Situation Update | November 2024

Kenya battles threats from communal militias and al-Shabaab

25 November 2024

Kenya at a Glance: 12 October – 15 November 2024

VITAL TRENDS

From 12 October to 15 November 2024, ACLED records 86 political violence events and 63 reported fatalities in Kenya. Most events took place in Mandera, which saw 10 political violence events that were mainly linked with armed clashes between al-Shabaab and security forces.
Mandera and Nakuru counties had the highest number of reported fatalities, with 14 reported in Mandera and seven reported in Nakuru. All of the fatalities in Mandera were from armed clashes involving al-Shabaab in the second half of October.
The most common event types during the reporting period were riots, with 49 recorded events, followed by battles, with 19. The majority of riot events were recorded in Machakos county, with six recorded events.

Infographic - Situation update | November 2024 Kenya

Kenya battles threats from communal militias and al-Shabaab

The unrest expected in the wake of Deputy President Rigathi Gachagua’s impeachment in October has not occurred. Since the spike in impeachment-related demonstrations on 4 October, ACLED records 12 such events, almost half of which did not support the former deputy president. Despite Gachagua challenging his impeachment in the courts, Kithure Kindiki was sworn in as the new deputy president on 1 November.¹ Kindiki was previously the cabinet secretary for the Ministry of Interior responsible for domestic security.

President William Ruto’s appointment of Kindiki, who is from Meru, helped appease political interests from the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru communities, collectively known as GEMA, after Gachagua was ousted. A new cabinet secretary for the Ministry of Interior is yet to be appointed, although the president is likely to recruit a successor from Western Kenya who can represent the interests of Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement.

Whoever is appointed will face the challenges of occasional flare-ups of violence between communal militias in the north and east and the enduring threat of al-Shabaab, particularly in the country’s northeast. The 21 reported fatalities in communal clashes in Tana River county in October illustrate the continuing power of communal militias in some communities and the multi-faceted ways the state can respond. In Mandera, the 11 attacks in border areas from 1 October to 15 November, 10 of which were against security forces, illustrate the continuing risk presented by al-Shabaab in Somalia.

Land-related clashes turn deadly in Tana River county

Tana River county Governor Dhadho Gaddae Godhana has been promoting a scheme since at least 2020 to develop what has been termed a “village cluster programme” to address flooding along the Tana River in Kenya’s southeast.² Because farmland in Tana River county is concentrated along the river, which runs alongside the border with Garissa county, cluster villages on higher land are envisaged as a solution to the displacement of farmers from the Wailwana community caused by intermittent flooding in lowland areas. Fears over how the scheme can affect access to land sparked a wave of armed conflict between the Wardei community livestock keepers and Wailwana farmers in October (see map below). At least 21 people died in these recent clashes that broke out in Tana River county.

The unrest did not happen in a vacuum. In February, Tana River county residents staged a demonstration at an area known as KBC, near one proposed cluster village in the county’s northwest, denouncing limited consultation with the local population as required constitutionally.³ They also voiced fears of losing access to what they termed “ancestral land.”⁴ On 4 October, KBC was the site of one of the first two clashes that day between the Wardei and the Wailwana communities, in which two people were killed. From 5 to 11 October, another 19 people died in clashes between the two communities across several locations.

The sudden outbreak of violence in a relatively small area prompted a heavy state response. On 5 October, Kenya Defence Force (KDF) troops and specialist police units were deployed to the area.⁵ On 11 October, the final day of clashes, Cabinet Secretary for the Ministry of Interior, Kindiki, declared 12 locations in Bangale and North Tana sub-counties as “disturbed and dangerous,” a declaration that gives security forces heightened powers.⁶

The same day, Governor Godhana and a member of the parliament from Galole town were arrested by the police’s Department of Criminal Investigation for failing to respond to a summons to an interview with police investigating the clashes. Three other public representatives in the county were also interviewed, though no action has been taken against any, including Godhana.⁷ Subsequent public reconciliation meetings included the governor but were dominated by central government figures such as the Tana River county Senator Danson Mungatana and the County Security Committee, which reports to the central government.⁸

For now, the resolution to the conflict gives some insight into the mechanisms the Kenyan state can deploy in the face of communal conflict. As the central government leads the security response, it can also present political opportunities to local interests. On 18 October, Kindiki was announced as President Ruto’s pick as deputy president following Gachagua’s removal. Speaking at a reconciliation meeting on 21 October, county Senator Mungatana noted that Kindiki comes from neighboring Thinaka Nithi county, and his appointment can be seen as an opportunity for Tana River’s development.⁹ President Ruto has yet to appoint a new cabinet secretary for the Ministry of Interior, but Kindiki’s replacement will have to deal with outbreaks of communal violence, as seen in Tana River county in October. The response to the Tana River county violence, involving executive order, military deployment, and placating of local leaders, both formal and informal, illustrates the level of political skill required from his replacement.

Al-Shabaab attacks against security forces intensify in Mandera county

Al-Shabaab staged eight attacks in Mandera county in October and a further three in the lead-up to 15 November. Most attacks targeted security forces in Lafey and Fino wards in Lafey sub-county, which borders Somalia’s Ceel Waak district in Gedo region. Ceel Waak saw an uptick in al-Shabaab activity in September and October this year (see graph below). Lafey sub-county has also seen an increase in al-Shabaab activity in recent months, with eight attacks in October. There were at least 14 reported fatalities in the Lafey sub-county attacks that month; eight fatalities occurred during one incident. In response, the Kenya Air Force dropped leaflets in Gedo region around 8 November, warning of imminent military operations.¹⁰ No such operations have yet been launched.

Al-Shabaab has been systematically targeting military installations on or close to the Somalia border in Mandera county, with a high concentration in Lafey sub-county. On 6 October, al-Shabaab attacked a Kenyan security forces convoy near Damasa on the Somalia border. On 16 October, militants undertook five attacks in Lafey. They struck a police station in Lafey town, after which the attackers were seen moving toward the border.¹¹ They also hit three forward operating bases close to the border, including one at Damasa, and a military convoy between Fino and Lafey towns. ACLED records at least three fatalities for the latter event. Three days later, on 19 October, al-Shabaab reportedly killed at least eight people in an attack on a forward operating base in Fino ward. On 27 October, the group again attacked a forward operating base at Damasa, killing at least three. On 2 November, near Arabia in Mandera East sub-county, two police officers were killed by an IED on a road less than nine kilometers from the Somalia border. Attacks continued into November. On 14 November, al-Shabaab attacked a security forces’ camp at Alungo in Lafey sub-county. The same day, in neighboring Mandera South sub-county, an IED hit an ambulance, injuring the driver.

Kenya’s threat to launch cross-border attacks against al-Shabaab likely indicates that security forces believe the group is using its positions within Somalia to carry out operations inside Kenya. It is also likely that al-Shabaab’s Gedo forces were involved in the Mandera attacks. ACLED data indicate an increase in al-Shabaab activity in Ceel Waak district in Somalia’s Gedo region in September and October. Situated on the border with Mandera county, al-Shabaab fighters in Ceel Waak would be well-placed to operate in Lafey sub-county.

KDF has not operated in Gedo region since October 2023, a year in which it launched 13 airstrikes against al-Shabaab. If Kenya intervenes in Gedo region, it will likely be through airstrikes, based on KDF’s previous activity. However, tension between Gedo regional authorities and the federal government over the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces and potential Egyptian forces’ deployment in Somalia after the completion of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia, as agreed by the federal government in August, may give Kenya pause from intervening in Gedo region.¹² Given their positive relationship with the Ethiopian government since 1997, the Gedo authorities do not support the agreement and would prefer for them to remain. The Kenyan government, for its part, may be reluctant to launch operations for fear of being drawn into a struggle for influence in the region between Egypt and Ethiopia.