Clionadh’s Monthly ACLED Data & Analysis Outlook
Dear readers,
2024 continues to be a tumultuous year, marked by significant political shifts and large-scale violence across multiple regions. From the enduring fight against al-Shabaab in East Africa and the ongoing, slow crisis in the Middle East —- including the recent escalation in Lebanon – to the artillery shelling in Sudan, the continued fragmentation of separatist movements in Cameroon, and the political turbulence in the United States ahead of its presidential election, the global conflict landscape remains in flux. We continue to reflect and investigate the nature and direction of these challenges and emerging threats for you through September. This month’s update largely concentrates on African cases that tend to get overlooked because of the continued (perhaps ‘expected’) violence, rather than the ‘large power’ clashes that have dominated conflict discussions for the past years.
Yet, understanding these conflicts is important for several reasons: African conflicts often affect communities more so than governments in power — because of the nature of the armed combatant groups, but also how the political environment is structured to ‘withstand’ conflict. African conflicts represent how local politics has a direct effect on the security, prosperity, and future of the world’s fastest-growing continent. It is here where we see how violence evolves directly in response to political change and competition, and how it adapts rather than dissipates, even to economic prosperity, democratic institutions, and inclusive representation.
Africa: Rising instability and evolving threats
The fight against al-Shabaab remains a pressing concern in East Africa, with recent months seeing an increase in attacks, especially in Kenya. August marked the most active month for al-Shabaab in Kenya, as the group exploited local disputes and regional tensions in Somalia. As the African Union’s ATMIS mission is set to end by December, Somalia faces heightened security risks, with al-Shabaab poised to capitalize on the transition.
In Sudan, violence continues to escalate, with both the SAF and RSF increasingly relying on artillery shelling and airstrikes in Khartoum and Darfur. The RSF’s expansion into Blue Nile state threatens to open new fronts in the conflict, while severe flooding and a stalled peace process have worsened the humanitarian situation. This conflict, like so many others, is a war of alliances — local and international — that are influencing the direction and magnitude of violence far more than the main combatants.
The Anglophone separatist conflict in Cameroon has fragmented further, with over 50 armed groups now operating in the Northwest and Southwest regions. Infighting and growing reliance on illicit economies like kidnapping for ransom have weakened the separatist movement, while violence against civilians by both separatists and government forces continues unabated. A joint panel of ACLED and GI-TOC experts discussed this at length in a recent webinar.
Meanwhile, Rwanda is positioning itself as an alternative security partner in the region, amid the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers and western forces in multiple regions of the continent. Its military forces, the RDF, began expanding its presence in 2023, notably through bilateral missions.
United States: Extremist mobilization declines amid election turbulence
Despite a fragile political climate leading into the 2024 presidential election, extremist mobilization in the United States is at its lowest level since ACLED began tracking in 2020. Groups like the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers have seen their influence wane, driven by leadership arrests and internal fractures. While this lull is surprising, the potential for renewed extremist activity remains, especially as the election nears and the political landscape becomes more contentious.
This dynamic has been further complicated by recent events, such as the two attacks targeting former President Donald Trump within the span of two months. Although he was unharmed in the latest incident, the frequency of such attempts has added to the uncertainty surrounding an already tumultuous election season. Still, the fact that the US is not currently in the throes of a great politically violent struggle seems to have taken many by surprise. There is reason to be concerned due to the high levels of polarization in the US, but not because it is creating outright violence — but rather eroding governance, trust, and order within an increasingly polarized elite system. This has downstream effects on law, order, trust, and what people consider solutions to society’s ills. Focusing too much on non-occurring violence may prove to be a distraction.
Notes and Notions
As the Gazan and wider conflict continues, distinct and compelling perspectives abound. Both Graeme Wood’s and Eliot Cohen’s perspectives on Israel’s ‘dark arts’ in Lebanon are realpolitik lessons in how to dismantle a group by distrust and tactical paralysis. Yet, the war’s shifting dimensions can obscure how it might end, and set the stage for the next conflict. Gershon Baskin — a fair, humane, and skilled Israeli negotiator – reminds us all of how Palestinians and Israelis will bear the real costs for this conflict in lost children, parents, friendships, and peace. He discusses his thoughts here.
We are starting a project on how it is to live in conflict, at the very local level, and the changes it brings. This is sparked by our new partnership with the Effective Peace Institute, which just launched and intends to bring more direction and rigour to the generation of peace. A very worthy initiative!
Living in conflict is not just about surviving violence, but about the compromises that everyday existence takes living amid destruction. This note by a Sudanese doctor trying to access patients is a vivid demonstration of immense, yet necessary, actions that happen constantly amongst the 15% of the world’s population exposed to conflict.
Since 2020, Azerbaijan has systematically targeted nearly 80 Armenian heritage sites in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, with destruction intensifying after the 2023 offensive. ACLED’s new visual report tracks these incidents and offers an interactive map to explore the ongoing loss of cultural landmarks.
Post-election periods can often be times of real change, especially when ‘democratic despots’ lose their overall mandate through low support. The reactions can be swift and brutal, as these leaders either try to shore up support by lashing out at opposition supporters in opposition areas; those around the leader start preparing for the post-leader world (and often these leaders suffer a strange and fatal end — side note, Venezuela’s Maduro might be sleeping with one eye open these days), and/or the support group of the leader (e.g., the Indian RSS for Modi) start flexing their influence before their open impunity ends. The latter appears to be occurring in India.
In a slightly altered context, Helen Morris and I wrote on the violence during runoffs, using Zimbabwe 2008 as a test case. We find that when a leader and ruling party find themselves in an election run-off it is because their core voter base has not supported them as expected (or the party would not have allowed the election to occur). This presents a dilemma: where and how is the party going to get enough votes to win in the second round? The runoff period provides time to force new ‘swing’ voters and votes in ‘core party support’ zones to come out in force, while a secondary — albeit weaker — strategy is to try to depress the opposition vote (which is as high as it will likely get during the first round). To get these once dependable — now ‘traitorous’ — voters to again support the ruling party, violence is brutally effective. This is why, during Zimbabwe’s 2008 five-week runoff period, far more violence occurred in ‘core support’ areas where voters had supported local ZANU-PF (ruling party) MPs, but not Mugabe. Those voters were violently harassed to support Mugabe, rather than trying to get those who supported opposition MPs and presidential candidates to switch (punishment for those voters would come later). This violence is driven by the desire to maximize power, as most violence is.
