Regional Overview
Africa
July 2024
Posted: 12 August 2024
In this Regional Overview
- Libya: Clashes break out in western Libya
- Mali: Rebels and insurgents conduct the deadliest ambush against Wagner Group in Africa yet
- Niger: Escalating violence in Tillaberi and worsening security post-coup
- Sudan: Violence spikes in Sennar state
- Uganda: Youth-led demonstrations rise following inspiration from Kenya
Libya: Clashes break out in western Libya
In western Libya, the reopening of the Ras Ajdir border crossing and growing competition between armed groups sparked an outbreak of violence in western Libya. Overall, political violence in Libya rose by 50% in July compared with the previous month and was nearly three times higher than the average over the past year. The worsening violence comes amid a growing number of active armed groups and militias. The number of active conflict actors in Libya grew throughout 2024 and reached levels in July not seen since December 2019 — a time of civil war and intense fighting in western Libya, especially over Tripoli. According to the ACLED Conflict Index rankings, Libya is one of seven countries that has worsened since the start of the year when measuring armed group fragmentation, rising from 11th position to 19th globally.
The northwestern districts of az-Zawiyah and an-Nuqat al-Khams were the hotbeds of the violence. In an-Nuqat al-Khams, the move by the Government of National Unity (GNU) to reopen the Ras Ajdir border crossing with Tunisia on 1 July resulted in increased violence.1The New Arab, ‘Ras Jedir border crossing between Libya and Tunisia fully reopens following delays,’ 2 July 2024 The coastal crossing had been shut for over 100 days after a failed attempt by the Interior Ministry to take control of this vital trade and smuggling hub from local militias and armed groups. Violent contestation between local Amazigh militias and competing armed groups involved in smuggling has increased in the past months and has continued since the reopening of the border.2The New Arab, ‘Tunisia closes crossing with Libya amid border clashes: state radio,’ 19 March 2024 Az-Zawiyah is a strategic area where armed groups have become increasingly involved in national-level politics and smuggling of fuel, migrants, and drugs. At least five distinct armed actors with disparate aims and interests are reported to have been involved in violent incidents in the area.3Wolfram Lacher, ‘A Political Economy of Zawiya: Armed Groups and Society in a Western Libyan City,’ Small Arms Survey, March 2024
Mali: Rebels and insurgents conduct the deadliest ambush against Wagner Group in Africa yet
On 27 July, rebels from the Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA) and militants from the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) carried out a deadly ambush on a joint Wagner and Malian military (FAMa) convoy near Tin Zaouatene in Kidal region close to the Algerian border. This ambush resulted in the highest reported number of Russian private military company fatalities on the African continent in a single event since Russia began deploying mercenaries to the continent in 2017. The militants killed about 50 Wagner mercenaries and FAMa soldiers, captured a dozen others, destroyed around a dozen vehicles and one helicopter, and forced another helicopter to make an emergency landing in Kidal. This encounter signifies a momentum shift after an increase in violence in Kidal region since May, with violence rising by more than 60% last month compared to June. Concerningly, part of the rising violence has involved an escalation in civilian targeting by the joint Wagner and FAMa forces, especially against nomadic populations in Kidal region. Before this ambush, the CSP-DPA and JNIM had been unable to effectively counter the Wagner Group and FAMa as they advanced toward the far north of Tin Zaouatene, where many people had fled from military operations. The successful ambush could strengthen the confidence and determination of CSP-DPA and JNIM but may also provoke a retaliatory response from Wagner forces.
Niger: Escalating violence in Tillaberi and worsening security post-coup
Battles between military forces and pro-government militias against Islamist militants affiliated with the Sahel Province of the Islamic State (IS Sahel) and JNIM rose by over 65% in Tillaberi region in the past month. These battles were concentrated in the northwest Tillaberi region and were highest in Tera department, where IS Sahel clashed with military forces and carried out violence targeting civilians. They were especially fatal in Tillaberi last month compared to the monthly average over the past year. In one of the deadliest incidents, IS Sahel militants reportedly killed 27 soldiers near Doungourou on 22 July. Beyond these battles, IS Sahel also claimed responsibility for a significant prison break on 10 July at the Koutoukale high-security penitentiary, which led to the escape of numerous detainees, including IS Sahel militants.4X @SimNasr, 19 July 2024
The rising violence in Tillaberi highlights the complexity of Niger’s escalating security crisis since the coup d’état, which took place on 26 July 2023 and overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum. Niger previously enjoyed international support as an important ally of Western states in the fight against al-Qaeda and IS-affiliated groups in the region. However, the coup marked a drastic turning point as the new junta allied itself with these groups in Mali and Burkina Faso and expelled the French armed forces, precipitating the withdrawal of US troops.5Mark Banchereau, ‘US hands over its last military base in Niger to the ruling junta,’ Associated Press, 7 August 2024 Additionally, German forces are scheduled to depart by the end of August 2024.6Voice of America, ‘German army to vacate Niger air base in August,’ 6 July 2024 These changing alliances created a vacuum of military and financial support,7Reuters, ‘EU suspends budget support, security cooperation with Niger,’ 29 July 2023; Philipp Sandner, ‘Niger coup: Where to now for European diplomacy?,’ Deutsche Welle, 6 August 2023 with Niger’s post-coup environment marked by a severe degradation in security. IS Sahel and JNIM have exploited the weakened security apparatus and expanded their influence in the country. In the year following the coup, the lethality of attacks by jihadist groups surged significantly as the number of deaths from political violence more than doubled compared to the year prior, rising by 121%, while the number of civilian deaths from direct targeting rose by 34%.
Sudan: Violence spikes in Sennar state
After the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) launched a major offensive on Sennar state in June, violence further increased in July as the RSF advanced further and captured numerous locations throughout the state. Battles between the SAF and RSF were concentrated along Blue Nile state and moved southward from Sennar city toward Singa city. Following common military tactics,8Mohammed Amin, ‘Air strikes and guerrilla fighting: The tactics deployed by Sudan’s warring sides,’ Middle East Eye, 9 May 2023 the SAF responded last month by conducting over a dozen air strikes against RSF positions, mostly near Sennar city. Nearly a quarter of all political violence recorded by ACLED in July took place in Sennar, second only to Khartoum state. Sennar state is of significant strategic importance given the possible trade routes through the two international borders with South Sudan and Ethiopia and the vital agricultural economy in Sennar. The spreading conflict in Sennar and across Sudan resulted in the country moving two positions from 10th to eighth spot on the mid-year update of ACLED’s Conflict Index.
Uganda: Youth-led demonstrations rise following inspiration from Kenya
Demonstrations in Uganda spiked last month as the youth used online mobilization tactics similar to those used during the Kenyan Finance Bill protests to organize marches against corruption and perceived governance challenges.9Rodney Muhumuza, ‘An online protest movement exposes corruption in Uganda. Officials and others are rattled,’ Associated Press, 4 March 2024; Emmanuel Mutaizibwa, ‘Anti-corruption protests stress test Judiciary,’ Monitor, 27 July 2024 Demonstrations were concentrated in Kampala where ACLED records six demonstrations associated with marches to parliament to voice grievances against the government — notably calling for the resignation of parliamentary speaker Anita Among10Elias Biryabarema and Aaron Ross, ‘Uganda police arrest more people protesting corruption,’ Reuters, 25 July 2024 who the US recently sanctioned for corruption.11Julius Barigaba, ‘No respite for the besieged Ugandan Speaker Anita Among,’ The East African, 2 June 2024 While most demonstrations were composed of youth and students, the opposition National Unity Platform joined some of the marches in solidarity with the grievances raised by the so-called Gen-Z movement.12The Observer, ‘Why Uganda’s Gen Z protests are falling short: A closer look at the obstacles,’ 7 August 2024 Police arrested dozens of demonstrators in the country’s largest protest movement since December 2021 during a wave of unrest over public service delivery. Although over 80% of demonstrations remained peaceful, police made numerous arrests and disrupted nearly half of the demonstrations.
See More
See the Codebook and the User Guide for an overview of ACLED’s core methodology. For additional documentation, check the Knowledge Base. Region-specific methodology briefs can be accessed below.
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For additional resources and in-depth updates on the latest political violence and protest trends, check our local observatories for Mozambique and Ethiopia, as well as our special Nigeria Election Violence Tracker project.