The group’s strategic shift: mobilizing for Palestine and expanding regional influence.
This piece was originally published in ISPI.
Ten years after capturing Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, the Houthis—also known as Ansar Allah—have reached the peak of their military strength, political influence, and popular support. Their Red Sea operations—officially framed as efforts to secure a ceasefire in Gaza, while also furthering other secondary objectives—have bolstered the group’s regional and international standing and fuelled recruitment for the Palestinian cause. Since the time of Husayn al-Houthi, founder of the movement, the group’s propaganda has attributed local problems to external enemies. This approach initially enabled them to channel popular grievances against the Yemeni government and later against the 2015 Saudi-led intervention. Ongoing confrontations with the US and Israel mark the culmination of this narrative.
As the Gaza crisis unfolded, the Houthis adopted a gradual approach to their military response.1Initially, the Houthis conditioned any military response on US involvement in the conflict. Drone and missile launches began after the al-Ahli Hospital massacre, first attributed to Israel, while the hijacking of the Galaxy Leader vehicles carrier, on 14 November, marked the beginning of attacks on maritime trade in the Red Sea. In contrast, popular mobilization was swift, with pro-Palestine demonstrations in Houthi-controlled areas in October 2023 alone exceeding the total number of demonstrations held in Yemen over the previous eight years. The Houthis quickly co-opted this popular enthusiasm, formalizing it into an institutional framework with the creation of the Supreme Committee of the National Campaign to Support al-Aqsa2To indicate Jerusalem. The Committee is chaired by Muhammad Mifath, appointed First Deputy Prime Minister of the Houthi-led Government of Change and Development in August 2024. on 29 October, which continues to lead mobilization efforts for Palestine.
Despite pledges by Houthi leaders to halt Red Sea operations if a Gaza ceasefire is achieved, the Committee‘s overarching, long-term goal remains the defeat of Israel and the liberation of al-Aqsa (Jerusalem). As the Supreme Political Council (SPC) President Mahdi al-Mashat stated, “The position of the Republic of Yemen is clear: to establish a Palestinian state with full sovereignty over all Palestinian territory.” This goal is pursued through both military and complementary activities, including boycotts of Israeli products, countering Western ‘soft power’ via so-called awareness campaigns, media efforts, financial support, and popular mobilization.
Mobilizing society and children: the Houthis’ militarization machine
A central pillar of the Houthis’ popular militarization strategy is the ‘open military courses’ known as al-Aqsa Flood. These two-week courses offer basic military training, field drills, and ideological instruction, preparing civilians—ranging from students to senior civil servants—for the anticipated ground battle against Israel. Participants are integrated into newly established military units, referred to as Popular Mobilization Forces, which are unrelated to the homonymous Iraqi organization. The first batch graduated in early December 2023 in Sanaa, with others following from different governorates. By March 2024, the leader Abdulmalik al-Houthi reported 282,000 trainees, a number that surged to 519,029 by October 2024.
These figures are likely overestimates, and the Houthis’ Popular Mobilization Forces are better understood as a ‘reserve force.’ Supporting over half a million active fighters would place an unsustainable financial burden on the Sanaa de facto government, especially given that soldiers—unlike most civil servants—are guaranteed an income in a country where most citizens face dire economic conditions. However, despite inflated recruitment figures, the Gaza crisis has undeniably fuelled a surge in enlistment. The UN Panel of Experts reports that the number of Houthi fighters rose from approximately 220,000 in 2022 to 350,000 in 2024, an exceptional increase driven by a dual strategy of repression and indoctrination.
Testimonies reveal that civil servants, teachers, and academic staff are being coerced into attending al-Aqsa Flood courses, with participation in Houthi-sponsored demonstrations closely monitored by neighborhood chairmen (‘aqil). The forced recruitment of Ethiopian migrants and members of the marginalized Muhamasheen minority highlights the Houthis’ systematic targeting of vulnerable groups. Recruitment campaigns, led by prominent Houthi leaders and coordinated by the Supervisory Authority for General Mobilization and Enlistment, exploit widespread Yemeni support for Gaza and the dire conditions of the population. Incentives such as food supplies and salaries are used to entice enlistees. While the prospect of fighting for Palestine drives enlistment, it often contrasts with the reality of being sent to Yemen’s domestic frontlines.
Children are a key target of Houthi propaganda. Since the late 1990s, the group has been organizing Zaydi-revivalist summer camps, initially centered on cultural activities and religious discourse. However, since the war began in 2015, these camps have evolved into tools for military recruitment, with children undergoing training and indoctrination. Houthi leaders claim that around 1.5 million children attended the camps last summer, though the internationally-recognized government estimates the figure at closer to 300,000. The educational system also serves the Houthi agenda, with changes to school curricula in Houthi-held areas normalizing militarism and violence. Newly established Education Units and Houthi-appointed Supervisors (mushrif) at the governorate and district level coordinate student participation in Houthi events. Indoctrination efforts are further reinforced through school radio stations, while university grades are reportedly tied to involvement in Gaza-support activities.
Before October 7, Houthi indoctrination was deeply entrenched in Yemeni civil society. Yet, the Gaza crisis has amplified the focus on Palestine, embedding it even further into daily life. Pro-Palestine sentiment, especially strong in Yemen’s northern highlands with historical roots dating back to Imam Yahya’s anti-imperialist stance, is now leveraged by the Houthis through several activities including documentation, mobilization, and religious and political discourse.
Houthi rhetoric places strong emphasis on documenting and condemning alleged “crimes of the Zionist entity,” a narrative actively promoted by the group’s media apparatus, civil society networks, and leadership. Abdulmalik al-Houthi frequently details such events in his speeches, aligning with Husayn al-Houthi’s principle that advocacy itself is a form of jihad and words are action. This militant rhetoric is supported by media activism, boycotts of US and Israeli products, and solidarity campaigns, including financial support for Palestine, blending propaganda with grassroots mobilization.
Framing the confrontation: the Houthis’ three “inevitables”
The Houthis’ political stance on the current conflict is rooted in their ideology, which portrays the West—especially Israel, the US, and the UK—as controlled by a Jewish lobby aiming to eradicate Islam. This alleged imperialist agenda is seen as pursued through “soft war” (cultural imposition) and direct military actions, such as US interventions and Israeli attempts to dominate the Middle East. The Houthis actively seek confrontation with the US and Israel, framing it within their doctrine of the “three inevitables,” which envisions this conflict as both necessary and predestined.
The first “inevitable,” according to Houthi leaders, is Israel’s defeat, which they claim is divinely affirmed by the Quran.3Among other Quranic verses, the Houthis often refer to Surat al-Isra (17:7), which discusses the punishment of the ‘Children of Israel’ for their alleged misdeeds. The expression “To sadden your faces,” taken from these verses, was also the title of a recent military maneuver. This notion intertwines anti-Semitic rhetoric with their political discourse, targeting Jewish people collectively as “corrupt and immoral,” rather than focusing solely on the state of Israel. Their interpretation of current events is framed through a Quranic lens, interpreting both the present and future as extensions of a divinely inspired past—a view encapsulated in their motto, “One eye on the Quran and one eye on the news.” This religious discourse is amplified through Friday sermons, which connect present-day confrontations with historical conflicts, such as those between the Prophet Muhammad and the Jewish community of Yathrib.4See, for instance, the recent sermon delivered by the member of the Houthi Political Office Hamud al-Ahnumi on Friday 8 November 2024. In contrast, the Houthis describe Israel’s religious rhetoric as “false” and “mythical,” while quoting Israeli and Western leaders who predict Israel’s demise.
The second “inevitable” is the defeat of those aligned with Israel, including its Western allies and Arab states that normalized or sought to normalize relations with Israel before the Gaza war. The group’s rhetoric, rooted in Husayn al-Houthi’s legacy, champions pan-Arabism and condemns Arab states collaborating with the US and Israel, questioning their commitment to the Islamic faith. Saudi Arabia, in particular, is criticized for refusing to open its borders to Houthi fighters wishing to join ground battles in Palestine, as well as for its perceived inaction and inadequate condemnation of Israel.5The recent statement issued by the Arab Islamic Summit on 11 November has been described by Abdulmalik al-Houthi as “not strongly worded” and criticized for posing demands instead of fostering action.
Lastly, the third “inevitable” is the victory of Islam, which combines a messianic vision with a strict adherence to “Quranic culture.” Rooted in Zaydi tradition,6The Houthis fully embrace the Zaydi principle of khuruj, or rebellion against unjust rule, which descends from the broader notion of “Commanding right and forbidding wrong” – the moral duty for Muslims to be proactive in the enforcement of religion. the Houthis promote jihad against perceived oppressors, both through military action and cultural mobilization. The culture of martyrdom is a prominent driver of recruitment, as it “frees the [Islamic] nation from the complex of fear.” Accordingly, martyrs are revered, and their families supported. Ultimately, the Houthis see their journey—from the six Saada wars (2004-2010) fought against the Yemeni government, through nine years of Saudi ‘aggression,’ to direct confrontation with the US and Israel—as a triumphant march toward victory, bolstered by their ongoing military successes, and see no reason to limit their regional ambitions.
