Q&A: What is happening in and around Goma?

Q&A with

Ladd Serwat

Africa Senior Analyst, ACLED

After more than three years of renewed operations in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, the March 23 Movement (M23) and Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) soldiers laid siege to Goma city on 26 January 2025. Reminiscent of the M23 and RDF takeover of Goma in November 2012, the rebels and Rwandan soldiers have taken over the airport and national radio station and clashed with Congolese forces (FARDC) and allied armed groups in at least 13 neighborhoods within Goma city. Several other neighborhoods of Goma were handed over to the M23 and RDF without contestation.

Simultaneously, M23 fighters have made a push down the N2 roadway, reaching northern areas of South Kivu province. This southward offensive sparked concerns that the conflict could expand toward major towns on the shores of Lake Kivu and along the roadway to Bukavu.¹ So far, the M23 has taken control of the mining towns of Lumbishi, Numbi, and Shanje in South Kivu (see map below).

Map - Political violence involving the M23 and RDF in the DRC 1 December 2024 - 28 January 2025

Fighting over Goma escalates the direct conflict between regional neighbors. It brings myriad actors into conflict with the M23 and Rwandan forces, including Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC) forces, United Nations peacekeepers, and Burundian military forces. Private military companies and a group of allied local armed groups under the Wazalendo coalition are also attempting to defend various positions around Goma from the M23 and RDF. Uganda continues to partner with FARDC in military operations further north in Ituri province, but UN experts have accused Kampala of supporting the M23 rebels and permitting M23 fighters to travel within Ugandan territory.²

Increased use of artillery and missile strikes is a notable characteristic of the recent fighting since 1 December 2024, continuing in January 2025 and used extensively in the offensive against Goma. The use of shelling and artillery by the M23 and RDF had significantly declined following peace agreements and ceasefire negotiations in July and August 2024. Since the RDF re-engaged in the violence in December, these forms of remote violence have resumed. Prior to the advance, the M23 and RDF used widespread shelling before launching a ground offensive into the city. Under assault from the M23, the Congolese military also began shelling into Rwanda, striking areas in the bordering district of Rubavu, including the border town of Gisenyi. The Rwandan military claims at least five civilians were killed and 30 injured.³

Demonstrations opposing the violence have erupted in several towns across the DRC. Several of these have turned violent, marked by the destruction of property, including arson attacks on several embassies perceived to support the M23 in Kinshasa.

Who is the M23?

The M23, known in French as the Mouvement du 23 Mars, is an armed group active in the North Kivu province of the DRC with support from the Rwandan government. The group’s origins trace back to challenges during the reintegration of Rwandophone militants after the Congo Wars, initially leading a group to break away from the process and establish the predecessor to the M23, called the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) under the leadership of Laurent Nkunda, a former member of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (for more, see ACLED’s in-depth profile of the M23 published in March 2023).

Why has the fighting in DRC worsened?

On 15 December 2024, peace talks broke down after the Congolese government refused Rwanda’s demands to negotiate directly with the M23. DRC President Felix Tshisekedi and Congolese officials have labeled the M23 a terrorist group and refuse to legitimize the group through direct dialogue.⁴ Since 1 December 2024, ACLED records an uptick in violence involving M23 rebels and Rwandan military forces across North Kivu and into northern areas of South Kivu. This effectively cut off the city of Goma. By 4 January 2025, the M23 had gained control over Masisi, a gold and coltan mining hub. The rebels then moved to capture the port town of Minova on 21 January, removing the flow of goods and military equipment to Goma from the south, and finally Sake on 23 January.⁵

Why is Goma strategically important?

Goma serves as the provincial capital of North Kivu, an economic hub for the region, and a key trade hub with Rwanda during normalized relations. Numerous Congolese and international businesses, NGOs, and media outlets maintain offices in Goma. Due to instability in the region, the Congolese government also installed military leadership of the province, but Major General Peter Cirimwami died after clashing with the M23 on 23 January.⁶ The M23 derives significant income from smuggling natural resources like cobalt (used in electric car batteries) and taxation of miners and road users through roadblocks in the region. The Rwandan government has been accused of backing the M23 to gain control of Congolese mineral resources, including gold, tin, tantalum (used in cell phones, microchips, and orthopedic implants), and tungsten (used in X-ray tubes, light bulb filaments, and armor plating projectile missiles).

What do you think could happen over the next few weeks?

There are two possible scenarios.

One, the M23/RDF takeover of Goma pushes Kinshasa and regional neighbors to negotiate.

The stronger bargaining position of the M23 after taking control of Goma may push the Congolese government to make a peace deal and negotiate directly with the rebels. The deal would likely include many of the public demands made by M23 spokespeople and Rwandan officials, especially the cessation of collaboration with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) — an armed group in the DRC comprised of some combatants who carried out the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and sympathizers recruited since this time — and focused military operations against the FDLR, efforts to end violence targeting Rwandaphones in eastern DRC, and stopping incendiary rhetoric over a military invasion of Rwanda or related military buildup near the shared border.⁷ Private discourse may include the provision of local political power in North Kivu to M23-aligned leaders and economic deals to ensure Rwandan interests — especially over natural resources such as cobalt — are secured in the region.⁸

After the M23 and RDF seized Goma in November 2012, negotiations in Uganda led the M23 to withdraw from the city by 1 December 2012.⁹ UN reports in July 2024 accused Uganda of supporting the M23, which may place Kampala in a strong negotiating position with the M23 once again.¹⁰ Like in 2012, agreements may initially be reached to hand over Goma, but fighting would likely continue in other areas of North Kivu.

Two, the DRC government pushes for a military solution.

The Congolese government may seek a military solution and increase cross-border retaliation into Rwanda. ACLED data show that Congolese forces began shelling into Rwandan territory on 26 January and have continued striking locations in Rubavu district. So far, the Congolese government has also withdrawn diplomats from Kigali and pushed Rwandan diplomats from Kinshasa,¹¹ additionally refusing to attend diplomatic discussions held by the East African Community in Tanzania. These moves may signal that Kinshasa is turning away from diplomatic solutions, and violence could continue escalating to recapture Goma and areas held by the M23 in North Kivu.

How are civilians affected?

Unlike the last major offensive in 2012 — when civilian targeting comprised nearly half of the total violence involving the M23 — the M23 rebels have remained more disciplined in the treatment of non-combatants. While many civilians have been caught in the crossfire and have been displaced from conflict zones, specific violence targeting civilians by the M23 comprises less than 15% of their annual operations since they reemerged in 2021.

However, civilian targeting by the M23 spiked in January 2025 as the rebels battled to control Goma. ACLED records more than 25 civilian targeting events in January 2025, the most since the previous takeover of Goma in November 2012 (see graph below). As the M23 pushes out the FARDC and exerts control over Goma, civilians may face dire consequences of the violence and humanitarian needs may increase. Nearly 2 million people live in Goma, including many displaced people who have fled from M23-related violence elsewhere in North Kivu.¹²