The US president has been in power for just over a month, and the effects on global politics have been seismic. The aid world is reeling from the fallout of USAID being dismantled and there is not yet an answer to the most important question: What now?
ACLED is focused on conflict, and so my comments will be on how the changes in USAID and aid funding declines in Germany, France, and the UK may impact conflict rates, patterns, and agents.
There is a context here to consider: Conflict rates doubled in the past five years, and moreover, they increased the most in places that did not (in the beginning) require USAID’s humanitarian and development assistance. Assumptions that conflict occurs most in poor places, with associated ‘failed’ governments, are outdated and inaccurate. Conflict is far more widespread than that, and it is growing because political competition generates political violence where power and control can be seized.
Most aid was not directed toward programs around conflict, peacebuilding, or even political change. However, there was an administrative fiat in USAID (actually, many administrative fiats) demanding that most programs and projects (on health, economic prosperity, and education) were tagged and branded as having secondary and forced effects on conflict or stabilization (and many other issues including climate, etc.). Also, former administrator Samantha Power, who held a seat on the US National Security Council, was clear in her early comments that she wished to wield aid as a security tool (USAID was the NSC’s “ground game”). This was not a good idea at any time, and some of the ‘security’ positions the administration took were woeful.
Finally, Prof. Alex Thurston (in his excellent substack Sawahil Newsletter) spoke well to the shifting defenses of USAID as both too extensive to be sound, and too weak to be effective. The latest round of defenses in the media spoke to the conflict mitigation effects of USAID’s work and, more broadly, aid’s influence on conflict. These are difficult waters to navigate if aid is presenting itself as unbiased or effective. Defenders of USAID have suggested unproven and implausible links to its record of conflict mitigation to reassert the logic that made the organization vulnerable to claims of overreach and bias in the first place.
The US government funded just under half of all global humanitarian initiatives in 2024, according to the UN, rising to as much as 59% of all humanitarian funding in Haiti and 68% in the Democratic Republic of Congo. US Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) specifically allocated to the conflict, peace, and security sector between 2013 and 2023 is 27% of all Development Assistance Community ODA of this kind. Despite the funding and focus on conflict and peace, the very recent cut-off of US aid programs has not led to a discernible increase in violence rates. But it has only been a short time, and conflict has not decreased either (see graph below).
Of the top conflicted recipients of USAID, Ethiopia, Somalia, Nigeria, Congo, and Syria each receive different levels of support, but a cessation in aid is unlikely to influence violence rates. Why? This aid is primarily focused on food, health care, education, running refugee camps, etc. People receiving this aid are not those engaging in conflict, or the reason these conflicts are prolific. Their governments may or may not take over providing these services. These governments are well aware that the poor and vulnerable are the least likely groups in their countries to fight to redress their marginalization — in short, these people are not a threat, they are considered a burden.
Support toward rehabilitation of armed group members, security around prisons, and keeping the peace is now off the table, and the ramifications of a corrupt or malfunctioning domestic security sector may certainly be a result of decreasing US aid and interest. Some effects that may emerge from upsetting the war economy include accounts of sizable, aid-supplied, financial and other resources under armed groups’ control. If a decline were to upset the war economy, unrest associated with dominant, organized armed groups may occur. But these are not the relationships aid advocates want to emphasize.
We all need a viable and well-directed aid sector. We all know the aid sector needs to change, and now, that change is upon us. But very little of the discussion has considered “what might development programming look like next year for the US?” and “how will it be determined, and what/who will determine it?” If it is determined on the effectiveness of aid programs, then food, health, and education aid are the best in terms of the number of people benefitting and the good they do. If it is determined on US advantage, it is a more difficult question: There are many from the developing world noting that USAID dependence distorted control and authority. There are few domestic US audiences who understand the role USAID is playing, and its scale. The question remains: “What should aid be for?”
There is also a puzzle at the heart of this issue, which is that the removal of USAID suggests isolationism, but the acts of the US administration veer toward another very different form of engagement. The latter is based — purely — on a premise of hard power while USAID advocated ‘soft’ power, including and extending past “aid for trade.”
Trump’s notion of power and influence cannot be translated into aid and its impact; it can be translated into an exchange with recipient countries. Certainly, that exchange will need to benefit the US and whomever is currently close to the administration. But this system has two outcomes that are unsettling: In answering “what should aid be for?” the answer is “to enable transactions with the US”; in answering “to whom is the system accountable?,” the answer is “the US and its close beneficiaries.”
Allowing the powerful to access more power and more leverage through aid transactions will create more competition for power amongst those strong enough to contest, and will, in turn, create more conflict to acquire that power. I question why people say President Trump wants fewer wars and the Nobel Peace Prize. He — quite clearly — wants fewer contests where the US does not benefit directly. If control of Afghanistan was on the table, or if Iraq was invaded to overtake, that could be a fight worth having. But transaction logic does not extend to democracy or human rights — those are not fights worth having — that exchange is not valuable. In the new system and for its agents, conflict is not something to mitigate but to direct at a cost. This is a very far place from the ‘decolonization of aid’ conversations, which might be the only good thing about it.
New expert insights on global hotspots
We have been producing a fantastic series of commentaries that involve real-time insights from our resident experts on all manner of conflicts and themes. For those produced recently, please see:
- Democratic Republic of Congo: Expanding areas of M23’s operations; The Rwanda-backed M23 capture Kavumu
- Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel: The IDF’s expanded buffer zone in Gaza and a 14% rise in violence by the IDF in the West Bank
- Jihadi activity: IS Somalia conducts its first-ever drone strike, while IS Sahel Province increases foreign kidnappings
- Other developments to watch include rising violence in Morobe, Papua New Guinea; a possible new phase of war in Myanmar; escalating violence in Ecuador’s electoral process; and increasing cattle rustling and pastoralist violence in Uganda.
Notes and notions
The world has continued turning, and with it, still a lot of conflict.
24 February marked three years since Russia invaded Ukraine and began this conflict. We produced an excellent report, Bombing into submission, alongside an expert comment on Ukraine’s long-range strikes on Russian territory and an insightful webinar.
We also wrote about the German election, which saw a conservative and far-right win following a series of protests across the country.
Conflicts that have decreased in one way continue to get worse in others as noted by our recent report on Colombia: Civilians in Colombia face less deadly — but more pervasive — violence.
I have been busy writing commentaries on African conflict for the Institute for Strategic Studies in South Africa and on the Middle East for the new Daily Euro Times.
I wish I had something a little frivolous to report, but February remains a miserable month. My only enjoyment has been reading “Get In: The Inside Story of Labour Under Starmer” by Patrick Maguire and Gabriel Pogrund and learning that a man from West Cork is running the whole show.
