On 12 January, United States and United Kingdom air forces claimed to have carried out strikes on over 60 Houthi targets at 16 locations in Yemen. The operation was supported by Australia, Bahrain, Canada, and the Netherlands, members of the naval task force Operation Prosperity Guardian. The spokesperson of the Houthi military forces acknowledged the attack, mentioning that 73 raids targeted the capital Sanaa and the governorates of al-Hudayda, Taizz, Hajja, and Saada, resulting in five fighters dead and six injured. The multi-national operation sought to eliminate Houthi strategic infrastructure, thereby diminishing the Houthis’ offensive capabilities, and to retaliate following the group’s 9 January direct attack on US warships. However, it is unlikely that the strikes completely eradicated Houthi military capacity to target objectives in the Red Sea.
For their part, the Houthis vowed to respond to what they termed a “criminal aggression” against the Yemeni people. This threat is likely to materialize in direct attacks against US and allied warships and could lead to a temporary increase in the targeting of commercial vessels. Arguably, Houthi ideology will play a substantive role in driving symbolically relevant retaliatory acts against the US. Since its inception, the Houthi movement has been warning the Islamic community against the threat of Washington’s military intervention. In a recent speech, the leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi expressed a willingness to directly confront the US and Israel, instead of “their agents.”
The current crisis marks a significant opportunity for the Houthis to capitalize on years of political rhetoric. Whether the conflict will trigger an escalatory loop will mostly depend on the scale of Houthi retaliation and on the subsequent response of the international community. Further, should this crisis derail peace talks, nothing would keep the Houthis from also reviving the domestic conflict in Yemen — a possibility opposed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
For more, see Q&A: Why Are Yemen’s Houthis Attacking Ships in the Red Sea?
On 20 February, ACLED and the Yemen Data Project will launch the Yemen Conflict Observatory (YCO). This ‘living’ hub will include profiles on the most important actors and regions in the conflict, as well as monthly analytical reports to help readers keep up-to-date with the latest developments. In the meantime, follow ACLED on Twitter, LinkedIn, and Facebook for more Yemen updates and to learn more about the upcoming YCO.
Recent ACLED publications on Yemen:
Middle East Regional Overviews
Beyond Riyadh: Houthi Cross-Border Aerial Warfare 2015-2022 (17 January 2023)
Violence in Yemen During the UN-Mediated Truce: April-October 2022 (14 October 2022)
The Myth of Stability: Infighting and Repression in Houthi-Controlled Territories (9 February 2021)
