Q&A: Behind the data on civilian suffering in Ukraine

You’ve just written a detailed report on the fate of civilians in Ukraine’s first two years of war, as seen through ACLED’s data. One of the most striking figures is that the number of civilian fatalities in the second year, 1,600 dead, is 70% down on the first year. What does that say about the conflict?

The decrease in civilian fatalities does not mean less armed violence — there is, in fact, more of it. In the first six months of the all-out invasion a lot of people got killed, creating a high benchmark. Even though the numbers ACLED records suggest fewer civilian fatalities in the second year of the war, there are many other aspects that cannot be quantified. How can one measure the constant threat of shelling along the frontlines, or drone and missile attacks in hinterlands? To get a glimpse of what life is like in Ukraine, try the ubiquitous air raid alert app for your phone. It can give you a sense of waking up to country-wide alerts several times a week, even in relatively safe central and western Ukraine. They occur when there are many incoming drones and missiles whose target is not immediately clear, prompting a general alert. It almost always happens at night. Just imagine the agonizing choice of whether or not to go to the shelter. Furthermore, the constant threat blunts people’s attention and perception of danger, they become less vigilant. I cannot speak for all, but anecdotally, it seems that people no longer react to terror alerts. Because you have to run to a shelter or a metro station in the case of big cities, and you cannot do that running every night.

Then there is displacement. Though life-saving, the disruption it causes is enormous. Of Ukraine’s 40 million people, nearly a quarter have been forced to leave their homes. Almost four million are displaced within the country, and six million others are refugees, including many in Russia who either had no other evacuation option or were simply deported.

ACLED’s latest study says 84% of Ukraine’s civilian fatalities were in areas close to the frontline. How do you interpret that?

It means that a lot of civilians are still in harm’s way. Those left behind are people who have nowhere to go, even though the government provides evacuation assistance. These are often vulnerable, elderly people who just want to stay put. Many just want to stay put. For instance, Bakhmut was one of the most affected places in terms of civilian casualties last year, despite being the site of one of the largest battles since World War II. Airstrikes and shelling literally leveled the town to the ground. Most recently, we saw a similar picture in Avdiivka: When Ukrainian forces withdrew, 700 locals were reportedly left behind.

ACLED often talks about events targeting civilians. What does that mean? Do you see any patterns that indicate that the shelling from the Russian side is targeting civilians?

In our data, the definition of an event “targeting” civilians just means that civilians were or could have been affected. ACLED research shows that more than 7,200 civilians were killed between 24 February  2022 and 1 March  2024. Of these, more than 6,700 were killed by Russian forces, nearly 100 by Ukrainian forces, 65 by pro-Ukrainian militias, and nearly 300 by unidentified actors.

However, I don’t think either side deliberately targets civilians. Neither would ever admit to it, even if the intended target turns out to be strictly civilian. I suspect Russian forces have a higher tolerance of what the military jargon labels ‘collateral damage.’ Their task is to capture as much territory as possible, regardless of losses among their own troops. I am not sure their attitude to civilians caught in the wrong place at the wrong time is any different. With the caveat that nothing is black and white in war, Ukrainian forces have to tread more carefully because their own people end up on the other side of the line. 

Why did you focus on civilians in your piece marking the second anniversary of the war? How does the civilian fatalities figure compare with the military one? Why does ACLED not include that?

Casualties among civilians are the best-documented part of the war. When you cover a war of such size and intensity, you have to pick your battles. There are a lot of gray areas, despite all the hype about the war being now near-transparent thanks to drone and satellite footage. You need to factor in unverifiable claims and omissions. For instance, neither side would confirm strikes at military sites. When it comes to civilians, Ukrainian public sources meticulously document civilian deaths and injuries, and damage to civilian infrastructure, so we can be more or less sure that our findings reflect the actual situation. We extract the data by searching for and comparing information from all major national and regional media outlets. In addition, we record readouts of the ministries of defense and — very cautiously — select social media. We also rely on trusted aggregators. For instance, the Institute for the Study of War extensively analyzes the mushrooming war-watching community online. While one should take claims with a good pinch of salt, it spares us the need to crawl the social media accounts ourselves.

As to military fatalities, both sides are exaggerating enemy losses while closely guarding their own. We even had to cap Russian claims at 10 for a given event in order not to inflate the figures. Estimates vary, but all suggest considerable losses. Needless to say, they are much less verifiable than deaths and injuries among civilians.

You spent months looking closely at the civilian side of the battlefield. What did that tell you about the progress of the war?

There is a correlation between military fortunes and the fate of civilians. In 2022, territory was changing hands a lot, putting civilians at greater risk. As a rule, liberation brings greater security to civilians, but how far enemy artillery retreats and whether its air forces can be kept at bay are key. Since Russia’s retreat on the other side of the Dnipro river in November 2022, the city of Kherson has become a hotspot for indiscriminate targeting. I’m afraid, in this case, the Russian side knows full well where they are striking. 

We read a lot about the lack of ammunition on the Ukrainian side. Does that make it safer for the people on the Russian-occupied side?

In the ACLED dataset, most civilian targeting events list Russian forces as the likely perpetrator, and much more rarely Ukrainian forces. We are seeing the same pattern in the case of Ukrainian strikes on Russian-occupied Crimea and areas of Russia bordering Ukraine’s northeast. One exception is the Russian-occupied Donetsk city, which lies on the frontline. There are lots of military sites in and around the city and Ukrainian strikes are not a rare occurrence there. While likely targeting Russian positions, their placement in urban agglomeration renders civilians unsafe. In addition, both sides use cluster munitions and anti-personnel mines, which put civilians even at greater risk.

What about the capital Kyiv? That’s a particular focus of attacks, isn’t it?

Yes. It’s one of the most frequently targeted non-frontline areas. Of course, Ukraine is huge, and Russian drones and missiles reach far beyond the frontlines, but we are seeing a systematic attempt to penetrate Kyiv’s air defenses. While strikes at military production sites cannot be ruled out as Kyiv is one of the best-protected places in Ukraine in terms of air defense, the strikes send a certain message to residents, Ukrainian leadership, and visiting foreign officials. For instance, one of the biggest strikes occurred during African leaders’ stay in Kyiv in June last year, and most recently during the visit of Europe’s foreign policy chief Josep Borrell. The persistent strikes also suggest that Russian forces appear to have greater tolerance of casualties among civilians as the presence of probably two of pre-war three million residents in Kyiv does not dissuade attacks.

It seems Ukraine has succeeded in reestablishing its grain exports to pre-war levels. Is there an economic recovery helping this resilience?

The grain corridor is a success, a typical David versus Goliath story. Ukrainians no longer have a fully-fledged navy but keep the formidable Russian Black Sea Fleet at bay. But 18% of Ukraine’s territory remains occupied while areas in the industry-heavy east are being destroyed. Grain exports alone cannot compensate for the loss of business elsewhere.

It’s a country at war. As we said in our report, it’s like running a marathon, only that Ukrainians have no choice but to continue. Russian forces can retreat across the border. Where would Ukrainians go? Unlike in Russia, where censorship precludes adequately gauging public opinion, there’s a certain level of pluralism in Ukraine. The war fatigue is visible and understandable, especially in light of setbacks. But Ukrainians seem to be bracing themselves for the long haul.

We read a lot about morale and the need for Ukrainian recruits for the frontlines. Is the Ukrainian war effort suffering?

I wouldn’t limit the discussion to troops. Enlisting younger people, who are less numerous than older ones, is indeed a political hot potato. Yet you still need weapons, ammunition, and training. These are beyond Ukraine’s control. Worryingly, Russia senses the void and is pressing ahead, having ramped up ammunition production at home and turned to fellow pariah states like Iran and North Korea for additional weapons and technology. 

When we look at ACLED’s new Conflict Exposure measure, it seems there are provinces where the war isn’t really close at all, especially in the west of the country. Is the atmosphere much safer for civilians there?

It’s a checkered picture. In the second year of the war Russian forces did not manage to strike the westernmost regions as often as they did in the first. But fewer events do not mean the danger is no longer there. There were actually more civilian targeting events in the Lviv region, for instance, including hits on multi-storied residential buildings causing multiple civilian casualties, just like in Ukrainian hinterlands further east. People are doing better in the west security-wise but you need to factor in that many people from the east ended up in the west of the country, which has repercussions for rents and the cost of living. This is another example of the often overlooked effects of the war on civilians. 

You’ve said one reason that you focused the report on civilians is because the best data relates to that. But does it capture everything? Are there no gray areas?

It’s a case of picking your battles. We are recording close to 3,000 events a month. But you can’t cover everything, and there are many gray areas. Not all gaps can be filled. For instance, while recording large-scale evacuations of civilians, we cannot track the everyday trickle of displaced people leaving or returning individually. Another missing dimension is the level of disruption of utilities. Areas along the frontlines are barely habitable. While the Russian bombing campaign of Ukraine’s power grid last winter led to extreme conditions for civilians, the wider public probably knows less about the lack of normal water supply in Donetsk city and the surrounding region over the course of the past two years, or the shortage of water in the Mykolaiv region prior to de-occupation. We track damage to infrastructure as a result of specific violent acts but not the lasting effects of disruptions.

We know very little for certain about the occupied areas. Controls there are even worse than in Russia itself. There is practically no independent reporting from the areas as neither journalists nor international organizations can access them. The destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam is a case in point. Russia did not allow international relief missions to the affected areas it occupies, likely in order to cover up tracks. Furthermore, it is extremely dangerous for the locals to share information. Whoever has a smartphone may be suspected of being an agent of Ukrainian intelligence. The static frontline also means there are fewer revelations of violence against civilians — in the first year, the scale of Russian forces’ abuses became known only upon their retreat from swathes of Ukrainian territory. 

What about the diaspora? You’ve talked about six million people in the diaspora who fled Ukraine. Are they staying connected?

We can only talk about this anecdotally, and it can’t be proven with any data. Pro-Ukraine rallies around the anniversary of the invasion suggest that many refugees long to return. The more protracted the war becomes, the more residential properties and infrastructure will be destroyed, and the more difficult it will be for people to go home. Also, the longer it takes to free Ukraine, the more people will integrate into host societies. Temporary protection for Ukrainian refugees in Europe expires next March, but there are no indications now that the war will be over by then. 

When the war started, what was it like to be under that attack? And what can you tell me what would make you feel that you could go back?

I was a privileged resident of Kyiv so I cannot compare my experience with what people in Kyiv, and especially the suburbs, endured. I left Ukraine safely shortly after the invasion. In the few days prior I saw how quickly a vibrant European city, very much like Berlin, can turn into a war zone. I also understood that the Russian expression “it smells like kerosene” for ugly situations can take a literal meaning with fighter jets buzzing around and enveloping the city in kerosene stench. The city changed overnight. The distance between war and peace is short. Very short.