Regional Overview
Africa
November 2024

Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria: Operation Haskanite drives increasing fatalities in the Lake Chad region

Chadian military forces launched Operation Haskanite in November to push back Boko Haram’s Jama’atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) faction following insurgent attacks in late October, including an attack by Boko Haram on 27 October that reportedly killed at least 40 Chadian soldiers at a military base in Bargaram, Lac region. State forces reportedly killed 96 Boko Haram militants in the Lac region in November and forced many Boko Haram fighters across the border into Nigeria and Cameroon. Clashes with insurgents continued on the Nigerian and Cameroonian sides of the border as Chadian forces and the MNTJF joined domestic military forces in Nigeria and Cameroon. The deadly fighting contributed to a surge in reported fatalities in the Lake Chad region last month, more than doubling the fatalities recorded the previous month, with notable rises in overall fatalities in Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria. 

Following the launch of Operation Haskanite, Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby criticized other countries in the Lake Chad region for failing to secure borders and permitting Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) insurgents to move throughout the region. President Déby also noted the lack of support by other military partners of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNTJF)¹Joël Honoré Kouam, ‘Chad complains it is fighting terrorism “alone” in the Lake Chad Basin,’ Africa News, 26 November 2024 — a joint force set up in 2015 to combat insurgents with troop contributions from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria — and threatened to withdraw troops from joint operations under the MNTJF.²Moki Edwin Kindzeka, ‘Chad says Boko Haram fighters fleeing to neighboring states,’ Voice of America, 12 November 2024 

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The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Battles show weakened alliances and a proliferation of violence in South Kivu

Several notable clashes in South Kivu province last month signaled diminishing cooperation between allied armed groups and an ongoing proliferation of violence in the wake of the March 23 (M23) rebellion. With violence involving the M23 lowering since July after the Congolese and Rwandan governments signed peace agreements,³Philippe Asanzi and Remadji Hoinathy, ‘The revived Luanda Process – inching towards peace in east DRC?’ Institute for Security Studies, 21 October 2024 the diminished threat of the M23 may have weakened alliances between armed groups supporting the Congolese military. In November, infighting among factions of the Wazalendo — a coalition of armed groups formed against the M23 — occurred in the Itombwe sector and the Lwindi highlands of South Kivu.⁴Coralie Pierret, ‘The “wazalendo”: Patriots at war in eastern DRC,’ Le Monde, 19 December 2023 The battles amongst Wazalendo fighters are indicative of the group’s lack of cohesion, which brings together numerous armed groups that previously fought against one another.⁵Romain Gras, ‘DRC’s wazalendo, Tshisekedi’s unpredictable allies,’ The Africa Report, 21 May 2024 While several clashes between Wazalendo factions have erupted in North Kivu, battles in South Kivu have been less frequent. Fighting broke out between Wazalendo groups for the first time in South Kivu in August over a dispute between rival factional leaders in Lwindi. 

Battles also erupted between the Congolese military forces (FARDC) and Wazalendo, which have also been allied in the fight against M23, in Kalundu district on 6 November. While the cause of this clash is unclear, Wazalendo fighters have increasingly been sent to the frontlines against the M23 when fighting alongside FARDC, diminishing trust amongst Wazalendo toward commanding officers.⁶Romain Gras, ‘DRC’s wazalendo, Tshisekedi’s unpredictable allies,’ The Africa Report, 21 May 2024; Coralie Pierret, ‘The “wazalendo”: Patriots at war in eastern DRC,’ Le Monde, 19 December 2023 

At the same time, Burundian military forces conducted operations against RED-Tabara, a Burundian rebel group, alongside Mayi Mayi Yakutumba in South Kivu last month, operating independently of the FARDC. Following a lull in violence involving RED-Tabara since June, Burundian military forces began a renewed campaign against the rebels following deadly clashes against RED-Tabara in several areas of Mwenga, South Kivu, in late October. RED-Tabara claimed that 45 Burundian soldiers and allied Mayi Mayi fighters were killed, including the deputy commander of the Burundian contingent.⁷X @Red_Tabara, 26 October 2024 The Burundian military’s unilateral operations and its partnership with other armed groups in the DRC show the propensity for conflict in the region to continue, even as the direct violence involving M23 subsides. Recent conflict with RED-Tabara illustrates the additional interests of the Burundian forces in DRC, who may use the lull in fighting with the M23 to pursue Burundian rebel groups in South Kivu, especially those like RED-Tabara that conduct cross-border attacks into Burundian territory.

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Ethiopia: The ENDF expands its aerial campaign in Amhara and Oromia

The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) carried out extensive drone and artillery strikes in Amhara and Oromia regions last month, expanding an aerial campaign that began in the Amhara region against Fano militias in October. The ENDF first began to target the Fano in 2022 as part of crackdown on ethno-nationalist elements, with violence against Fano youth militias escalating following the government’s dissolution of regional special forces in April 2023. The strikes last month against Fano militias were primarily focused in the Amhara region, an area of concentrated Fano militant activity. 

However, the ENDF’s aerial campaign has also expanded into Oromia, where the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) — referred to by the Ethiopian government as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)-Shane — controls several areas and demands self-determination. While nearly a third of the strikes hit the OLA/OLF-Shane, half of these events targeted civilians. With OLA/OLF-Shane militants living among civilian populations, ENDF strikes and artillery shells often hit markets, schools, and health facilities, and resulted in at least 85 reported civilian fatalities last month. The escalation in explosives and remote violence in November resulted in the highest number of such events since October 2021 during intense fighting between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and ENDF.

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Libya: Municipal elections coincide with a rise in violence in the west

On 16 November, Libya held local elections in 58 of the country’s municipalities, with 77% voter turnout.⁸Abdulkader Assad, ‘UNSMIL welcomes results of municipal councils’ elections in Libya,’ The Libya Observer, 25 November 2024 The High National Election Commission published results on 24 November,⁹High National Election Commission, ‘Commission Council Resolution No. 132 of 2024,’ 24 November 2024 with Saif Gaddafi claiming a landslide victory.¹⁰Facebook @SyfAlqdhafy, 20 November 2024 A second phase of the elections will follow in January 2025 in the country’s remaining 59 municipalities.¹¹Libya Review, ‘Libya to Hold Municipal Elections in January,’ 13 October 2024 While the successful holding of these elections represents an important milestone in Libya’s democratic process, the ongoing proliferation of violence involving competing armed groups points to its ongoing fragility. Coinciding with the election period, violent events in the western provinces of Libya more than doubled in November compared to October. Most events took place in Tripoli and az-Zawiyah districts. The conflict landscape in Libya is highly fragmented among a myriad of armed actors contesting for power. Last month’s violence involved at least 16 unique armed groups and infighting between the judicial police and the special task force in the Zanata area of Tripoli. Notable violence included the abduction of the security director of the intelligence services by unidentified gunmen in as-Sabaa area on 6 November, later released on 12 November. The abduction came amid a judicial investigation into the security director over alleged corruption involving the National Oil Corporation.¹²Libya Review, ‘Libyan Protesters Demand Government Action on “Missing” Intelligence Chief,’ 12 November 2024

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Burkina Faso and Mali: JNIM intensifies its campaign against pro-government militias

Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) militants stepped up their campaign against pro-government militias in November, including the state-backed Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), the majority ethnic Dogon militia Dan Na Ambassagou, and other Dozo (or Donso) hunter militias in Burkina Faso and Mali. This ongoing offensive made November the deadliest month of violence between JNIM militants and militias since July this year. Throughout the month, 35 armed clashes took place between JNIM and militias, resulting in 164 reported deaths. This represents a 7% increase in the number of reported fatalities resulting from clashes between opposing camps compared to the previous month. Originally stemming from inter-ethnic and inter-communal violence, these conflicts have been exacerbated by the militarization of identities and the arming of local communities. Over time, disputes that were once localized clashes between pastoralist and sedentary communities have evolved into protracted ‘communal wars’ during which parties increasingly affiliated with jihadist groups and ethnic militias settle scores.

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Tanzania: A wave of violence targets political opposition during local elections

Despite lifting a ban on opposition party public rallies and updating electoral laws in 2023,¹³Aikande Clement Kwayu, ‘Tanzania’s election laws make it hard to build political opposition – what needs to change,’ The Conversation, 14 July 2024 the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party still dominated local elections held on 27 November. CCM candidates won over 98% of the vote for all street, sub-village, and village positions. However, the voting for tens of thousands of positions was marred by a rise in civilian targeting compared to the average over the past year, primarily targeting members and candidates of the opposition Party for Democracy and Progress (CHADEMA). Unidentified groups that likely have political affiliations carried out many of the attacks, but police and military forces were also reported to have carried out violence targeting CHADEMA. In Dar es Salaam, soldiers fatally shot a CHADEMA candidate for a district local government delegation on election day. Police sources claimed the candidate died during a fight between CHADEMA and the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi members.¹⁴Matthew Atungwu, ‘Three opposition candidates killed in Tanzania local election,’ Daily Post Nigeria, 27 November 2024 The rise in attacks and abductions of opposition members is indicative of the ongoing challenges for multipartyism in Tanzania ahead of the general elections in 2025.

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