Q& A: What happened in the coastal region of Syria last week?

On 6 March, a group of armed supporters of former President Bashar al-Assad ambushed a group of security forces in Beit Ana village in the Lattakia countryside, killing and injuring several service members. Following the attack, the gunmen targeted an ambulance that tried to evacuate those who were killed and injured. This triggered a large-scale response by the security forces inside Beit Ana that included artillery shelling and helicopter strikes. Later that same day, Assad loyalists launched coordinated attacks across Lattakia and Tartus governorates to restore control over the main junctions that link the two provinces. This sparked a cycle of violence that included extrajudicial killings of people in the Alawite community by regime forces. At least 57 distinct locations in Lattakia, Hama, Homs, and Tartus governorates were the site of violence over four days (see map below). 

Who was involved in the clashes? 

These attacks on the regime coincided with the creation of the Military Council for the Liberation of Syria, a pro-Assad group that seeks to liberate Syria from “terrorist forces,” referring to the country’s transitional authorities.¹X @ETANA Syria, 7 March 2025 The council is led by Brigadier General Ghiath Dalla, a high-ranking officer in the 4th Armored Division of the Assad regime who has strong ties with Iran.²Noura Doukhi, “Ghiat Dallah: Architect of the rebellion against Syrian forces, Iran’s trusted man,” L’Orient Today, 11 March 2025 It is not the first time that clashes between forces of the new regime and Assad loyalists have taken place in Syria since the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024. There were at least 23 such incidents between 9 December 2024 and 5 March 2025.

If clashes between these actors are not new, why did they spiral out of control this time? 

Syria’s new authorities are faced with the massive challenge of leading the country through a difficult political transition after almost 14 years of civil war. The new authorities inherited a fragmented country with numerous rival armed groups. Among those groups are Islamist foreign fighters³Diaa Audi, “Accused of murder in ‘the coast’.. Who are the foreign fighters in Syria?” Alhurra, 11 March 2025 and former members of the Syrian National Army,⁴Alhurra, “Accused of Killing Syrians… What Do You Know About ‘Al-Amshat and Al-Hamzat’?” 10 March 2025 which reportedly seek revenge on the Alawite community, which they associate with the former Assad regime.⁵Hugo Bachega, “Syrian bloodshed heaps pressure on Sharaa and exposes deep fractures,” BBC, 10 March 2025 The integration of these groups into the Syrian army and police has happened in haste and lacked discipline and coordination. It is also worth noting that it is in the interest of Assad-era commanders to fuel instability in the country as a way to prevent transitional justice and their trials for potential war crimes.

What has the toll been on civilians? 

The exact number of civilian casualties remains unclear at the moment, as reports of mass graves continue to emerge. The Syrian Network for Human Rights estimates that at least 803 people were victims of extrajudicial killings between 6 and 10 March.⁶Syrian Network for Human Rights, “803 Individuals Extrajudicially Killed Between March 6-10, 2025,” 11 March 2025 Another organization, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, puts the civilian toll as high as 1,093.⁷The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, “Despite the relative calm in retaliatory operations on the coast and its mountains… 44 sectarian massacres claimed the lives of 1,093 citizens without deterrence,” 11 March 2025 If we use these as a baseline, the civilian toll of these clashes is only comparable with the offensive of the Assad regime on Rural Damascus in February and March of 2018, which according to ACLED resulted in at least 1,192 and 1,313 civilian fatalities, respectively.

Clashes now seem to have stopped, but is a relapse likely? 

Following reports of the high civilian toll, Syria’s interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa announced the formation of an independent committee on 9 March to investigate reports of extrajudicial killings. He stated that the individuals involved in the mass executions would be held accountable and brought to justice.⁸Samia Nakhoul, Maya Gebeily and Timour Azhari, “New Syrian leader Sharaa says killings of Alawites threaten unity, vows justice,” Reuters, 10 March 2025 In parallel, Syrian authorities are likely to deploy more disciplined security forces to the coastal regions to re-establish security and stability.

The events in Syria’s coastal region highlight the challenges awaiting the transitional authorities. The Alawite community, along with other minorities, may harbor mistrust and resentment against the interim government, providing a fertile environment for the emergence of an armed opposition. The agreement signed on 10 March between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces, which recognizes the Kurds as part of the Syrian state and imposes a nationwide ceasefire,⁹Al Jazeera, “Syria merges Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces into state institutions,” 10 March 2025 is an attempt to assuage concerns among minority communities, as is the dialogue with Druze leaders in southern Syria.¹⁰Medya News, ‘Suwayda province to fully integrate into Syrian interim government,’ 11 March 2025 On 13 March, al-Sharaa also signed a constitutional declaration into force. The document, which provides a judicial framework for the transition, outlaws calls for division and separatism and announces the creation of a “transitional justice commission” to investigate the crimes of the former regime.

While the Military Council for the Liberation of Syria is unlikely to mobilize again in full force, the coordinated nature of the recent attacks in Lattakia and Tartus indicates that some anti-government cells are dormant and likely to engage in other attacks in the future. Regional powers, including Israel and Iran, may have a vested interest in fostering unrest to weaken the transitional authorities and carve out their respective spheres of influence.

Muaz Al-Abdullah was speaking to ACLED Head of External Affairs Tania Corbett.