Regional Overview
Africa
March 2025

Central African Republic: Deadly attacks against ethnic Fulani increase

In February, a robbery triggered escalating violence between Anti-balaka and Fulani pastoralists, two groups locked in a longstanding competition for power in the country. The Anti-balaka arose from self-defense groups, primarily recruited from animist and Christian populations, and have contested power against numerous predominantly Muslim groups, including ethnic Fulani.¹Human Rights Watch, “Central African Republic: Muslims Forced to Flee,” 12 February 2014 Civilian targeting increased after two people, who had been part of an Anti-balaka militia under the leadership of Michel Bélo, stole a motorcycle, gold, and a sum of money on the Baoro-Bouar axis in Ouham-Pendé on 14 February.²Corbeau News, “Fulani Massacres in Bozoum: The CPC denounces the killings by the ruling militia,” 24 February 2025 (French) Subsequent reprisals and counter-attacks were coordinated by numerous militias, with violence concentrated in Ouham-Pendé prefecture. 

The violence primarily targeted civilians and led to at least 130 reported fatalities. Fulani pastoralists were particularly affected by the violence, comprising at least 85% of the reported fatalities from civilian targeting last month. The escalation in civilian targeting led to February being the deadliest month in the country since March 2022, when the Wagner Group carried out widespread violence targeting civilians in Vakaga prefecture.

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Democratic Republic of the Congo: Civilian targeting surges as M23 advance in South Kivu

In February, the March 23 Movement (M23) and the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) captured the South Kivu regional capital of Bukavu. They marched further into the province, with the Congolese army (FARDC), Wazalendo, and Burundian army retreating southward to positions around Uvira. Each month, fighting tends to break out between the Wazalendo and FARDC, who have maintained a precarious relationship in their collaboration against the M23-RDF offensive. The retreat of the FARDC sparked clashes with allied militias under the Wazalendo coalition, who resisted the withdrawal of the FARDC and demanded fleeing Congolese soldiers surrender their weapons.³Reuters, “Rebel advance causes panic in Congolese border town Uvira,” 19 February 2025 

Amid the instability and changing authority in the province, there was a spike in civilian targeting in South Kivu last month. Nearly half of the violence targeting civilians was carried out by FARDC soldiers, who often looted and attacked civilians in areas under threat from the M23 offensive or during their retreat from the frontlines. The FARDC  is composed of numerous ex-militants from various armed groups and tends to lack discipline and cohesion. They frequently pose risks to civilian populations and engage in widespread violence targeting civilians, looting, and property destruction.⁴Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen, “The volatility of a half-cooked bouillabaisse: Rebel–military integration and conflict dynamics in the eastern DRC,” African Affairs, October 2013, pp. 563–582 The M23 and Twirwaneho — an armed group of ethnic Banyamulenge allied with the M23 — also accused the FARDC of conducting aerial bombardments on civilian-populated areas under M23 control in South Kivu.⁵X @twirwaneho, 26 February 2025; X @M23_ARC, 6 February 2025 The M23, meanwhile, attacked civilians in South Kivu after taking control of populated areas. Contributing to the civilian targeting was a rise in mob violence. Given the unstable governance in the province, locals increasingly took justice into their own hands through lynchings and collective violence against suspected criminals.

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Ghana: Violent Bawku disputes spill over into the North East region

Violence linked to the spillover of the Bawku chieftaincy dispute from the Upper East region escalated in the North East region of Ghana. Longstanding conflict over the Bawku chieftaincy has historically clustered in the Bawku district of the Upper East region and stems from decades of disputes between the Mamprusia and Kusasi groups over authority and land ownership.⁶Nuhu Yidanax and Elizabeth Izac-Hassan, “Navigating Historical and Legal Shortfalls to Resolve the Bawku Chieftaincy Conflict in Ghana through Court-connected Mediation,” SOAS University of London, 30 November 2024 While the conflict has persisted for decades, violence intensified in October 2024 when chief Alhaji Seidu Abagre returned from exile, triggering disputes over authority, legal challenges, arrests, and clashes between the Kusasi and Mamprusi groups.⁷Ibrahim Abode, “Bawku: Two persons reportedly killed, others injured in gun battle,” Citi News Room, 27 October 2024 Sporadic and lower-level violence related to the Bawku conflict had been concentrated in the North East region, and this is the first escalation of Bawku-related violence in the Upper East region. Much of the violence involved attacks on civilians by unidentified armed groups, and the military carried out reprisal violence targeting civilians with suspected connections to the Bawku violence. In the Mamprusi West district — which was especially affected — gunmen attacked buses traveling along the Bolgatanga-Tamale highway, burned vehicles, and reportedly killed seven people. Northern Ghana is an important commercial and migration hub, and increased insecurity provides opportunities for Islamist armed groups to move across the border and capitalize on local political divisions.

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Niger: An ISSP offensive contributes to a rise in fatalities

Last month, the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) launched an offensive in Dioundiou commune, on the border with Nigeria, where it clashed with military forces and attacked several villages. The attacks on these border villages fit into a broader pattern of the collective punishment of civilians whom the group considers to be loyal to the state. The push may be linked to efforts to gain more direct access to the Niger-Benin pipeline that runs through the Dioundiou commune, which ISSP has already directly targeted on several occasions. The outbreak of violence in Dioundiou contributed to an uptick in reported fatalities in Niger, which increased nearly four times compared to the previous month. This latest offensive comes against the backdrop of a new phase of jihadist expansion undertaken by ISSP and its rival, the al-Qaeda affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Since the beginning of 2024, both ISSP and JNIM have launched parallel offensives into the border regions between Benin, Niger, and Nigeria. The string of attacks also shows that ISSP is replicating its approach used elsewhere in the region and is utilizing mass violence to take control of territory in Niger and exert its influence over the local population.

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Somalia: US and UAE-supported airstrikes against insurgents escalate

Puntland state security forces, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States carried out an intensive joint airstrike campaign targeting bases, training facilities, and camps linked to the Islamic State Somalia Province (IS Somalia). Early in February, US airstrikes targeted members of IS Somalia in Puntland, killing 14 militants, including a senior IS Somalia recruiter, a financier, and an external operations leader responsible for the deployment of fighters into the US and across Europe. US officials believe that the IS threat is growing in Somalia after top IS members allegedly traveled to the country to expand and develop links in the region.⁸Carla Babb, Harun Maruf, and Jeff Seldin, “Islamic State in Somalia poses growing threat, US officials say,” Voice of America, 18 June 2024 Although the Emirati military had conducted airstrikes in Somalia before, the scale of UAE airstrikes in February was unprecedented, with at least 30 strikes targeting militant positions in the mountainous areas of Bari. For its part, IS Somalia has ramped up the use of drone strikes, which struck Puntland Maritime Police and Dervish Forces at bases in Qandala district of Bari. This aerial campaign represents a significant escalation in the fight against IS Somalia, whose leader, Sheikh Abdulkadir Mumin, is believed to have risen through the ranks of the global militant organization. US airstrikes were reported to have killed Mumin in 2024, but his death has never been confirmed.⁹Associated Press, ‘The quiet financier: Islamic State’s elusive strongman,’ 6 January 2025; Mary Harper, ‘Why Trump is on the warpath in Somalia,’ BBC, 7 February 2025

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Sudan: The SAF capture numerous locations and strategic parts of Khartoum

In February, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) gained control of numerous strategic locations in Khartoum, including the Kafouri neighborhood, parts of the East Nile locality, and central Khartoum. Seizing control of the Kafouri neighborhood proved difficult for the SAF due to the presence of high-rise buildings utilized by Rapid Support Forces (RSF) snipers.¹⁰Sudan War Monitor, “Map: Sudan army reclaims Khartoum Bahri, advances in East Nile,” 21 February 2025; Sudan Tribune, “Sudanese army claims partial control of key Khartoum bridge,” 24 February 2025 The fight to control central Khartoum was predominantly focused on the Republican Palace, a symbol of political power in Khartoum and central Sudan. Although the SAF made numerous advances in Khartoum, fighting with the RSF continued in west and south Omdurman neighborhoods, East Nile, and central Khartoum. The SAF campaign in Khartoum began in September 2024, when the SAF adopted an offensive posture that helped recapture several locations in southern and central Sudan from the RSF.¹¹Sudan Tribune, “Sudanese army gains ground in Khartoum intensifies RSF pressure,” 27 January 2025 

The wider offensive also gained momentum across the country, with the SAF and its allies regaining control of at least 100 different locations from the RSF and supporting militias in February, the most since the onset of the war in April 2023. Outside of Khartoum, the SAF made important gains south of the capital along the White and Blue Nile rivers in al-Jazirah and White Nile states, as well as North and South Kordofan. The capture of locations in North Kordofan opened up critical supply routes as El Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, could be used as an operations hub for the SAF to reach areas of West Kordofan and Darfur, including the highly contested city of al-Fasher.

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