Little-Known Military Brigades and Armed Groups in Yemen: A Series
This series maps the activity of little-known military brigades and armed groups proliferating throughout the conflict in Yemen. Mapping these actors has become relevant for understanding future trajectories of violence in Yemen as some of them have developed significant combat capabilities with shifting allegiances. While some follow their own interests, others have clear allegiances to the internationally recognized government or the Southern Transitional Council. As with actors in other conflict scenarios, such allegiances are, however, never set in stone. Rather, allegiances are a fluid process, shifting due to changes of outside circumstances (e.g. the behavior of a patron) or battlefield victories. In order to be better prepared for these changes, this series maps the activity of such military brigades and armed groups — some of them have become relevant already, while others may see their turn towards increased relevance in the future.
This piece provides a deep dive into an actor that is not yet covered in much detail by traditional media; as such, it draws on OSINT, including new media sources, more than traditional ACLED analysis. Some of these sources are not used in ACLED’s data collection, but the information garnered from them for this piece has been either triangulated or presented with the appropriate caveats.
The Asifah Brigade, also known by its English translation as the “Storm Brigade,” is a brigade that is advancing the goals of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in Aden. Although it has operated in Yemen for some time, the Asifah Brigade remains little-known. It did not gain prominence until April 2020, when it secured most of Aden’s strategic infrastructure following the STC’s call for self-administration across southern Yemen (Twitter, 26 April 2020).
The Asifah Brigade was founded in early 2018 and is led by Awssan Fadl Al Anshali, who was the commander of the personal guard of STC President Aidarus Al Zubaidi back when he was governor of Aden. An extremely close relationship seems to have developed between the two men, with some reports suggesting that Al Zubaidi is Al Anshali’s father-in-law (News Line, 22 May 2020). In January 2016, Al Anshali drove his armored vehicle into a car carrying a suicide bomber to protect Al Zubaidi’s convoy, with photos showing Al Zubaidi by his hospital bed (Twitter, 6 January 2016; Twitter, 8 January 2016).1In late 2018, Al Anshali reportedly spent three months in Egypt for medical treatment to address complications from wounds sustained during that incident (Al Hezam Media, 29 December 2018). As a result of this relationship, the Asifah Brigade is sometimes described as answering directly to STC President Al Zubaidi (Al Masdar Online, 6 June 2020), while most other pro-STC armed groups are understood as answering to STC Vice President Hani bin Braik. In the past, Al Anshali has been described as Al Zubaidi’s right-hand-man in Aden (Twitter, 11 November 2017; Twitter, 19 December 2017); today, he can be considered his closest ally in the city.
Some claim that the Asifah Brigade’s leader, Awssan Al Anshali, maintains links with the family of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. He has, for instance, been accused of being loyal to one of his sons, Yahya Muhammad Abdullah Saleh, as he reportedly worked as a Central Security Officer in Sanaa before returning to southern Yemen.2Twitter, 8 January 2016;Twitter, 2 August 2017 Some reports also allege that after the Houthis killed President Saleh in December 2017, Al Anshali helped move a number of Republican Guard forces led by his nephew, Tareq Saleh, to the 31st Brigade camp in Aden, in Bir Ahmed area.3Facebook, 18 January 2019;Al Wattan, 19 January 2018;Twitter, 24 January 2018
Although unverified, these claims hint at a possible alliance that — while being widely discussed — has yet to officially materialize between the STC and a faction of the General People’s Congress (GPC) that is loyal to the Saleh family, and, in particular, to Tareq Saleh, who is now a prominent commander on the western front.4ACLED, 20 July 2018; Middle East Eye, 26 July 2020 As both the STC and Tareq Saleh are backed by the UAE, such an alliance would most likely be aimed at weakening the Hadi government, perceived by all three actors as favorable to the Islah party. This is especially deserving of attention as Aden’s new governor, Ahmad Lamlas, is a former GPC member argued to be a Saleh loyalist, who has in the past threatened the Hadi government with forming an alliance with Tareq Saleh.5Al Masdar, 17 December 2019 Such an alliance could weaken the Hadi government and its affiliated forces to a point they have never been since the beginning of the conflict, as they would be simultaneously fighting pro-Houthi forces in the north of the country, and this still hypothetical STC-Saleh alliance in Taizz and the south.
While the brigade was first mentioned on social media in March 2018, with some referring to them as “Storm Belt forces” (Twitter; 6 March 2018), the first batch of Asifah Brigade troops appears to have completed its training in June 2018 (Twitter, 21 June 2018). However, very few reports mentioned the brigade until 2020. ACLED records the first event involving the Asifah Brigade in January 2020, almost two years after its creation (see graph below).6On 2 May 2018, unidentified armed men reportedly threw a sound bomb at the residence of Awssan Al Anshali in the October area of Khur Maksar district in Aden, but this event did not involve the Asifah Brigade per se. On 1 January 2020, Al Anshali’s forces reportedly looted 18 billion Yemeni riyals (approximately 70 million US dollars) belonging to the Central Bank in the container port of Aden and stored them in the STC-controlled Jabal Hadid military camp, before handing them back two days later (Twitter; 2 January 2020; Al Masdar Online, 2 January 2020; Al Masdar Online, 3 January 2020; Al Masdar Online, 3 January 2020).
Starting in March 2020, reports then emerged about the Asifah Brigade launching security operations across Aden, including alongside other pro-STC brigades in Dar Sad and Ash Shaikh Outhman districts (Al Wattan, 10 March 2020). In Craiter, they reportedly replaced the forces of Mukhtar and Imam Al Nubi, who were sent to the 5th Support and Reinforcement Brigade in Radfan district of Lahij governorate. The Asifah Brigade subsequently took control of most of the district, including the strategic Camp 20 (Twitter, 24 March 2020; Al Masdar Online, 24 March 2020). Al Nubi forces only remained in the Presidential Palace area (Aden News Agency, 24 March 2020; Aden Time, 25 March 2020).
By late April 2020, the Asifah Brigade had reportedly taken control of a number of government facilities, banks, ports and the city’s airport, although it was prevented from overtaking the Central Bank by Saudi forces (Twitter, 26 April 2020; Twitter, 26 April 2020; Al Omana, 26 April 2020). Ultimately, the Asifah Brigade positioned itself as the STC’s new security provider in Aden (Aden Al Ghad, 7 June 2020). This rebalancing of power in Yemen’s interim capital, however, has led to increased tensions. In early June 2020, clashes erupted in Aden between forces from the Asifah Brigade and Security Belt forces led by Imam Al Nubi after the latter refused orders given by Al Anshali to go fight against pro-Hadi forces in Abyan (Al Araby, 6 June 2020; Al Masdar Online, 6 June 2020). The map below shows the various locations in which ACLED records Asifah Brigade activity in 2020.
The Asifah Brigade’s focus on Aden and its connection to the city is clear. Although it might have been involved in clashes in neighboring Abyan governorate to the west of Aden, ACLED so far records no activity of the brigade outside of the interim capital. As aforementioned, its leader, Awssan Al Anshali, has been working in Aden since at least 2016, first as the head of the governor’s personal guard, and then as commander of the Rapid Intervention Battalion (Twitter, 3 August 2017; Twitter; 5 November 2017) after the creation of the STC in May 2017. In this position, he worked on the security file in Aden alongside STC ally Shallal Ali Shaya (Twitter; 6 November 2017).
Al Anshali, however, is not originally from Aden, but from Ad Dali governorate. His various appointments in the city can be interpreted as loyalty rewards from Al Zubaidi, who hails from Ad Dali himself.7Shallal Ali Shaya, the former Security Director of Aden, is also from Ad Dali governorate. Some reports also claim that most fighters of the Asifah Brigade come from Ad Dali governorate and the Yafa region (Aden News Agency, 28 March 2020). As such, as the brigade consolidates power over Aden, tensions could arise with the city’s residents and other local armed groups, who might perceive the Asifah Brigade as an external force imposed on them. Few pro-STC fighters in fact hail from Aden, nor do its leaders, with the notable exception of its Vice President Hani bin Braik. At the same time, competition could also arise from within the brigade itself. Although the Dali-Yafa-Radfan triangle often seems to be a cohesive unit, there are rumors of increasing competition between leaders and fighters from Ad Dali and those from Yafa.
These risks have especially increased in light of a potential breakthrough in the Riyadh Agreement in late July 2020, after an impasse that lasted for nearly nine months (Associated Press, 29 July 2020). Although the STC announced that it abandoned its aspirations for self-administration in southern Yemen, it gained as compensation the nomination of its Secretary-General, Ahmad Lamlas, as the new governor of Aden (Saba News Agency, 28 July 2020).8Ahmad Lamlas was formerly the governor of Shabwah, and, prior to that, manager of several districts in Aden (Ash Shaikh Outhman, Al Mansura and Khur Maksar). After taking over the city by force last April, the STC now seems to have assumed official control of Yemen’s interim capital. The way the Asifah Brigade extends and exerts its influence in Aden over the next few months will need to be monitored closely, as it will be crucial in determining future patterns of political violence in the city.
© 2020 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). All rights reserved.
