Regional Overview
Africa
September 2024

Posted: 4 October 2024

In this Regional Overview

Kenya: School arsons surge
Madagascar: Banditry and military offensives drive rise in violence
Mali: JNIM launches coordinated attacks in Bamako
Mozambique: Pre-election month sees less unrest than in 2019, outside Cabo Delgado
Sudan: Increasing proportion of violence shifting back toward Khartoum

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Kenya: School arsons surge

While arson at educational facilities and student demonstrations during which school property is burnt frequently occur in Kenya, these events surged in September throughout the country. ACLED records at least 50 cases of arsonists and rioters burning down school property last month. These school arson attacks contributed to over 80 mob violence events in Kenya, the highest number of monthly mob violence events since ACLED began recording data on Kenya in 1997. The arson at schools was widespread across 18 counties in Kenya, with the highest number of events in Machakos county to the east of Nairobi. These cases of arson sometimes turned deadly, including on 5 September, when the burning of the Hillside Endarasha Academy dormitory reportedly killed 21 students and injured at least 20 others.¹ Kenyan authorities have conducted several investigations into the prevalence of school arson that show it tends to occur most often during the second school term due to exam pressure, workload, extended absence from parental figures, disciplinary measures, and the lack of counseling or psychological services at educational facilities.² Although at least 15% of these events were attributed to students, perpetrators have not been identified for the remaining events. The inability to identify the majority of arsonists makes understanding the rise in school fires difficult.

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Madagascar: Banditry and military offensives drive rise in violence

Last month, state forces offered bounties and conducted widespread operations against dahalo — Malagasy for bandits — under Operation Harato 2.³ These military operations led to at least 30 battles with dahalo, along with widespread civilian targeting by bandit groups. As a result, September was the most violent month in Madagascar so far in 2024. Around 20% of dahalo-related violence took place around Analamanga, with further concentrations in the regions along Analamanga’s eastern border in Betsiboka and Bongolava. Most of the clashes with dahalo involved state forces, but local militias also operated independently or alongside the military in 15% of these battles. While dahalo often operate in smaller groups, events in the past month showed the capacity for groups to carry out violence in larger numbers. Around 400 heavily armed dahalo attacked civilians in Andebegne Fokontany village in Androy region on 12 September, killing a civilian, burning houses, and looting goods.⁴

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Mali: JNIM launches coordinated attacks in Bamako

On 17 September, a commando of 13 fighters from the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) carried out simultaneous attacks on the gendarmerie school in the Faladje quarter and on Modibo Keita Airport in Mali’s capital Bamako, resulting in 90 reported fatalities.⁵ JNIM fighters temporarily took control of Bamako’s international airport before military forces overran and killed the militants. Violence by insurgents in Bamako is rare; the last case took place nearly two years ago in November 2022 when JNIM abducted a German Catholic priest. The high number of fatalities in Bamako also contributed to the capital district being the deadliest administrative region in Mali last month. Although security measures have reportedly been tightened due to the increased threat,⁶ contestation between JNIM and the Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) may result in further violence throughout the region. These attacks in Bamako occurred in the midst of wider instability marked by several major incidents, including a mid-July prison break at the high-security prison in Koutoukalé staged by IS Sahel fighters, the defeat of the Wagner Group in clashes with rebels from the Permanent Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad and JNIM near Tin Zaouatene in late July, and the mass killings of soldiers and civilians by JNIM in Nassougou and Barsalogho in August.

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Mozambique: Pre-election month sees less unrest than in 2019, outside Cabo Delgado

In Mozambique, the 9 October general election will see incumbent President Filipe Nyusi of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) step down for incoming ruling party candidate Daniel Chapo. FRELIMO has been in power since 1975 and holds 71% of the seats in parliament. However, the elections will also be contested by Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) candidate Ossufo Momade and Venâncio Mondlane of the Optimistic Party for the Development of Mozambique (PODEMOS).⁷ Mondlane was a member of the RENAMO party but switched to PODEMOS after his candidacy was blocked by Momade earlier this year.⁸

Political campaigning officially began on 24 August, and, outside the insurgency-plagued Cabo Delgado province, disorder levels in September were half the levels of September 2019, the month leading up to the last general election. The majority of election-related violence last month involved fighting between FRELIMO members and opposition supporters. PODEMOS features in almost half of such events, reflecting the impact of Mondlane’s presence on their ticket. In the fortnight after the October 2023 municipal elections, there was a significant spike in disorder in urban centers around election count discrepancies. Actions by the National Electoral Commission, such as the continued use of non-transparent ballot boxes, may also contribute to post-election disorder in 2024.⁹

For more analysis on election-related violence around the world, see ACLED’s Election Watch portal.

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Sudan: Increasing proportion of violence shifting back toward Khartoum

The failure of the latest round of ceasefire talks in August coincided with an escalation in artillery and airstrikes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Khartoum over August and September, each side likely bolstering their future negotiating position (for more, see ACLED’s September Situation Update on Sudan). Last month, Khartoum was the site of over 60 SAF airstrike events and extensive artillery shelling by the RSF, which hit over a dozen different areas of the capital city. Over half of all political violence in Sudan in September took place in Khartoum. This was the largest proportion of the total violence in Sudan to have occurred in the capital since January 2024. Prior to the latest shift toward Khartoum, the conflict’s focus had moved westward, as levels of violence fell in the city and amid growing contestation between the RSF and SAF in North Darfur and al-Jazirah.

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Methodology

See the Codebook and the User Guide for an overview of ACLED’s core methodology. For additional documentation, check the Knowledge Base. Region-specific methodology briefs can be accessed below.

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Regional Special Projects

For additional resources and in-depth updates on the latest political violence and protest trends, check our local observatories for Mozambique and Ethiopia, as well as our special Nigeria Election Violence Tracker project.