A barometer of Houthi repression: governance and infighting in Ibb governorate

Away from the high waters of the Red Sea, where they waged hundreds of attacks on commercial shipping, inside Yemen, the Houthis are grappling with growing domestic unrest. In recent months, the movement has carried out mass arrests of opposition figures, civil society groups, influencers, and humanitarian workers on charges of conspiring with the enemy. Increasingly restive tribes and alleged factional divisions add to the paranoia that characterizes Houthi rule, which they fear could be threatened if the country relapses into conflict.

Nowhere are these dynamics better illustrated than in Ibb, a Sunni-majority province in central Yemen that is home to nearly 4 million people and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people. Once dubbed Yemen’s “hotbed of infighting,” Ibb continues to harbor considerable instability despite efforts by the Houthis to co-opt local elites and avert potential threats. Rampant crime and a string of revenge killings further reveal ongoing struggles to restore security. At a high-level meeting convened in December, Ibb Governor Abdulwahid Salah admitted the challenges and called on the military and security services to work alongside the local authorities.¹

Interrogating Houthi repression and political disorder in Ibb serves as a barometer of simmering turmoil in Houthi-controlled areas. It highlights several patterns found in other governorates, including the repression of political plurality and freedom of opinion, land-related disorder and tribal disputes, and infighting within Houthi ranks.

Shrinking space for activism and political dissent

In April 2022, a nationwide truce brokered by the United Nations came into effect in Yemen. Confrontations between the warring parties in the 34 months after the truce decreased by an estimated 70% compared to the same period before the truce. With the war effort waning, the Houthis turned their attention to the internal front, seizing the opportunity to tighten their grip on power. This translated into heightened levels of civilian repression, and spaces for grassroots activism, political dissent, and freedom of expression have been shrinking dramatically across Houthi-controlled Yemen.

This is especially evident in Ibb governorate. From the outset of the conflict, the Houthis struggled to consolidate their control over this region, facing deep-rooted opposition driven by sectarian divisions and a distinct cultural identity. Since April 2022, Ibb has witnessed a severe crackdown on civil society, with Houthi assaults and abductions nearly tripling compared to the pre-truce period (see graph below). The scale of repression intensified further in June 2022, as the Houthis launched a sweeping campaign against civil society activists and human rights defenders, underscoring the governorate’s significance as a center of political dissent.

As part of a coordinated security campaign spanning multiple governorates — and most notably the capital, Sanaa² — the Houthis escalated their clampdown on activists who are critical of the regime on platforms like YouTube and Facebook. In Ibb alone, at least 13 individuals were abducted under trumped-up charges. Among these incidents, the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Hamdi Abdulrazzaq al-Khawlani, an influential social media activist nicknamed “al-Mukahhal,” sparked widespread public outrage.³ His death, which human rights organizations attribute to the Houthis, triggered a wave of political unrest, which was promptly suppressed by the Houthi security apparatus.

Overall, the suppression of grassroots activism signals a shrinking of freedom of expression, accompanied by growing efforts to impose Houthi ideology, resulting in largely subdued, yet persistent, pockets of popular opposition. This campaign, however, has also extended to organized political groups, such as the General People’s Congress (GPC) — the party of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The repression of the commemorations for the 26 September Revolution anniversary⁴ well exemplifies this emerging trend. Historically, the Houthis allowed 26th September anniversary celebrations until 2023,⁵ when the GPC used the anniversary to demand the disbursement of public sector salaries that the pro-Houthi Sanaa-based government had frozen. In response, the Houthis suppressed the celebrations, launching a wave of arrests in areas surrounding Sanaa.

In Ibb, repression remained relatively low in 2023 but escalated in September 2024, when the Houthis reportedly abducted hundreds (see graph above), including tribal shaykhs, local political figures, and children, in the run-up to the anniversary. This crackdown came about six weeks after the announcement of a new Houthi cabinet that excluded the GPC.⁶ These developments underscore increasing censorship of former republican symbols, the use of the 26th September anniversary to target GPC sympathizers, and a broader crackdown on GPC leadership, including the incremental replacement or co-option of their leaders in public institutions.⁷

On a broader scale, the Houthis have carried out an arrest campaign that targeted the Yemeni staff of international organizations in response to the aerial strikes that the United States and the United Kingdom launched on Houthi positions in Yemen since January 2024. Many of them are accused of belonging to an international spy network affiliated with the US, UK, Israel, and other Western countries conspiring against Yemen. Most arrests occurred around Sanaa, Amran, and Saada, reflecting the Houthis’ perspective on security priorities: while Ibb is viewed as a hotbed of internal dissent, northern strongholds like Saada are seen as potential targets for foreign intelligence activities.

Tribal disorder and property seizures

Although less pronounced than in the far north of the country, the tribes’ role remains crucial in Ibb, where they continue to serve as key actors in conflict resolution and mediation. However, following the UN-mediated truce, tribal mechanisms have come under strain due to a surge in land disputes, driven either by Houthi-led property seizures or escalating intra-tribal conflicts. This has led to a significant 60% increase in tribal disorder compared to the pre-truce period.

Since the onset of the war, Ibb has seen a significant rise in land and real estate values, driven by a high influx of internally displaced people and increased investment from expatriates.⁸ Exploiting this surge in value, the Houthis have forcibly seized private property by, for example, confiscating land and properties for infrastructural projects without due compensation; appropriated Sunni religious property as a means of enforcing sectarian repression; seized religious endowments; and expropriated tribal lands for the benefit of select Houthi factions, which often compete among themselves for revenue.

Since April 2022, Houthi land-related violence increased by more than seven times compared to the pre-truce period (see maps below). This violence has mostly taken the form of attacks and kidnappings targeting non-compliant civilians and tribesmen but has also escalated into armed clashes between Houthi factions and tribal militias. In a few cases, violence ensued from the imposition of higher fees on the local population.⁹ Most Houthi violence related to property seizures took place around the two main roads cutting across Ibb governorate, from north to south and from east to west, underscoring the higher value of property located close to key routes. Contrastingly, land-related tribal disorder appears to be more randomly distributed across the governorate, reflecting the local nature of the tribal conflicts involved.

CASE STUDY: Waqf reforms and Houthi infighting | Houthi authorities reformed the religious endowments (“waqf”) system in January 2021 with the aim of extracting resources for the state and the war effort while securing loyalty through their spoils system. The creation of the General Authority for Religious Endowments, led by Abdulmajid al-Houthi,¹⁰ strengthened the group’s control over religious endowments, increasing rents and displacing vulnerable tenants. In Sanaa, religious endowments fell under the influence of Supreme Political Council member Muhammad Ali al-Houthi, while in Ibb, Abdulmajid exercised control through his intermediary, Bandar al-Asal, head of the region’s religious endowments authority. In September 2022, al-Asal and Nassir al-Arjali — a Houthi leader from Amran — crossed fire during a dispute over waqf land, and al-Asal killed al-Arjali’s brother.¹¹ Al-Asal was later detained in connection to the killing. After his imprisonment in 2022, the rate of Houthi-led waqf expropriations in Ibb governorate increased dramatically, testifying to the complex dynamics driving internal competition within the Houthi movement.

In parallel, intra-tribal disputes appear to be on the rise, with tribal violence against civilians more than tripling compared to the pre-truce period. Several factors contribute to this unrest. The volatility of the land market and the dire economic situation caused by the war pressure residents into selling valuable land, fuelling competition between families and factions. The return of fighters from the frontlines has also reignited unresolved disputes and sparked new conflicts over land and water.

Adding a political layer to the unrest, tribal disorder in Ibb also appears to be a function of deliberate governance strategies. The Houthis align with specific tribal factions to fuel local conflicts as part of a broader divide-and-rule strategy, with the aim of curbing dissident tribes and weakening tribal mechanisms. As observed in other governorates,¹² abuses by Houthi officers are rarely prosecuted, despite tribal demands for retribution. Loyal tribes are rewarded with financial and political incentives, undermining traditional mechanisms of tribal solidarity. The killing of tribal mediators by the Houthis, with the latest incidents in Ibb reported in December 2024,¹³ further escalates tensions and weakens customary arbitration mechanisms.

CASE STUDY: Houthi-driven tribal disputes | The ongoing tribal conflict in Udayn district, west of Ibb, is a prominent example of Houthi meddling in tribal disputes. Tensions first flared in December 2019 when the pro-Houthi security director of al-Udayn killed a tribesman from the al-Shahari group and fled the governorate, with Houthi authorities ignoring the tribe’s demands for retribution. In 2020, when confrontations broke out between the al-Shahari and al-Duraymi tribes in Khabbaz district, the Houthis seized the opportunity to weaken the Shahari by actively supporting the Duraymi. Tensions escalated with targeted attacks against Shaykh Abdulwahid al-Shahari, the secretary-general of Udayn’s Local Council, despite tribal calls for an end to Houthi interference.¹⁴ The conflict, which persisted into January 2025, has resulted in at least 20 deaths, numerous abductions, and significant material damage. It stands as a stark demonstration of how the Houthis exploit tribal divisions to further their political goals, fueling local unrest and undermining efforts at reconciliation.

Infighting

Tribal tensions in Ibb are frequently interwoven with factional competition within the Houthi movement. The Houthis’ power grab in 2014 precipitated internecine fighting between local allies and Houthi loyalists from Yemen’s northern governorates. In 2019, Ibb was home to a conflict pitting security director Abdulhafidh al-Saqqaf — an ally of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh who enabled the Houthi advance in Ibb — and a loyalist Houthi faction from Saada under the command of Abu Ali al-Ayani — the Houthis’ military supervisor and commander of the Ibb axis. The clashes plunged the governorate into instability as the two parties mobilized rival tribal networks. Sporadic skirmishes continued for months after al-Saqqaf’s defeat¹⁵ before gradually ebbing away as the Houthis reshuffled Ibb’s security architecture.

Al-Saqqaf’s loss to the Houthis did not entirely stop infighting in the governorate. After the peak in 2019 and 2020 — when 27 distinct events were recorded — at least another 20 distinct infighting events occurred between January 2022 and January 2025. This is approximately 40% of all infighting recorded in Houthi-controlled Yemen during this period (see map below). During this time, the Houthis designated Hadi al-Kuhlani, a former personal bodyguard of Abdulmalik al-Houthi and security leader in al-Hudayda, as security supervisor in Ibb. The appointment of a high-profile Houthi loyalist after a protracted turnover in the governorate’s security apparatus reveals that the movement’s central leadership views the security situation in Ibb as highly critical.

Simmering resentment toward Houthi loyalists from outside Ibb continues to generate friction between the movement’s different wings. One recent case has involved Abu Imad al-Jalal (an official close to Houthi leader Yahya al-Rizami), whose abduction of an Ibb resident on 9 December 2024 prompted Deputy Governor Abdulhamid al-Shahiri to mobilize armed fighters.¹⁶ An influential shaykh affiliated with the GPC, al-Shahiri has maintained a relative degree of autonomy thanks to his tribal connections, voicing occasional criticism against the Houthis.¹⁷ In 2022, Abu Imad and his men were involved in another incident where they locked horns with local armed Houthis over a piece of land.¹⁸

Disputes over taxation, arbitrary property seizures, and power thus sow frequent discontent not just among tribes — many of which have reluctantly succumbed to the Houthis — but also among local Houthi leaders who joined the movement out of pragmatic considerations, locally known as “‘mutahawwithin.” Houthi meddling in tribal affairs worries local elites that the Houthis may be seeking to alter the governorate’s demographic makeup, acquiring lands forcefully or ousting them from operating lucrative checkpoints.¹⁹ Recent clashes between Houthi elements from Khawlan (an area close to the border with Taizz governorate) and Houthi security in Ibb city, which broke out after the former demanded retribution over a killing, underscore the tense coexistence of these groups within the Houthi movement.²⁰

The future of the Yemen peace process hangs in the balance, shrouded in uncertainty as regional and international dynamics shift unpredictably. The US designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)²¹ threatens to upend the diplomatic landscape further, seemingly derailing any prospects of an agreement on the UN roadmap between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis. Inside Yemen, drums of war intensify, with belligerent parties threatening a return to an all-out conflict.

Against a backdrop of growing uncertainty, the repressive strategies underpinning Houthi repression in Ibb governorate are likely to persist and intensify as they remain deeply embedded in the group’s governance system. In particular, the FTO designation will lead to reduced international support for humanitarian and development projects, greater diplomatic isolation of the Houthis, and heightened paranoia over foreign conspiracies targeting their leadership. This, in turn, will intensify Houthi suppression of political dissent and internecine competition over increasingly scarce state resources and rents. Patterns of Houthi repression in Ibb are likely to be replicated in other governorates with similar underpinnings, as demonstrated by the crackdown on tribal dissent in the Sunni-majority province of al-Bayda and the escalation of infighting in the capital, Sanaa.

Visuals produced by Ana Marco.