Georgia: An “existential” election
21 October 2024
In the upcoming parliamentary election on 26 October, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party is seeking a fourth term in office after ousting its main rival, the United National Movement (UNM), in 2012. The standoff between the two parties is at times violent; however, GD may be more anxious about Georgia’s civil society rather than the fractured opposition.1Shota Kincha, ‘Two major opposition groups fail to unite ahead of Georgian elections,’ Open Caucasus Media, 19 September 2024 This is exemplified by GD’s insistence on passing the foreign agent law despite external criticism and mass demonstrations within the country.2Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, ‘Georgia – Urgent Opinion on the Law of Georgia on Transparency of Foreign Influence,’ 21 May 2024; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, ‘Georgia: Urgent Opinion on the Law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence,” 30 May 2024 A wave of attacks on and harassment of protest leaders in May and June offers a preview of the tactics that could be employed should the unpredictable election outcome trigger another bout of unrest.
A high-stakes exercise
Georgia’s outgoing president, Salome Zourabichvili, called the election “existential”3Régis Genté, ‘Salomé Zourabichvili, présidente de la Géorgie, au Figaro: «L’élection parlementaire sera un référendum sur l’avenir européen de notre pays»’ Fiagro, 8 September 2024 — and it may indeed be critical for both incumbents and the opposition. Led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who made his fortune in Russia in the 1990s,4Forbes, ‘Bidzina Ivanishvili Profile,’ accessed on 14 October 2024 GD threatens to outlaw UNM and associated opposition groups should it regain the constitutional majority it held between 2016 and 2020.5Gabriel Gavin, ‘Georgia goes ‘North Korea’ with bombshell plan to ban main opposition parties,’ Politico, 23 August 2024; Giorgi Lomsadze, ‘Incumbents touting desire to turn Georgia into a one-party state,’ Eurasianet, 27 August 2024 With its de facto leader, former President Mikheil Saakashvili, serving a long sentence for abuse of power while in office,6Ellen Boonen, ‘European Court affirms Georgia’s jailing of former leader Saakashvili,’ Politico, 23 May 2024 UNM is a shadow of its former self. This is due to a substantial negative rating, internal rifts, and the proliferation of splinter groups.7Joshua Kucera, ‘Never Mind Unseating Georgian Dream, Georgia’s Opposition Must First Overcome Internal Frictions,’ Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 25 July 2024 Nevertheless, UNM holds a quarter of parliamentary seats, and its members are victims of frequent targeted attacks.
ACLED records at least 17 attacks against UNM members since 2018, when ACLED began collecting data for Georgia. Most of the time, the incidents involve beatings by unidentified perpetrators on the streets, though, in November 2023, two UNM members claimed that GD rivals shot at them in southern Georgia.8Tata Shoshiashvili, ‘Two opposition figures shot at in southern Georgia within days of each other,’ Open Caucasus Media, 6 November 2023 There were also several instances of gunfire targeting party offices. Meanwhile, both GD and UNM were implicated in about 37 scuffles, mostly during public campaign events and voting in the 2018 presidential election, 2020 parliamentary elections, and 2021 local polls (see graph below). The current campaign has been remarkably calm, though GD leaders did place the blame for probable violence on opponents beforehand.9sOpen Caucasus Media, ‘Georgian Prime Minister warns that opposition might be ‘at risk of attack’ by themselves,’ 4 September 2024
Clampdown on civil society
While threats against the opposition have mostly remained rhetorical, the foreign agent law has already put Georgia’s civil society to the test. The GD-dominated parliament passed the law on a second attempt amid mass protests and systematic intimidation of activists, including physical attacks. Civil society and media organizations, partially or fully foreign-funded, have been a thorn in the side of established and aspiring authoritarian regimes keen on controlling public space in Georgia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia.10Iskra Kirova, ‘Foreign Agent Laws in the Authoritarian Playbook,’ Human Rights Watch, 19 September 2024 Russia’s government has been particularly notorious for muzzling critical voices by labeling them as ‘foreign agents’ — a term that invokes associations with treason in post-Communist countries rather than political lobbying.11Open Society Foundations, ‘The Troubling March of “Foreign Agents” Laws,’ accessed on 14 October 2024
GD first attempted to push through the foreign agent bill in spring 2023. Dubbed ‘the Russian law’ by opponents in Georgia, it requires that foreign-funded organizations register as promoters of foreign influence or face hefty fines.12Nina Akhmeteli and Kateryna Khinkulova, ‘Georgia protests: Controversial law highlights struggle for future,’ BBC, 8 March 2023 The law encountered a large wave of demonstrations, of which some turned violent (see figure below). GD subsequently backtracked: it released most people detained during protests without charges and promised not to broach the bill again. More than caving in to protestors’ demands, the party may have been concerned about securing Georgia’s candidacy for membership in the European Union after failing to obtain it alongside Ukraine and Moldova in June 2022. Georgia was eventually granted the candidate status in December 2023.13European Council, ‘European Council conclusions, 14 and 15 December 2023,’ 15 December 2023
GD unexpectedly revived the foreign agent bill in April 2024, citing security threats posed by funds being funneled to NGOs.14Tata Shoshiashvili, ‘Georgian Government to bring back aborted foreign agent law,’ Open Caucasus Media, 3 April 2024 At about the same time, it rushed through a bill waiving taxes on offshore asset transfers to Georgia.15Jam News, ‘“The offshore law” has been passed in the third reading by the Parliament of Georgia. What does this mean?’ 20 April 2024 Protestors returned to the streets, launching one of the largest demonstration waves in Georgia’s recent history, both in terms of duration and size.16Civil Georgia, ‘Photo Story | Tens of Thousands Protest Against Foreign Agents Law,’ 12 May 2024 This time, however, GD’s parliamentary majority was implacable. The bill passed committee hearings and subsequent plenary votes despite non-stop demonstrations and external criticism, as well as threats of sanctions from the EU and the United States.17European Parliament Legislative Observatory, ‘Resolution on attempts to reintroduce a foreign agent law in Georgia and its restrictions on civil society,’ 25 April 2024; U.S. Embassy in Georgia, ‘Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs James O’Brien Remarks to Media in Tbilisi,’ 14 May 2024 On 29 April, GD bused in thousands of supporters for a rally in Tbilisi, during which Ivanishvili, GD’s founder, spoke at length about foreign meddling and vowed to repress not only longtime UNM foes but also opposition writ large.18Civil Georgia, ‘Bidzina Ivanishvili Backs Anti-Western Policies, Threatens Repressions,’ 29 April 2024
Tensions boiled over both within and outside parliament in May. In addition to police using heavy-handed tactics such as tear gas, water cannons, and often violent detentions on 13 and 14 May, protest leaders and journalists also faced beatings. In May and June, unidentified perpetrators carried out at least eight attacks against people participating in protests, including UNM members. The then-UNM leader, Levan Khabeishvili, also claimed police beat him up during a demonstration.19Civil Georgia, ‘UNM Chair Severely Beaten by Police During Rally Against Agents’ Law,’ 1 May 2024 Most incidents occurred in the capital, Tbilisi, and often outside victims’ residencies at night. Protesters and their families faced intimidating phone calls and harassment in public.20Joshua Kucera, ‘Opponents Of Georgia’s ‘Foreign Agent’ Law Accuse Government Of Targeting Them In Campaign Of Intimidation,’ Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 6 June 2024 Apparent GD supporters vandalized the offices of opposition media outlets and NGOs.21Open Caucasus Media, ‘Georgian Dream MP admits to attacks on NGO and opposition offices,’ 31 May 2024 Additionally, on 1 June, several dozen men wielding sticks and stones attempted to break into UNM headquarters in Tbilisi. Another UNM office in Poti was vandalized later in June.
Protests fizzled out after GD overcame the largely symbolic vetoing of the foreign agent law by President Zourabichvili.22Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, ‘Despite Mass Protests, Georgia’s ‘Foreign Agent’ Bill Becomes Law,’ 3 June 2024 However, attacks against activists continued until mid-June when the Georgian football team’s landmark participation in the European championship likely diverted domestic attention.23Colin Millar, ‘Georgia’s glorious Euro 2024 and the politics, protests and divisions back home,’ The Athletic, 30 June 2024 By early September, 476 of about 4,000 active civil society organizations on Georgia’s public registrar submitted paperwork for foreign agent designation.24Civil Georgia, ‘476 CSOs Register by Foreign Agents Law Deadline,’ 3 September 2024 The rest are defying the provisions of the foreign agent law as it is being challenged in the Constitutional Court. The standoff may be resolved after the elections, the outcome of which is uncertain.
Risk of violence after elections
Held per proportional system with extensive electronic voting for the first time,25Tamara Sartania, ‘New Voting Technologies in Georgia’s Parliamentary Elections,’ European Platform for Democratic Elections, 2 April 2024 the elections may be decided by a third of voters whose preferences are yet unknown.26Tim Judah, ‘The west needs to prepare for a crisis in Georgia,’ Financial Times, 10 September 2024 Turnout may prove key, as will the 5% threshold favoring bigger parties, though the opposition partially succeeded in forming coherent electoral alliances.27Open Caucasus Media, ‘Three Georgian opposition parties unite ahead of election,’ 10 July 2024; Giorgi Lomsadze, ‘Georgia prepares for an all-against-one election,’ Eurasianet, 2 October 2024
GD’s apparent acceptance of the fallout with the EU and especially the US28US Department of State, ‘Promoting Accountability for Serious Human Rights Abuse and Anti-Democratic Actions in Georgia,’ 16 September 2024 due to the passing of the foreign agent law may point to its prioritization of winning the election. To remain in power, it is running on a populist platform relying on social conservatism, underscored by claims of foreign interference.29Giorgi Lomsadze, ‘Georgia: Chronicle of coup foretold,’ Eurasianet, 18 September 2023; Jam News, ‘“Members of the CANVAS organization conducted training on overthrowing the government in Georgia” – Security Service,’ 3 October 2023 Shortly before the electoral campaign recess in September, GD deputies severely restricted LGBTQ+ rights, likely to curry favor with voters in the Christian Orthodox majority country where queerphobia is common.30Reuters, ’Thousands mark Family Purity in Georgia as anti-govt protests simmer,’ 17 May 2024; Tamar Khoshtaria, ‘Results of the 2008-2024 Caucasus Barometer surveys,’ p.18, Caucasus Research Resource Center, 18 July 2024, p.18 GD also appears to be instrumentalizing the trauma of the 2008 war with Russia over Georgia’s breakaway region of South Ossetia. It alleges that a “global war party” is attempting to drag the country into Russia’s war against Ukraine by opening a “second front” against Russia.31Ivanishvili used the phrases “global war party” and “second front” during a campaign speech in July. Civil Georgia, ‘Ivanishvili Launches GD Campaign with “Global Party of War” Conspiracy as its Pivot,’ 16 July 2024 It has also used imagery of destruction in Ukraine in its campaign,32Shota Kincha, ‘Georgian Dream launches campaign ads using images of war-torn Ukraine,’ Open Caucasus Media, 26 September 2024 amid an apparent rapprochement with Russia, which seconds GD’s claims of foreign meddling.33Reuters, ‘Georgia’s most powerful man suggests an apology for 2008 war with Russia,’ 15 September 2024; Associated Press, ‘Russia-Georgia flights resume despite protests, strained ties,’ 19 May 2023; TASS, ‘US, OSCE ODIHR conspiring to discredit Georgian elections — SVR,’ 11 September 2024
GD may be more concerned about possible post-election unrest, however. In 2003, an uprising dubbed ‘the Rose Revolution’ brought UNM to power. The arguably less-strained parliamentary elections in October-November 2020 prompted demonstrations contesting the outcome, though they were short-lived and mostly involved opposition members and supporters. This is in contrast to the wider, non-partisan masses of people who mobilized against the foreign agent law in the spring of 2023 and 2024, as well as in 2019 in reaction to the behavior of a Russian MP who, during a visit to the parliament, took the seat of the speaker.34BBC, ‘Georgia protests: Thousands storm parliament over Russian MP’s speech,’ 21 June 2019 Keeping in mind protesters’ mobilization potential, in October 2023, the GD-dominated parliament banned encampments during protests.35Shota Kincha, ‘Georgian Dream pass new anti-protest amendments,’ Open Caucasus Media, 5 October 2023
Should the opposition deem the score unfair and the public agree, another iteration of unrest could ensue, with the stakes for GD and its opponents higher than during the previous waves of mass demonstrations. The policing of demonstrations, protestors’ actions, and possible infiltration of gatherings by provocateurs, as well as the continuation of individual attacks against members of the opposition, media, and civil society, may decide whether the demonstrations would escalate or fizzle out. The lack of meaningful investigation and prosecution of police applying excessive force and attacks on demonstrators during the spring protests36Human Rights Watch, ‘Georgia: Violent Attacks on Government Critics,’ 20 August 2024 is a worrying sign that points to the governing party’s tolerance, if not encouragement, of brute force to suppress dissent.
Correction: An earlier version of this report incorrectly said the incidents where two UNM members claimed GD rivals shot at them occurred in October and November 2023. The incidents occurred on 1 and 4 November.
Visuals in this report were produced by Christian Jaffe.