Disorder and Distrust Ahead of the 2023 Elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo

13 December 2023

On 20 December, 44 million eligible Congolese voters will elect their new president alongside parliamentary, regional assembly, and local council positions in a single-round poll.¹ The incumbent President Felix Tshisekedi and 21 opposition candidates have entered the presidential race,² marking the first election after a democratic transition of power since independence. Following elections in 2018, Tshisekedi took power from former President Joseph Kabila.³ Despite this significant democratic milestone, the 2023 elections take place amid heightened disorder triggered by serious concerns about the impartiality of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) along with violence directed toward party candidates and members.

After numerous opposition-led challenges to the 2018 election process and outcome,⁴ demonstrators took to the streets during President Tshisekedi’s first term in office to demand changes to the electoral process and accused the CENI of bias toward the incumbent president.⁵ Government forces often suppressed opposition gatherings, contributing to the limited number of total demonstrations in the DRC — averaging fewer than 45 events each month during Tshisekedi’s time in office between January 2019 and November 2023. Congolese state forces prevented or stopped many demonstrations and political rallies by keeping political groups from gathering or entering certain areas, along with arrests of party leaders.⁶ In addition, increasing violence has targeted political party supporters and candidates in 2023 as the election date approaches.

Rival Party Supporters Target Election Monitor Amid Allegations of Bias

CENI is the body that oversees the electoral process in the DRC, designed to be neutral and autonomous and tasked with ensuring “free and democratic elections.”⁷ In the lead-up to the 2023 elections, demonstrators have called for changes to CENI policies, leadership, and election materials. Armed groups and political party supporters also carried out targeted violence against CENI officials, equipment, and buildings – especially during changes to CENI oversight and voter registration.⁸ Since Tshisekedi took office in 2019, CENI has developed a controversial reputation related to its perceived closeness with the government⁹ and associated concerns over the publication of voting documents, procedural irregularities, and CENI’s leadership.¹⁰ CENI has struggled to obtain the necessary voting machines and ballots to hold elections and has faced challenges with updating the electoral roll.¹¹ These concerns have been a significant driver of demonstration activity in the DRC.

Demonstrations led by opposition political parties and several influential civil society groups over CENI have driven multiple surges in the total number of monthly demonstrations in the DRC (see graph below). The largest spike in demonstrations since Tshisekedi took office on 24 January 2019 occurred in July 2020, primarily driven by widespread demonstrations against the partisan appointments to CENI leadership. Significantly, the selection of Denis Kadima as the head of CENI triggered widespread demonstrations, as critics found Kadima too close to President Tshisekedi — both are members of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) party, and hail from the Luba ethnic group and Kasaï region.¹² Opposition Lamaku coalition supporters have increasingly mobilized against CENI since the last election, with another spike in demonstrations in September 2021 against the perceived politicization of the electoral commission ahead of Kadima’s formal appointment to CENI. Security forces often prevented these political opposition gatherings, including the blocking of further attempts by opposition candidates and supporters on 25 May 2023 to gather outside the national CENI office.

Since Tshisekedi entered office, demonstrations have been most frequent in the turbulent North Kivu province, comprising over a quarter of annual demonstrations during this period. Despite being the most active in demonstrations, locals in North Kivu face significant threats of voting irregularities and disruptions due to high levels of insecurity. A surge in political violence in the province since October 2023 may delay or hinder voting in areas facing insecurity. Potential political interests of the ruling party may also influence voting delays or disruptions in the eastern region, given the area’s widespread support for opposition parties.¹³

In addition to demonstrations against CENI, electoral officials, polling stations, and CENI leadership have been targeted by violence. So far in 2023, ACLED records over 30 such events, compared to an estimated 24 events during the 2018 election period. Rioters and political party supporters have been primarily responsible for the violence, but armed groups active in the east of the country have also targeted CENI offices, materials, and workers. While most of these cases occurred in North Kivu province, the increasing diffusion of events across 10 provinces shows the widespread challenges facing CENI (see map below).

Candidates Across the DRC at Risk of Intimidation

Armed groups and political actors employ specific violence targeting political party members, political candidates, and those holding government positions to influence policies or secure access to strategic positions. The targeting of political party members, leaders, and candidates in the DRC has grown in recent years; ACLED records 15 and 19 events in 2021 and 2022, respectively, before surging to 32 so far in 2023. Although such incidents remain comparatively low in the DRC relative to other types of violence, an increasingly diverse set of political party groups have been targeted each year since Tshisekedi took office in 2019. Furthermore, political party leaders have also been targeted across a wide range of territories from 2019 to 2023. Collectively, these trends show the fracturing of the coalitions that underpinned the previous election — notably the now-dissolved Cap for Change (CACH) and Common Front for the Congo (FCC) coalition between current President Tshisekedi and former President Kabila — and the lack of a united opposition against the incumbent Tshisekedi.

In 2023, members of at least 10 distinct political parties were the target of violence in the DRC. This phenomenon speaks to the broad spectrum of political parties fielding candidates in this election cycle and the lack of a robust political coalition against the sitting president.¹⁴ Amidst this heterogeneity, supporters of the ruling UDPS have been the most targeted group and simultaneously the most active in carrying out violence against other political party groups since 24 January 2019, including the high-profile killing of the youth leader of the Together for the Republic party on 28 November 2023.¹⁵ Supporters of the opposition Engagement for Citizenship and Development (ECIDE) have also been frequent victims of targeted violence. Several observers and ECIDE members believe the party leader, Martin Fayulu, actually won the 2018 election, resulting in attacks against ECIDE members voicing concerns about the election outcome.¹⁶

Political party leaders currently holding government positions are also targeted in the DRC, most often in the eastern provinces of Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu, where 75% of attacks on serving political party members during Tshisekedi’s time in office have taken place. In 2023, these events were less numerous than in past years but more geographically widespread beyond the eastern region, taking place in nine different provinces. In the capital Kinshasa, the high-profile assassination of a member of parliament and spokesperson of Together for the Republic party, Cherubin Okende Senga, on 13 July 2023 sparked political unrest. While some opposition members have dropped out of the race to support other candidates in the last weeks before the election,¹⁷ the lack of a unified coalition amongst opposition parties further poses the risk of violence targeting a more geographically widespread and diverse group of political actors.

A Volatile Election

The majority of violence in the DRC in the coming weeks and months is likely to target the voting process itself. Attacks against CENI officials, buildings, and equipment spiked in the lead-up and during the previous presidential elections in 2017 and 2018, with voting materials and infrastructure destroyed on numerous occasions. While these events tapered off in the months following the election, targeting of election officials has risen again since voting registration began in 2023.

Political party candidates and supporters will likely continue to be occasional targets of violence during and immediately after the elections. The ways that the ruling regime and opposition groups decide to cooperate will influence political party violence and demonstrations over the details of these arrangements. After the previous election, the details of the CACH-FCC coalition power-sharing arrangement undergirded numerous demonstrations. Many parties have shared a united voice against CENI,¹⁸ and political coalitions may be another key to the December 2023 elections.¹⁹

Particularly in the eastern provinces, voting disruptions will likely limit or delay the population from participating in the election. Political opposition groups in the eastern provinces have expressed resentment during numerous demonstrations against international military forces, with some violent repression in response by authorities.²⁰ Further, armed group threats or violence targeting voters will further influence the election outcome in these areas by affecting voter registration, depressing voter turnout on election day, or pressuring voters to select specific candidates. The escalation of the M23 violence since late 2021, with reported support from Rwanda (see Actor Profile: The March 23 Movement), has also inflamed a well-worn political discourse concerning those who are genuinely Congolese and others labeled outsiders – especially those of Rwandan heritage.²¹ These local dynamics are likely to have implications on the outcome of the election and broader post-election disorder in the DRC.

Visuals in this report were produced by Ana Marco.