Situation Update | March 2024

Kenya: Demonstrations, Gangs, and Kenya-Somalia Relations

22 March 2024

Kenya at a Glance: 17 February to 15 March 2024

VITAL TRENDS

From 17 February to 15 March 2024, ACLED records 89 political violence events and 64 reported fatalities in Kenya. Most events took place in Nairobi, with 12 instances of political violence recorded, including 10 riot events.
Samburu and Narok counties had the highest number of reported fatalities, with six fatalities in each county. The six reported fatalities in Samburu resulted from battles and violence against civilians, whereas the other six reported fatalities in Narok resulted from battles and riots.
The most common event types during the reporting period were riots, with 49 recorded events, followed by violence against civilians, with 26 events. The majority of riots were recorded in Nairobi, while most of the violence against civilians events were related to ethnic militia attacks, including the stealing of livestock, across multiple counties.

Horn of Africa situation update March 2024

Demonstrations, Gangs, and Kenya-Somalia Relations

The Kenya Medical Practitioners, Pharmacists and Dentists Union (KMPDU), a trade union organization, mobilized in the capital Nairobi and several other counties to demand the placement of medical graduates in internship positions. In the west, an outbreak of mob violence between police and a prominent gang in Busia town on Kenya’s border with Uganda sparked four days of violent demonstrations and mob violence in February. In a separate development, the long-awaited border reopening with Somalia was postponed despite both parties remaining committed to improving diplomatic relations and cross-border security.

Health Worker Grievances Drive Demonstrations

On 29 February, hundreds of health workers, joined by KMPDU officials, marched to the Ministry of Health and the National Treasury in Nairobi. Demonstrators protested the health ministry’s failure to open internship posts for medical graduates in February, as KMPDU claimed it was agreed upon at talks with the health ministry in January.¹ Police lobbed tear gas canisters to disperse what reports say was a peaceful demonstration.² More than 20 people, including KMPDU Secretary General Dr. Davji Bhimji Atellah, were injured in the incident. In subsequent days, demonstrations were held in Nairobi, Nakuru, Kakamega, Kisii, and Uashin Gishu counties to protest the violent intervention by police the previous day and to continue to press for KMPDU demands.

Health worker demonstrations thus far in 2024 surpass the upward trend seen in demonstrations overall since 2022. ACLED data show that demonstrations doubled in 2023 compared to 2022. This overall trend has held for the first quarter of 2024. However, the trend in demonstrations involving health workers differs. In 2023, ACLED records 28 demonstrations involving health workers — more than twice compared to the preceding year. Yet, the first three months of 2024 have almost matched the whole of 2023, with 27 demonstrations recorded up to 15 March (see graph below). KMPDU demonstrations since 29 February have accounted for almost one-third of these 27 demonstrations. Protests may continue in the short term. While the KMPDU strike called for 14 March was blocked by the Employment and Labour Relations Court a day before, the planned strike action went ahead.³

Gang Politics in Busia County

On 20 February, utility workers attempted to remove illegal electricity connections in the Marachi area of Busia town. This sparked a violent backlash in the area over the next three days, to which police responded, and led to at least one fatality. The violence has been associated with the Jobless Group — an organization connected to the old Marachi Boys gang. The Jobless Group grew out of the Marachi Boys, which was listed as a militia group by the government in 2016. The Jobless Group has since received incentives from politicians in return for support in political campaigns.⁴ Involvement with politicians, like the management of illegal power connections, is a common characteristic of gang behavior in Kenya.⁵ February’s clashes suggest this relationship is strained.

The relationship between the Jobless Group and Busia’s political leaders was made explicit in February 2023, when Busia County Governor Paul Otuoma presented the group with a minibus to be used as a matatu, or commuter bus. The governor also supported a security firm and car wash linked to the group, while plans were in place to involve the Jobless Group in waste management.⁶ Otuoma was not acting alone. Reportedly, a group of Busia county politicians underwrote the purchase of the matatu, including Governor Otuoma, his deputy, and other elected representatives.⁷

In the wake of the trouble, the chairperson of the Jobless Group, William Onyango, tried to explain what caused it. He pointed the finger at Governor Otuoma, saying, “The whole game is politics…[Otuoma] has turned against the people who assisted him to win the seat.”⁸ Perhaps ironically, Kenya’s experience with such issues will be of benefit if it manages to deploy police to Haiti, where a gang revolt led to the resignation of the Haitian acting president just days after he signed an agreement with President William Ruto to allow the deployment of Kenyan police officers.⁹

Kenya-Somalia relations

ACLED records 11 political violence events involving al-Shabaab since the start of the year. Four of them occurred between 17 February and 15 March in Garissa and Lamu counties. These most recent incidents come as Somalia became a full member of the East African Community (EAC) and Kenya has tried to cool tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia over Somaliland relations. Though Somalia completed its admission process to the EAC on 4 March, reopening of the border with Kenya remains in the distance.¹⁰ President William Ruto’s plan to reopen the border, which has been closed since 2011, was postponed in July 2023 following a spike in al-Shabaab activity. Kenyan security officials reportedly fear that al-Shabaab may use the reopening to infiltrate border counties.¹¹

There may also be Kenyan interests at stake. Reportedly, sugar smuggling from Somalia to Kenya via Wajir is currently controlled by political interests in the area.¹² The practice is long-standing and has reportedly involved Kenyan security officials themselves in the past. Keeping the border closed would allow smuggling interests to benefit from the consequent arbitrage opportunities.¹³

At the diplomatic level, relations between President Ruto and his counterpart, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of Somalia, remain positive. The two met in Nairobi on 28 February, the same day that the Kenyan president hosted Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.¹⁴ While the conclusions from the meetings remain unclear, they were a chance for Kenya to help Somalia and Ethiopia improve relations, which deteriorated recently over Ethiopia’s port access agreement with Somaliland (for more, see the Somalia Situation update: January 2024 and the EPO Monthly: January 2024).¹⁵