Regional Overview
Africa
October 2024

Posted: 8 November 2024

In this Regional Overview

Central African Republic: Rising civilian targeting by state forces and Azande Ani Kpi Gbe
Mozambique: Post-election unrest breaks out countrywide
Niger: JNIM attack on a security checkpoint in Niamey illustrates vulnerabilities in Sahelian capitals
Somalia: Military offensives lead to escalating battles against al-Shabaab
Sudan: Violence in al-Jazirah contributes to the most fatal month of the war

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Central African Republic: Rising civilian targeting by state forces and Azande Ani Kpi Gbe

Violence by state forces and ethnic self-defense militias drove a sharp increase in civilian targeting in October in the Central African Republic. Among the groups responsible for most incidents of violence against the civilian population is the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe. Formed in 2023, Azande Ani Kpi Gbe claims to protect the Azande people and primarily operates in the Haut-Mbomou prefecture with support from the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) and the Wagner Group to combat rebel groups operating under the Coalition of Patriots for Change.¹ Since its formation, however, 41% of the group’s total operations have involved civilian targeting, often against ethnic Fulani and Muslims. Azande Ani Kpi Gbe also has a precarious relationship with FACA, as it battles state forces and collaborates with them during specific operations. October was the most active month for Azande Ani Kpi Gbe militants in 2024. Yet, all of the operations carried out by the group last month targeted civilians and resulted in at least 21 reported fatalities. Consistent with past activity, over half of the violence targeting civilians last month by Azande Ani Kpi Gbe targeted ethnic Fulani and Muslims.

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Mozambique: Post-election unrest breaks out countrywide

On 24 October, the National Elections Commission announced a landslide victory for the ruling Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) candidate, Daniel Chapo, in the presidential election and an overwhelming majority for FRELIMO in the National Assembly.² Widespread disorder followed the announcement of the results, headlined by a series of demonstrations by members of the opposition Optimist Party for the Development of Mozambique (PODEMOS) under the leadership of Venâncio Mondlane.³ Mondlane claims he is the actual victor and FRELIMO committed fraud to win the election.⁴ Two PODEMOS affiliates, Elvino Dias and Paulo Guambe, were killed by suspected state forces in Maputo on 18 October.⁵ Dias, Mondlane’s lawyer, was working on an appeal to the Constitutional Council against the official results.⁶ The post-election unrest, recorded in at least 11 of Mozambique’s provinces, drove a 58% increase in political violence from the previous month. Government actions to repress PODEMOS members suggest that FRELIMO perceives a significant threat in Mondlane’s leadership.

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Niger: JNIM attack on a security checkpoint in Niamey illustrates vulnerabilities in Sahelian capitals

On 26 October, al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) militants attacked a security checkpoint in the Seno district in Niger’s capital, Niamey, resulting in one fatality, the capture of an AK-47 rifle, and the destruction of a vehicle. JNIM militants have steadily increased their operational presence in the Niamey area in 2024, carrying out a variety of attacks, including armed assaults on military patrols and gendarmerie checkpoints, looting, and the detonation of explosive devices targeting government and civilian vehicles. Similarly, JNIM has targeted the Malian capital of Bamako. In September, two coordinated attacks targeted a gendarmerie training facility and the international airport.

These events reflect broader regional dynamics as the jihadist insurgency, traditionally rooted in rural areas, increasingly encroaches on capital cities. Rapid urbanization and the strategic targeting of capital cities to maximize impact pose a major security challenge. The overlap of urban and rural areas creates new vulnerabilities as militant groups exploit less secure outskirts as access points into urban conglomerates. In addition, the technological evolution of the protracted conflict in the Sahel poses an even greater threat to urban security through the increasing use of drone warfare and remote violence by non-state armed actors.

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Somalia: Military offensives lead to escalating battles against al-Shabaab

Somali military offensives and operations by al-Shabaab led to a 35% increase in battles in October compared to the previous month. Last month, contestation between al-Shabaab and military forces continued at high levels in Lower Shabelle region but also escalated in Galgaduud and Middle Shabelle regions, where military forces carried out specific operations to dislodge al-Shabaab from several strategic bases.⁷ Notable concentrations of violence took place in the Ceel Dheer district of Galgaduud region, where military forces and allied Abgal clan militias targeted al-Shabaab strongholds (for more, see ACLED’s October Situation Update). The clashes in October marked the highest number of monthly battles since a previous escalation of fighting with al-Shabaab in September 2022.

The increase in clashes came as President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud formalized agreements with Eritrea and Egypt on 10 October amid increasing tension with Ethiopia.⁸ The agreements were made to strengthen military relations even though military support to Somalia from Egypt and Eritrea already included shipments of ammunition, small arms, and heavy weapons.⁹ The Somalian president also visited Uganda on 19 October to sign a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on defense cooperation with Kampala’s government.¹⁰ Since a MoU was signed between Ethiopia and Somaliland for Ethiopian seaport access in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s sovereignty, relations between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa have deteriorated.

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Sudan: Violence in al-Jazirah contributes to the most fatal month of the war

On 20 October, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander from al-Jazirah state, Abu Aqla Keikel, defected with troops under his command and joined the ranks of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).¹¹ In reprisal for Keikel’s desertion, the RSF carried out widespread violence in his home state of al-Jazirah, where political violence more than doubled in October compared to the previous month. Over 75% of the violence involved civilian targeting. ACLED records more than 90 such events, including sexual violence and abductions. Residents claimed that RSF branded civilians in the area as supporters of Keikel and carried out violence as a punishment for his defection to the SAF.¹² Violence in al-Jazirah state was almost exclusively carried out by the RSF, resulting in over 260 reported civilian fatalities and the displacement of more than 47,000 people fleeing the violence.¹³ The escalation in deadly civilian targeting in al-Jazirah state contributed to the deadliest month of the war in Sudan since the conflict began in April 2023, with over 2,600 fatalities reported across the country in October.

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Methodology

See the Codebook and the User Guide for an overview of ACLED’s core methodology. For additional documentation, check the Knowledge Base. Region-specific methodology briefs can be accessed below.

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Regional Special Projects

For additional resources and in-depth updates on the latest political violence and protest trends, check our local observatories for Mozambique and Ethiopia, as well as our special Nigeria Election Violence Tracker project.