ACLED’s CEO, Prof. Clionadh Raleigh, said: “The lines of this potential conflict are too fragmented, and there is more smoke than fire. The prevailing idea seems to be a rising contest between Eritrea and Ethiopia in and over Tigray, which the Ethiopia National Defense Force (ENDF) withdrew from in February. The ruling Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) party is incredibly and dangerously fragmented, and the non-ruling fragment is making a lot of noise. Although the faction has never admitted it, much is being made about their possible opportunistic alliances with the (former and current enemy) Eritrean government on one hand and fragments of the (former and current enemy) Amhara nationalist militias — Fano — on the other hand. So who would fight whom over what is as confusing and unlikely in Tigray as it is outside of the region.”
The complex dynamics are addressed below
Background
The TPLF’s internal rift has been escalating since the start of the year. The escalation came on the heels of an ultimatum that the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) issued on 26 December 2024 urging the TPLF to convene its general assembly meeting — a key step in the group’s path to re-registration as a political party — before the 10 February deadline.
Signs of disagreement among the TPLF’s top leaders emerged only days after the TPLF and the Ethiopian government signed the Pretoria agreement, which ended the Tigray war, in November 2022. Divergences over the implementation of the peace agreement resulted in two factions emerging.
One faction is loyal to the president of the Tigray Regional Interim Administration, Getachew Reda, and advocates for the TPLF to concentrate on determining accountability for the devastation in Tigray resulting from the conflict.
The “old guard” faction, aligned with TPLF party President Debretsion Gebremichael, instead prefers to begin the internal assessment from the establishment of the interim administration in March 2023 and focus on the activities of the interim administration.1Lewam Atakelti, “‘We will save the party by peacefully and legally eliminating the TPLF wing that held the conference,’” Reporter, 2 October 2024 (Amharic); Ethiopia Observer, “Debretsion Gebremichael reelected as TPLF chairperson amid party split,” 19 August 2024; Kate Hairsine, “Ethiopia: Who is Tigray’s leader Debretsion Gebremichael?” Deutsche Welle, 27 November 2020; BBC Amharic, “Tigray: Could the conflict between the TPLF leadership lead to a conflict?” 30 August2024 (Amharic)
The NEBE’s December 2024 statement forced the Debretsion faction to step up its efforts to capture the interim administration. Since mid-February, members of the Tigray Defense Forces who support the Debretsion faction began to forcefully confiscate local administrations’ official seals and take control of administration offices (see map below; for more, see the Ethiopia situation update (5 March 2025) and Ethiopia situation update (19 March 2025)).
Will the real TPLF please stand up?
Getachew Reda, who leads the ruling faction in the TPLF split, has accused the Debretsion faction of colluding with the Eritrean government to initiate a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea on a number of occasions since last year.2YouTube @fanabroadcastingcorporate, 13 March 2025 (Amharic); YouTube @Reyot, 17 March 2025 (Amharic) On 17 February, the former president of Ethiopia also accused the Eritrean government of trying to take advantage of the TPLF’s internal dispute to incite war in Ethiopia.3Mulatu Teshome Wirtu, “To avoid another conflict in the Horn of Africa, now is the time to act,” Aljazeera, 17 February 2025 The Eritrean government responded by expressing that it has no interest in the TPLF internal dispute and accusing the Ethiopian government of planning to invade Eritrea to gain access to the Red Sea4X @hawelti, 18 March 2025; X @hawelti, 13 March 2025 (for more on Ethiopia’s quest for sea access, see this report). Since then, many reports have indicated the high possibility of war between the two countries.5Nosmot Gbadamosi, “Tigray Power Struggle Risks Ethiopia-Eritrea War,” Foreign Policy, 19 March 2025; Aaron Ross, “Explainer: Why are Ethiopia and Eritrea on the brink of a possible war?” Reuters, 14 March 2025; General Tsadkan G. Bayru, “Tigray cannot be the battleground for Ethiopia and Eritrea,” The Africa Report, 10 March 2025
The main assumption
Many observers believe the Eritrean government is collaborating with members of the Debretsion faction and Fano militias — which are fighting the Ethiopian government in the Amhara region — to attack the Abiy Ahmed-led government.
Why might this be an accurate assumption?
There are signs of possible conflict in the Tigray region, just as there were before the start of the two-year war in northern Ethiopia, like the Eritrean forces’ mobilization6Borkena, “Eritrea Mobilizes Military Reserves, Imposes Travel Restrictions Amid Rising Tensions with Ethiopia,” 21 February 2025 and the Ethiopian government showing the public various acquired and produced weapons.7YouTube @EBCworld, 8 March 2025 (Amharic); YouTube @ethiopiainsider, 6 March 2025 (Amharic)
Why might it be inaccurate?
Unlike the two-year war in Tigray, the Debretsion faction lacks massive support from the residents of the Tigray region and the Tigrayan diaspora, who have not yet recovered from the war. Hence, reigniting a new round of conflict with the Eritrean government’s support will defy the faction’s main purpose, as it seeks to regain support from the Tigray people. The Debretsion faction also lacks support from the international diplomatic community.
Fano militias are also weak and are struggling to come under one umbrella due to their structure and lack of common ideology. Basically, these factions are making a lot of noise about how strong they are.
The possibility of war
A direct confrontation between Ethiopia and Eritrea is unlikely despite the threat of military action in both countries.
There is an indication that the ENDF is trying to avoid a direct confrontation. According to Getachew, the ENDF withdrew from major towns in Tigray in February.8YouTube @Reyot, 17 March 2025 (Amharic) The Ethiopian government’s tactic is to avoid being stationed in areas surrounded by potential adversaries to avoid a direct confrontation.
The Eritrean government also cannot afford a direct confrontation with the ENDF due to repercussions from the international community on top of current sanctions by various governments.
ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data) is an independent, impartial, international non-profit organization collecting data on violent conflict and protest in all countries and territories in the world.
