – likely fewer cases than there were in reality. This was low enough to hold the referendum while also allowing the government to impose health restrictions, accompanied by an internet shutdown, open intimidation by security forces and gangs, and manipulated voting lists (Netblocks, 2020; Africa Confidential, 2020; Francophonie, 2020). In short, Condé used the coronavirus numbers to restrict the opposition. Hours after the polls, two new cases were confirmed, setting the stage for further security measures. Days later, on 26 March, and without election results declared, a state of emergency banned all gatherings of more than 20 and gave the security services a free hand to maintain ‘order’ (Dakar Aktu, 2020). With the lockdown in place, the government proceeded to release the contested referendum results two days later: 92% support for Condé (Jeune Afrique, 2020). On 30 March, new cases and a night curfew were announced, followed by parliamentary election results on 2 April : 67% for the RPG Arc-en-Ciel (Jeune Afrique, 2020). Since then, coronavirus cases have risen exponentially, warranting additional measures that make protests even more difficult (e.g. wearing unavailable face masks). On 21 April, the new parliament was suddenly installed, just days before an expected ECOWAS ruling (Africa Guinee, 2020).
Second, the pandemic has led to uncertainty in the ranks of the FNDC (Afrique Guinee, 2020). In recent weeks, the opposition has tried to mobilize regional and international actors, including by preparing a case before the International Criminal Court. While sub-regional and international governments sympathize, the FNDC has so far found that outsiders are too occupied with their own problems amid the pandemic. This leaves the FNDC with a contentious and risky option: renewed protest. Indeed, the movement maintains extensive control over the streets: in the past, major dips in protests (see graph above) followed FNDC’s calls to pause. Within the ranks of the FNDC, it is recognized that mass mobilization is their only remaining source of power, but also one that can be squandered if people stay at home due to the coronavirus outbreak. The previous Ebola epidemic left people with a genuine fear of public health crises, and as a result they are reluctant to go out during the coronavirus pandemic. Combined with blatant repression and concerns that public gatherings will spread the virus, the FNDC hesitates. This is influenced by a fight for the presidency later this year; various FNDC leaders may run against Condé – and one another. For all these reasons, it is possible that the FNDC will decide to hold off on public protests and instead sponsor concealed unrest; there are, for example, claims that recent arson attacks are backed by the opposition (Media Guinee, 2020; Guinea Matin, 2020).
Finally, the coronavirus outbreak may also indirectly obfuscate ongoing political violence by restricting the flow of information and the ability of journalists to report. Right after the referendum, multiple journalists were put under house arrest after two were potentially infected by coronavirus (Kaba Bachir, 2020). Those at home had limited ability to obtain information, while others recognized tacit threats by the government and resorted to self-censorship. In reality, political violence is likely continuing out of sight. Some credible sources claim torture, arbitrary arrests, and enforced disappearances are occurring on a large scale (Le Djely, 2020; Guineenews, 2020; Vision Guinee, 2020, HRW, 2020). Indeed, arrests of opposition members have been reported since 22 March (Africa Confidential, 2020). There is also a persistent rumor that a massacre was perpetrated in Nzérékoré on election day, and that detention camps have been set up in the Soronkoni military camp, among other locations (Africa Guinee, 2020). Many of these reports have proven difficult to corroborate given Guinea’s media landscape, and within the current environment especially. This underlines the importance of expanding coverage in the country beyond solely traditional media sources, which ACLED is taking steps to do.
The outbreak has significantly altered patterns of political violence and demonstrations in Guinea. It has created an opportunity for the Condé regime to consolidate power and to impose new restrictions to hamper the opposition. At the same time, it is undermining the opposition’s capacity for mobilization by sowing doubts over the use of mass protests, all the while impeding the free flow of information – meaning that violence is likely going underreported. These trends underscore the fact that patterns of political violence are changing due to the coronavirus outbreak and require close monitoring.
Implications
These changes may have lasting consequences. The opportunity offered by the outbreak is structurally altering the distribution of power in Guinea. Condé is rapidly rebuilding his ruling coalition, appointing his long-term ally Amadou Damaro Camara from the Forestiere region (Camara also has a base in Upper Guinea) as president of parliament (Jeune Afrique, 2020). In recent days, Condé has reworked the RPG’s bureau politique (Guinee News, 2020). Soon a cabinet change will follow. The further ascent of Camara underscores that Condé is increasingly drawing on the clique that held former long-term ruler Lansana Conteh in power (Africa Confidential, 2020).
But there are other potential long-term consequences that should be a concern for both Guinea and the international community. First, the space for opposition is shrinking. Guinea’s history of coups, incidental outbursts of violence, and existing ties between opposition figures and politicians in Mali and Burkina Faso may in time push the opposition into a corner that could further destabilize the region. Second, pushing through the referendum has isolated Condé in the sub-region as well as internationally. Relationships with France were already strained (Jeune Afrique, 2017; L’Opinion, 2020) whereas Condé enjoys an excellent relationship with Russia, China, and Turkey (Guinee Live, 2020), not in the least after the Russian ambassador supported the constitutional change, stating that constitutions are “no dogmas” (Voice of America, 2019). Condé’s manipulation of power during the outbreak may in this way accelerate geopolitical change and reconfigure which international players hold most sway in the sub-region. Finally, Condé is known to mingle in the affairs of Guinea’s neighbors. Both Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau have seen a somewhat unexpected loss of incumbents who were each very close with Alpha Condé. It is clear that in these circles Condé’s manoeuvring is met with applause and hope for a better future for the old guard.
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