‘Total Peace’ paradox in Colombia: Petro's policy reduced violence, but armed groups grew stronger

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Since he took office in August 2022, Gustavo Petro — the first left-wing and former guerrilla president in Colombia’s history — has invested much of his political capital into ending the country’s decades-long conflict. His strategy, known as Total Peace,¹ aims to enforce the 2016 peace accords signed with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) that his predecessor, Iván Duque (2018-2022), failed to implement. It also envisions reforms to the tax, welfare, and health care systems, as well as land redistribution programs and a shift away from a drug policy based on forced eradication of illicit crops.² Above all, Total Peace focuses on engaging in peace talks with rebel, paramilitary, and urban armed groups still active in the country. The legal framework for these negotiations, enshrined in a law that Petro signed on 4 November 2022,³ allowed the government to negotiate peace deals with rebel groups and justice arrangements with high-impact organized crime structures.⁴

Two years on, Petro’s government has reached some milestone achievements, such as a yearlong ceasefire with the National Liberation Army (ELN) — the longest the group has agreed to since its creation in 1964 — and has managed to rein in an escalation of political violence that the country had been experiencing since 2019. However, this has been driven by a plunge in hostilities between security forces and armed groups, which has, in turn, fostered territorial expansion and violent competition among armed groups vying for the control of illicit activities.

Colombia’s unresolved conflict

Colombia has uninterruptedly experienced an internal armed conflict since the 1960s when some of the region’s oldest guerrilla movements, namely the FARC and the ELN, formed with the aim of taking power through arms and reshaping a political system that they saw as fostering inequality and excluding the rural class.⁵ These and other guerrilla groups mainly expanded in Colombia’s most remote rural areas, even though some, such as the M19 — of which Petro was a member — had a more distinctly urban dimension and support base. To finance their activities, the guerilla groups initially relied mostly on extortion of local communities and kidnappings of businessmen and land owners. Over time, however, they increasingly benefitted from illicit economies such as drug trafficking and illegal mining. They confronted not only state security forces but also paramilitary groups, often backed by conservative political, military, and economic sectors.⁶ To date, the conflict has directly affected nearly 10 million people, including over 280,000 people violently killed and 8.7 million people internally displaced.⁷ Over the years, several governments managed to come to an agreement and demobilize smaller guerrilla and paramilitary groups. But it was only when President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) signed the peace accords with the FARC – the largest guerrilla group in the country – that prompted the demobilization of over 13,000 fighters, that it seemed the Colombian armed conflict could be close to an end.⁸

However, after an initial respite, violence soared again. Some FARC dissident frentes (Spanish for fronts, used to describe armed units), who refused to sign the peace accords, continued to operate and gathered under the name of Central General Staff (EMC). Other still-active rebel and organized crime groups such as the ELN and the Gulf Clan poured into areas formerly controlled by the FARC and strategic for drug trafficking and illegal mining activities, particularly along the Caribbean and Pacific coasts, the Amazon basin, and the departments bordering Venezuela.⁹ The faulty implementation of the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC under Iván Duque’s administration, overtly disapproving of the accord and negotiations with armed groups in general, also prompted many former FARC members to abandon the demobilization and reintegration process and take up arms again, giving birth to the Second Marquetalia faction.¹⁰ As a result, between 2019 and Petro’s rise to power, Colombia experienced a significant increase in armed group violence.

Petro’s bid to end Colombia’s armed conflict through negotiations with all the main armed groups operating in the country revived hopes that peace was still within reach.¹¹ As a first step, Petro’s government indicated it would pursue parallel negotiations with the following armed groups: three remnants of guerrilla groups, the FARC’s EMC and Second Marquetalia factions, and the ELN; two paramilitary-style organized crime groups, the Gulf Clan and the Self-Defense Conquerors of Sierra Nevada (ACSN); and street gangs in Buenaventura, the Valle de Aburrá region, and Quibdó.¹² However, he has faced legal hurdles related to the different nature of the actors involved: the political status of the Gulf Clan – a hybrid organized crime group whose members come from paramilitary, security force, and guerrilla backgrounds¹³ – and that of FARC dissidents has been questioned, raising doubts about the government’s ability to seek peace deals.¹⁴ These legal challenges, which added to the government’s limited capacity to handle so many processes and the half-hearted commitment to negotiations of certain armed groups, have led some of these processes to make little progress, stall, or derail, while others have only been announced but have yet to formally start.¹⁵

Petro curbed violence, but only between security forces and armed groups

Although Petro has not been able to reach any lasting agreement yet, his eagerness to engage with armed groups instead of waging an all-out war against them helped rein in the levels of violence in the country. In 2023, ACLED records the first slight decrease in armed groups’ violence since 2020, with around 2,400 events (see graph below). The reduction would likely have been even greater if not for the spike in violence that rocked the country around the local elections in October 2023 as a result of the armed groups’ attempt to assert their grip over local authorities. The downward trend has become more evident in 2024, which will likely end with around 2,000 events of armed group violence. This also resulted in fewer deaths: In the first 27 months of Petro’s administration, ACLED records 4,069 fatalities related to armed groups’ violence, 11% less than the period before.

The reduction of violence was driven by a 28% decrease in violent events between security forces and armed groups in the first 27 months of Petro’s administration, compared to the previous period. This stems partly from unilateral decisions by the Petro government and armed groups. One of Petro’s first decisions was to suspend aerial bombardments against armed groups’ camps where combatants under the age of 18 were confirmed to be present.¹⁶ Although aerial bombings alone represent a small fraction of engagements between security forces and armed groups, they are often used to provide aerial cover for ground operations. For its part, the country’s main organized crime group, the Gulf Clan, announced a unilateral ceasefire with state forces as a goodwill gesture on the day of Petro’s swearing-in ceremony.¹⁷

But the decrease is mostly attributable to the ceasefire agreements the government relentlessly sought with armed groups, although often without the oversight mechanisms needed to ensure an adequate implementation. For example, on 31 December 2022, Petro announced six-month bilateral ceasefires with the ELN, the FARC’s EMC and Second Marquetalia dissident factions, the Gulf Clan, and the ACSN.¹⁸ However, security experts concur that the announcement was hastily thrown together: “It had no protocols, oversight mechanisms, or territorial demarcation of where the armed groups should remain in the meantime,” as one of them told ACLED.¹⁹ The ELN immediately denied agreeing to any ceasefire, and the government suspended its ceasefires with the Gulf Clan and the EMC in March and May 2023, respectively, arguing these groups had violated the terms of the agreements.²⁰

Unstable negotiations and volatile ceasefires

The government continued to engage in talks with armed groups to pursue more structured agreements, prioritizing those with the ELN and EMC, in which neighboring Venezuela acts as a guarantor.²¹ Both processes led to temporary ceasefires that significantly reduced clashes with security forces before being suspended. However, it also exposed the breaches in those groups’ leaderships, leading to splits within the rebel groups. Meanwhile, the political deadlock that followed the disputed July presidential elections in Caracas has hampered the progress in those negotiations, as both the ELN’s and FARC dissidents’ strategies depend on keeping Venezuela as a safe staging ground.²²

Negotiations with the ELN brought about some milestone achievements: a significant involvement of civil society groups and, above all, a yearlong ceasefire from August 2023 to August 2024 — the longest the group has ever agreed to since its creation in 1964.²³ During that year, clashes between the ELN and security forces plummeted to historic lows, with only 11 events, compared to 67 recorded in the year before (see graph below). However, the negotiations were frozen by the ELN’s reluctance to put an end to kidnappings and its leadership’s opposition to installing a parallel, localized process with its Comuneros del Sur front in the southern Nariño department.²⁴ Comuneros del Sur eventually detached itself from the armed group and in August 2024, the ELN resumed attacks against security forces and key infrastructure,²⁵ including an attack against a military base that killed and injured over 20 in Arauca on 17 September. Petro suggested the attack put an end to negotiations with the ELN but later accepted the group’s offer to revive talks.²⁶

In the case of the Gulf Clan, which prefers to be called the Gaitanist Army of Colombia, the government agreed to start negotiations with the group only in August 2024,³⁷ but talks have not yet started. Even so, clashes with the group have decreased substantially since Petro took office (see graph below). ACLED records 128 events of violence between the Gulf Clan and security forces in the first 27 months of Petro’s administration, roughly half of those recorded in the same period before he took office. One explanation lies in the above-mentioned unilateral ceasefire, with which the group claims to have complied ever since.³⁸ But the measure also came after an offensive launched by the group in response to the extradition of one of its main leaders, known as ‘Otoniel,’ captured in late 2021, through two of the tactics armed groups often use to put pressure on governments. In May 2022, the Gulf Clan imposed a so-called armed curfew — consisting of roadblocks, threats to close commercial establishments, and the suspension of classes in schools and universities. Shortly afterward, in July 2022, it launched a wave of targeted attacks against police and military personnel — a tactic usually referred to as the Pistol Plan — which made clashes with security forces skyrocket.³⁹ Another explanation for the reduction, according to some experts, lies in the reluctance in certain sectors of the army to take on the Gulf Clan: “The army is happy that another actor is fighting rebel groups and does not attack them,” according to one expert.⁴⁰ The Gulf Clan is also believed to bribe local political and security officials, particularly in places with very weak police and army presence, to be able to operate freely.⁴¹

Overall, the government’s strategy contributed to reducing the intensity of the conflict between state forces and armed groups. However, volatile ceasefires and the reluctance of certain rebel groups’ leaders to permanently de-escalate violence led to a fragmentation of talks with splinter factions of the EMC and the ELN. It is unclear whether the government deliberately sought to weaken the groups by co-opting the internal factions who showed greater commitment to advance in talks while concentrating security forces’ energies on fighting the hardliners. Some armed groups’ leaders openly accused the government of aiming to divide them,⁴² but this fragmentation may well be the natural result of the tensions within the rebel groups’ incohesive leadership. By prioritizing negotiations with ideology-driven armed groups, the government also seems to have lost the opportunity to discuss the submission to the justice system of organized crime groups, which are now seeking political recognition.⁴³

Multiple conflicts flare up between expanding armed groups

Petro’s openness to lift military pressure on armed groups unintentionally allowed them to focus on expanding their territorial presence and weakening their rivals.⁴⁴ Their quest for expansion responds to their interest in strengthening their negotiating position with the government but also, more importantly, in accruing their finances, mostly by exploiting the illicit economies of the areas in which they operate. In fact, coca crops have more than doubled since 2020 and kept increasing in 2023, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, with Nariño and Cauca being the main hotspots.⁴⁵ The same areas that are suitable for cultivating coca are often rich in gold. With gold prices steadily climbing in recent years,⁴⁶ illicit mining activities have soared, turning into a new major driver of violent competition between armed groups.⁴⁷

In parallel, the Gulf Clan has taken advantage of its presence in northern Colombia to become a gatekeeper of the Darién Gap, a once impenetrable jungle connecting Colombia and Panamá, crossed by over 520,000 migrants in 2023,⁴⁸ gaining between $50 and $80 per smuggled person.⁴⁹ Finally, armed groups are expanding their criminal portfolio. The EMC, for example, is fostering deforestation and land appropriation to control cattle ranching activities, particularly in the Amazon basin departments of Meta, Caquetá, and Guaviare.⁵⁰ For its part, the ELN is possibly the group that still relies the most on ransom kidnappings, particularly in the oil-rich northeastern departments of Norte de Santander and Arauca.⁵¹

Armed groups expand their territory

This expansion is firstly reflected in the number of municipalities affected by the groups’ activities. In the first 27 months of Petro’s administration, ACLED records activities involving armed groups in over 580 municipalities, 43 more than those recorded in the same period before he was sworn in. Most groups had already been expanding and stepping up confrontations since 2020, when they took advantage of COVID-19 pandemic-related mobility restrictions and economic hardship to strengthen their territorial control and double down on forced recruitment.⁵² However, 446 municipalities were affected in 2023 alone, the highest number since 2018 and 30% more than in 2019, before the outbreak of the pandemic (see maps below) — confirming that, while this expansion started before Petro’s term, it certainly continued under his watch.

In recent years, the EMC has been expanding in Cauca, Antioquia, and Nariño, key areas for drug trafficking and illegal mining activities, but since 2023 it has significantly stepped up its activities in Huila,⁵³ Caquetá, and Tolima. The purported aim is to reconnect its units in Cauca with those in Guaviare and the Central Cordillera mountain range, to consolidate a corridor from coca-producing to shipping departments.⁵⁴

For its part, the Second Marquetalia ramped up operations in the southern departments of Nariño, Caquetá, and Putumayo, even before starting talks with the government in June 2024.⁵⁵ These departments are crucial for the production of cocaine.⁵⁶

The ELN scaled down its operations between 2018 and 2021, torn by internal divisions and under heavy military pressure from both the Duque government and the Gulf Clan.⁵⁷ Yet, it exploited the ceasefire between August 2023 and August 2024 to revamp its operations, particularly in the Chocó and Cauca departments.⁵⁸

Finally, the Gulf Clan was the only group whose actions were recorded in fewer municipalities in 2023 than in 2022, but in both years, it was present in significantly more locations than in 2021. This reflects the rapid expansion the Gulf Clan undertook beginning in 2022 after ‘Chiquito Malo’ rose to power following Otoniel’s arrest.⁵⁹ Under Chiquito Malo’s guidance, the Gulf Clan has significantly increased its presence in Chocó and the northern coastal departments such as Bolívar, Córdoba, Cesar, Atlántico, and La Guajira, aiming to control the entire Caribbean and Pacific coasts and thus exploit revenues from extortion, drug and migrant smuggling, and mining activities.⁶⁰

Clashes surge in subregional conflicts

The armed groups’ quest for expansion has translated into a surge in armed clashes between rival groups. In the first 27 months of the Petro administration, ACLED records a 40% increase in violence between armed groups compared to the same period prior to Petro’s arrival. In 2023 alone, clashes between armed groups rose to their highest levels since 2018. The departments of Cauca, Antioquia, and Nariño have historically been and continue to be major hotbeds of violence. These are also the departments where the highest number of armed groups’ units operate and are among the most strategic for the cultivation and shipping of illicit crops, illegal mining activities, and extortion of cattle ranching businesses.⁶¹

But conflict can also be intense where few but battle-hardened armed groups fiercely compete for territory. Chocó, where ACLED records events involving almost exclusively the ELN and the Gulf Clan, was the department with the fourth-highest number of events of violence between armed groups in the first 27 months of Petro’s administration, amid an all-out war between the two armed groups in which the Gulf Clan seems to have the upper hand.⁶² Similarly, clashes were more lethal in the Arauca department — home to a turf war between the ELN and the EMC: Arauca ranked seventh for the highest number of events per department, but second for the number of fatalities.

Adding to the complexity, relations between armed groups vary significantly depending on the conflict setting (see diagram below). For example, the EMC and the ELN have been fighting each other heavily in the Cauca, Arauca, and Nariño departments, but have coalesced to fight off the Gulf Clan in northern Antioquia and southern Bolívar.⁶³ The Second Marquetalia, despite the common FARC origins, has also clashed at least 50 times with the EMC in 2023, particularly in Cauca, Caquetá, Nariño, and Antioquia. By contrast, it has maintained a generally non-belligerent stance toward the ELN, with which it forged an alliance in early 2024 to fight the EMC in Nariño and Cauca, even though they did clash a few times in Nariño in 2023.⁶⁴ A schism within the EMC appears to have opened another front in the war, with the faction led by Mordisco declaring war on the one led by Calarcá, which has already translated into the first skirmishes in the Caquetá department.⁶⁵ The Second Marquetalia may also face a similar fate after the group’s first- and second-in-command, ‘Iván Márquez’ and ‘Walter Mendoza’, locked horns over the handling of negotiations with the government.⁶⁶

On top of all the challenges of dealing with localized conflicts between armed groups with extensive territorial reach, Petro is confronted with a wide array of other local armed actors that further complicate efforts to reduce violence in the country. Since 2018, ACLED records events involving over 50 gangs that have been allying, working for, or clashing with the country’s main outfits. Once-powerful groups such as the United Guerrillas of the Pacific, the Popular Liberation Army, and Los Caparros have virtually disappeared, either annihilated by rival groups or dismantled by state forces.⁶⁷ But the security landscape remains scattered, with some smaller groups operating in restricted patches of territory. For example, in Tulúa, Valle del Cauca, the La Inmaculada gang tried to influence the outcome of the 2023 election through a series of attacks against then-mayoral candidate Gustavo Vélez and his aides.⁶⁸ For its part, the ACSN, with whom the government announced talks in August 2024,⁶⁹ has been fighting heavily against the Gulf Clan in parts of the Magdalena and La Guajira departments.⁷⁰

In sum, the government’s prioritization of talks over military actions reduced conflict between state forces and armed groups, but the latter exploited this to heighten competition with their rivals over territorial control, negotiating power, and economic rents. This has translated into a surge in municipalities affected by armed groups’ presence and deadly clashes between armed groups. The evolution of the conflict between armed groups has also displayed the volatile, opportunistic relations among actors that ally or fight each other, depending on the conflict setting. These dynamics make it increasingly harder for the government to defuse localized conflicts through disjointed talks with national armed groups’ leaderships.

Challenges to peace

Petro’s Total Peace plans face several hurdles. Negotiations with armed groups can significantly reduce levels of violence between those groups and state forces, and have helped the government stem the violence the country had been experiencing in previous years. However, they can also fuel intergroup fighting, as fragmented and opportunistic armed groups vie for the control of territory to strengthen their negotiating position and enhance their illicit revenue streams. If these dynamics persist, a growing number of civilians are going to pay the toll of increased armed groups’ presence and competition. This is particularly true if talks are not coupled with sustained security forces’ pressure aimed at weakening those groups and protecting civilians, and if they are not accompanied by an increase in state presence in the territories where any possible agreement will be implemented.⁷¹

Meanwhile, the government does not seem to have sufficient capacity to handle multiple processes simultaneously with heterogeneous and divided armed actors. Lack of progress in one negotiation, in turn, can make others derail. For example, the fact that negotiations with the ACSN and the Gulf Clan were announced simultaneously hints at the link between the two processes, as neither group is likely to agree on any de-escalation measures without guarantees from the other. Also, by focusing on negotiations with the main armed groups, the government seems to have sidelined the urban peace processes.⁷² As an illustration, the Quibdó-based gangs threatened to abandon negotiations if the Gulf Clan, which they claim exploited their participation in peace talks to expand its presence in the city, does not agree to a truce.⁷³

Furthermore, Petro’s latitude to reach significant deals will likely continue to narrow as the end of his mandate in 2026 approaches and political uncertainty continues to riddle Venezuela. In the remainder of his term, Petro will likely have to make tough decisions on which processes to prioritize, conscious of the fallout these may have on the ones that he will almost inevitably sideline. Smaller-scale, localized agreements with those groups more committed to peace and responding to citizens’ needs may be Petro’s best chance to achieve significant results in reducing the harm caused by decades of conflict in Colombia. However, they will likely fall short of achieving total peace.

Visuals produced by Ciro Murillo.