Regional Overview
Asia-Pacific
March 2025
Posted: 7 March 2025
In this Regional Overview covering February 2025:
- Bangladesh: Hasina’s speech prompts demolitions of property related to her party
- India: Violence escalates in Kashmir amid renewed clashes along the Line of Control
- Indonesia: Budget cuts spark nationwide student protests and violence in Papua
- Myanmar: Civilians subject to violence as clashes intensify in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu
- Philippines: Top NPA leader in Mindanao is killed in a clash
- Thailand: Violence erupts as Thaksin visits the Deep South
Bangladesh: Hasina’s speech prompts demolitions of property related to her party
On 6 February, former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina called upon supporters to stand against the interim government in a live virtual speech delivered from India, escalating political tensions. Ahead of her address, thousands of people, including Anti-Discrimination Student Movement leaders, who were at the forefront of the 2024 anti-government demonstrations, demolished the historic Dhanmondi residence of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh’s founding leader and Hasina’s father. The destruction later spread to other parts of the country, with rioters using bulldozers and excavators to demolish what they called “symbols of fascism.”1Al Jazeera, “Bangladesh protesters torch family home of ousted PM Sheikh Hasina,” 6 February 2025 According to ACLED data, buildings associated with the Awami League (AL) were demolished in all eight divisions of the country. Dhaka and Khulna were the two divisions with the most incidents of destruction. Despite the significant destruction of property, ACLED records only two instances of violence directly targeting AL supporters in Dhaka and Narsingdi. In Gazipur, a clash between students and AL supporters resulted in the death of one student.
Bangladesh continues to face challenges since the ouster of Hasina in August 2024, with frequent calls for justice and accountability for the violence that occurred during the anti-government demonstrations. On 12 February, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights released a report finding the AL government complicit in “serious human rights violations” during the demonstrations while also noting “troubling instances” of retaliatory violence against AL members and religious and sectarian minorities.2Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Bangladesh: UN report finds brutal, systematic repression of protests, calls for justice for serious rights violations,” 12 February 2025
India: Violence escalates in Kashmir amid renewed clashes along the Line of Control
Political violence in Jammu and Kashmir nearly doubled in February compared to the month prior, as Indian and Pakistani security forces engaged in several cross-border clashes along the Line of Control, marking a rare violation of the 2021 ceasefire agreement.3The Hindu, “Pakistan troops violate ceasefire in J&K, suffer ‘heavy casualties’ after Indian Army retaliates,” 13 February 2025 Though reporting on the Pakistani side is limited, Indian reports indicate that unidentified militants joined Pakistani security personnel in two of the nine reported armed clashes. ACLED also records at least three instances of attempted cross-border infiltration by militants from Pakistan into India in February. On 4 February, Indian security forces foiled one such attempt in the Krishna Ghati sector, killing at least four militants and three Pakistani security personnel. In an effort to defuse the hostility at the border, Indian and Pakistani armies held a joint meeting on 21 February.4Peerzada Ashiq, “Armies of India, Pakistan hold talks in Jammu amid rising tension along LoC,” The Hindu, 22 February 2025 The rise in cross-border tensions comes as Indian reports claim that local militant strength has fallen to a record low compared to previous years.5Peerzada Ashiq, “Local militant recruitment down in Kashmir; Pakistan agents driving terror activities, say police,” The Hindu, 15 February 2025 Moreover, Indian officials accuse Pakistan of driving militancy in the region in the face of Pakistan’s continuous denials.6Dharvi Vaid, “Is India facing a new kind of militancy in Kashmir?” Deutsche Welle, 25 November 2024
Indian security forces also engaged in two acts of violence against the civilian population in February. Two cases stand out in early February: military forces shot and killed a truck driver in Baramulla district for bypassing a checkpoint, and a Gujjar youth belonging to the Gujjar ethnic group died by suicide after he claimed he was tortured in police custody for suspected links with militants.7Fayaz Wani, “Youth dies by suicide after alleged police torture in J&K; video recorded before death surfaces,” The New Indian Express, 7 February 2025 Apart from these incidents, local police detained over 500 people across the Kashmir Valley in response to the targeted killing of a retired soldier by militants on 3 February.8Scroll (India), “Over 500 detained in J&K after suspected militants kill retired soldier in Kulgam: Report,” 5 February 2025 Human rights bodies have long expressed concern over the human rights situation in Kashmir, where the military and police have sweeping powers under anti-terror laws.9Human Rights Watch, “India: Repression Persists in Jammu and Kashmir,” 31 July 2024; Amnesty International, “India: Authorities must end repression of dissent in Jammu and Kashmir,” 18 September 2024
Indonesia: Budget cuts spark nationwide student protests and violence in Papua
In February, students protested against President Prabowo Subianto’s budget cuts, fearing the cuts would negatively impact health and education. The money cut from those budgets will fund President Subianto’s free meal program, among other policies.10Budi Satriawan and Yuddy Cahya Budiman, “Students lead ‘Dark Indonesia’ protests against budget cuts,” Reuters, 20 February 2025 Students staged around 100 demonstrations in at least 30 provinces across the country, demanding a re-evaluation of national projects, including the costly school lunch program, along with other concerns.11Resty Woro Yuniar,“‘Most deadly 100 days’: Indonesia’s Prabowo faces major student protests against costly policies,” South China Morning Post, 21 February 2025 In Papua, students demanded free education rather than free lunches, citing concerns over the safety of the food provided by the Indonesian authorities.12Suara Papua, “Papuan community, students reject free school lunches, want free education instead,” indoleft, 5 February 2025 Driven by these demonstrations, February had the highest number of protest events in Indonesia since August 2024, when there was nationwide unrest over regional election law revisions. Though mostly peaceful, violence broke out in 14 demonstrations. State forces deployed live bullets and tear gas during a demonstration in Papua. Nearly 80 protesting students were arrested across the country, and several were injured.13Human Rights Monitor, “President Probowo’s free lunch program triggers protests in West Papua: Police officers intimidate, arrest and ill-treat pupils,” 25 February 2025
Amid the demonstrations, the separatist West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) released a statement opposing the free lunch program and launched several attacks on state and military infrastructure in Central Papua.14Jubi, “TPNPB attacked military post in Intan Jaya for three days 9,” 25 February 2025 (Bahasa Indonesia); Jubi, “TPNPB-OPM announced school strike in Papua [TPNPB-OPM umumkan mogok belajar di Papua],” 18 February 2025 (Bahasa Indonesia) The TPNPB attacked military bases in Sugapa for three consecutive days between 21 and 23 February. They also burned down two schools, forced strikes, and threatened further attacks if the program continued.
Myanmar: Civilians subject to violence as clashes intensify in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu
After months of territorial gains in Rakhine state, the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) attacked military locations in Sittwe and Kyaukphyu townships in February — two of the three townships that are still under military control in the state. The ULA/AA shelled military bases on the outskirts of Sittwe, the state capital, and used heavy artillery to target key military positions, including the Regional Operations Command base, naval base, police facilities, and the port. The ULA/AA also attacked military bases in villages situated between the Dhanyawadi naval base and Kyaukphyu town, where significant Chinese investment projects are located.15Maung Kavi, “Myanmar Junta Pushes Key Chinese Projects in Rakhine Despite Looming AA Threat,” The Irrawaddy, 16 January 2025
The military deployed combined air and naval forces to defend Sittwe, firing artillery at ULA/AA positions and using airstrikes to target civilian areas outside the city, most notably in nearby Pauktaw township. On 20 February, a military airstrike killed four civilians, including two children, in Kyauk Taung village of Pauktaw. ACLED records the highest number of airstrikes in Pauktaw township this month since November 2023, when the conflict between the military and ULA/AA resumed. Overall, the offensive drove an over 64% increase in political violence in Rakhine state in February compared to the month prior.
Thousands of internally displaced people and civilians have been trapped in Sittwe16The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar Junta Forcing Villagers Into Sittwe as ‘Human Shields’ for City,” 11 June 2024 because of the ULA/AA’s advances and Myanmar military’s movement restrictions for months. Their difficulties are also compounded by a communications blackout.17Radio Free Asia, “Telecom outages impact livelihoods in Myanmar’s Rakhine,” 12 February 2025 Any relief for civilians remains remote as the conflict in Rakhine state is expected to escalate further: The ULA/AA has not yet initiated a ground offensive to capture the state capital and appears to still be probing for weaknesses.
Philippines: Top NPA leader in Mindanao is killed in a clash
The Philippine military claimed a major victory against the communist New People’s Army (NPA), killing an important NPA leader in Butuan City on 12 February. The NPA leader, Myrna Sularte, also known as “Ka Maria Malaya,” served as the secretary of the NPA – Northeastern Mindanao Regional Committee and was a member of the political bureau of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which leads the NPA. Sularte also served as the Eastern Mindanao spokesperson of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), the CPP political organ negotiating for peace with the Philippine government. Sularte was the widow of Jorge Madlos, a high-profile spokesperson of the NDFP in Mindanao who was killed by the military in October 2021.18Uriel Quilinguing, “Army says it sought peaceful surrender, but NPA leader Maria Malaya chose to fight,” Rappler, 14 February 2025 The military claimed that the death of Sularte, who was around 70, has opened a leadership vacuum in the organization.19Priam Nepomuceno, “NPA leadership vacuum to worsen with Sularte’s death,” Philippine News Agency, 13 February 2025
A series of high-profile rebel deaths, including that of Madlos, has racked the communist insurgency since 2020, leading to questions about its future. The killing of the NPA leader in February marks the first event where ACLED records a high-ranking NPA leader being killed since June 2024. The resumed peace negotiations between the two sides announced in November 2023 remain moribund.20Phlistar Global, “NDF’s Myrna Sularte killed in Agusan del Norte clash, says military,” 14 February 2025 Top government officials last expressed optimism about the negotiations in September 2024.21Zacarian Sarao, “Marcos gov’t confident it could sign peace deal with CPP-NPA-NDFP,” INQUIRER.NET, 2 September 2024
For more on the challenges facing the NPA, see the ACLED report The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: A ‘Protracted People’s War’ Continues.
Thailand: Violence erupts as Thaksin visits the Deep South
Former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s 23 to 24 February visit to several of Thailand’s southern provinces, where Malay Muslim separatists have long waged an insurgency, was preceded by a series of explosions across the area. The visit to the region, which is called the Deep South, was Thaksin’s first since conflict escalated during his incumbency in 2004. The purpose of Thaksin’s visit to the region — in his capacity as an informal advisor to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and representative of the Pheu Thai Party — was to address security and peace challenges in southern Thailand.22Thai PBS World, “Thaksin to visit Narathiwat on Sunday,” 20 February 2025 On 20 February, separatists shot and killed two police officers on patrol in Yarang district in Pattani province. The violence continued with coordinated bombings on 22 February, targeting government offices and military bases in Narathiwat and Yala provinces. On 23 February, a bomb exploded near Narathiwat Airport just before Thaksin’s arrival, injuring security personnel. Thaksin described this as a “symbolic act” aimed to intimidate him, but he continued the visit, expressing optimism about the prospects for peace.23Bangkok Post, “Unfazed by bombs, Thaksin says he feels more welcome in Thailand’s deep South,” 23 February 2025
The explosions are reminiscent of the surge in unrest ACLED observed in October 2024 after the statute of limitations for the Tak Bai massacre expired. During the Thaksin administration over 20 years ago, Thai forces killed 85 Muslim protesters as they were being transferred from Tak Bai police station to an army camp in Pattani province. At that time, there was no subsequent action from the Thailand government. During his visit, Thaksin apologized for the government’s past actions during the Tak Bai massacre, reaffirming his commitment to peace, signaling a shift in the government’s approach to the ongoing conflict.24Abdullah Benjakat, “Thaksin says sorry for Tak Bai,” Bangkok Post, 24 Feb 2025 The lingering grievances from past incidents continue to obstruct trust-building efforts between the Thailand government and the Muslim population.
See More
See the Codebook and the User Guide for an overview of ACLED’s core methodology. For additional documentation, check the Knowledge Base. Region-specific methodology briefs can be accessed below.
Links:
- Methodology and Coding Decisions for Political Violence and Demonstrations in Afghanistan
- Methodology and Coding Decisions for Political Violence and Demonstrations in China and Taiwan
- Methodology and Coding Decisions for Political Violence and Demonstrations in Myanmar
- Methodology and Coding Decisions for Political Violence and Demonstrations in North Korea