As M23 rebels take hold of eastern Congo, the Islamic State is capitalizing on the chaos

Since the March 23 Movement (M23) began its advance in December 2024, taking over vast areas of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s North and South Kivu in a matter of months, other armed groups have exploited the upheaval to expand their operations. Violence committed by armed groups in the DRC, including the M23 and others, resulted in over 2,500 reported fatalities in the first three months of 2025, ACLED data show, though Congolese officials claim thousands more.¹ Even by conservative fatality estimates, the first quarter of this year was the most fatal since 2002, when the country was embroiled in the Second Congo War.

The M23 rebels’ northward advance in 2025 brings the group into an area of frequent incursions by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an Islamist armed group with ties to the Islamic State (IS). While both the M23 and ADF have long been active in North Kivu province, the violence by each group was previously concentrated in geographically distinct areas: the M23 in the south and the ADF in the north. To proceed northward, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reported, the M23 rebels sought agreements with the ADF to avoid clashes between the two groups.² Although denied by the M23, the UN report detailed that the ADF refused to form a non-aggression pact.³

While the M23 and ADF have yet to clash with one another, their simultaneous operations in geographically proximate areas have strained the Congolese military forces’ (FARDC) capacity to counter both groups simultaneously. As the FARDC tried to contain the M23 advance in the first quarter of 2025, its attention was diverted from the ADF, allowing the Islamist group to carry out a surge in civilian targeting.

Violence involving the ADF and M23 overlaps

Unlike the M23 rebellion, which receives backing from Rwanda and aims to overthrow the current Congolese administration,⁴ the ADF swears allegiance to IS and is also known as the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) in the eastern DRC and Uganda. Instead of replacing local authorities and forming alternative administrations like the M23, the ADF tends to use insurgent tactics to decimate local areas. Initially formed as a Ugandan rebel group in 1994 led by Jamil Mukulu, early ADF leadership and ideology arose from the Tabligh Muslim sect⁵ with intentions to overthrow Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni.⁶ Mukulu was arrested in 2015 and replaced by Musa Baluku. Baluku moved the group toward more extremist views of militant Islam,⁷ consolidated decision-making, and developed relations with IS — an integration Mukulu long resisted.⁸ By 2020, Baluku declared that the ADF had become ISCAP.⁹

Starting from December 2024, the M23 and Rwandan military’s (RDF) northward push toward Lubero town in North Kivu brought the rebels into an area of frequent ADF violence (see map below). Lubero territory is a key area marking the northernmost advance of the M23-RDF so far in 2025, with Ugandan military (UPDF) positions north of Lubero town blocking further progress into Butembo or Beni towns. When the UPDF announced a potential withdrawal from the area in March, local civil society organized demonstrations and “dead city” protests in favor of continued UPDF occupation to defend Lubero from potential takeover by the M23-RDF.¹⁰

Before the M23 and RDF reached Lubero, the core areas of each group’s operations had remained separate. When these areas converged, what followed is illustrative of the risk of escalating insecurity through overlapping violence. On 9 January, the M23 and RDF fought together against the FARDC in Kaseghe, a town in Lubero territory. Just days later, on 11 January, the ADF took advantage of the FARDC’s instability as a result of the previous attack to carry out a violent attack in the same locality, reportedly killing 11 civilians. As numerous armed groups contend for power across the eastern DRC, the ADF has seized moments of FARDC weakness to increasingly move out of remote camps and carry out such civilian targeting.

While the ADF has long been based in the northern areas of North Kivu province — notably around Beni territory since the ADF shifted into the DRC from Uganda in the 1990s¹¹ — the ADF has also gradually moved northward toward Ituri province, with a notable escalation in operations since 2021. ADF violence in Ituri comprised only 11% of the group’s total violence in 2020, growing to 40% by the end of 2024. In both North Kivu and Ituri, the ADF also veered toward forested areas further west to avoid confrontations with military forces.¹² This westward movement notably shifted ADF violence in 2024 away from border areas near Uganda, with no violent incidents recorded within Ugandan territory last year.

ADF dealings with other armed groups

As the M23 sought to expand into new areas of the eastern DRC, the rebels attempted to forge agreements with the ADF. In December 2024, the UNSC reported that the M23 rebels sought agreements with the ADF to avoid clashes between the two groups as the M23 moved northward into Lubero territory and further toward Ituri province.¹³ Although the M23 denied they had made such a non-aggression pact, the UN report detailed that the ADF refused collaboration and would not agree to a non-aggression pact with the M23.¹⁴ Although the details of the M23’s proposed non-aggression pact with the ADF remain unclear, the ADF’s unwillingness to cooperate is consistent with its usual operations.

In March 2025, however, Ugandan military intelligence claimed that new alliances had been forged between the ADF and a coalition of Lendu militants, called the Cooperative for Development of the Congo (CODECO).¹⁵ A traditional chief in the Kasenye area of Lubero explained, “the ADF are no longer alone. Other armed groups with similar methods are operating in the shadows.”¹⁶ The ADF rarely collaborates with other armed groups and has struggled with internal schisms in recent years.¹⁷ The tendency for the ADF to operate alone also makes the Ugandan intelligence claim of ADF and CODECO collaboration a more novel development. If the two groups operate together, the partnership would be the first major ADF alliance since the demobilization of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) — a Ugandan rebel group — in 2007.¹⁸

Joint Congolese and Ugandan military operations increase pressure on the insurgents

With the instability and disruptions involving the M23, the ADF initially faced reduced pressure in December 2024 and January 2025 as Congolese forces and allied armed groups focused on curbing the northward M23 offensive. Analysis of ACLED data indicates that territorial capture by the M23 in 2024 and so far in 2025 has an inverse relationship with the number of armed clashes involving the ADF (see graph below). This suggests that in months where the M23 captured additional territory, the Congolese forces and allies had limited capacity to also confront the ADF. This trend suggests the FARDC has limited capacity to confront both the ADF and M23 at the same time.

In response to the rising instability at its borders, Uganda deployed an additional 1,000 troops in February to Ituri and North Kivu, elevating the total number of Ugandan troops to around 5,000.¹⁹ Despite a lull in ADF violence since December 2024, the UPDF claimed that the ADF had moved westward into the densely forested areas of Ituri and North Kivu to avoid confrontation.²⁰ In addition to the UPDF, Congolese authorities increasingly recruited and encouraged allied armed groups to support security efforts against the ADF. These include local self-defense militias and Wazalendo — a loose coalition of armed groups that began as youth self-defense militias but has expanded with a growing number of members since the resurgence of the M23.²¹

Despite the deployment of additional Ugandan forces and allied militias, the ADF has effectively evaded clashes in the first quarter of 2025. ACLED records only five clashes involving the ADF between January and March 2025, less than 25% of the quarterly average number of battles involving the ADF in 2024.

The recent Ugandan military pressure on the ADF stems from the ongoing Operation Shujaa, a multinational counterterrorism operation spearheaded by Ugandan and Congolese forces since 2021. During the course of Operation Shujaa, joint forces have been destroying numerous ADF camps and forcing the ADF to frequently change locations to avoid confrontations with soldiers,²² limiting the ADF’s ability to re-establish long-term bases.²³ Operation Shujaa has been effective in reducing overall levels of ADF violence, but has struggled to curb civilian targeting. Overall, ADF violence peaked in 2021 and has declined each year that followed during the course of Operation Shujaa.

The ADF’s camp structure shifts to respond to pressure

Under the increasing pressure of Operation Shujaa, the ADF was forced to adapt its operational structures. Each camp functions as a unit of the ADF, and all major operations must be reported to Baluku as the overall leader of the group.²⁴ ADF camps are composed of both militants and their families, along with captured civilians, frequently using more mobile structures such as tents as shelters.²⁵ The ADF uses the camps as a site for habitation, training, communication of IS ideology, construction of explosives, and weapons storage.²⁶ Some camps, such as the previously captured Kambi Ya Yua, have been as large as eight acres and feature more semi-permanent structures such as fences and booths made from local materials.²⁷

Faced with the joint military operations since 2021, the ADF initially split into at least six camps under different commanders to permit increased mobility and decreased risk of detection.²⁸ The ADF camps have used different tactics vis à vis other armed groups and the civilian population, changing location frequently to avoid confrontation with Congolese and Ugandan military forces.

By mid-2024, the ADF consolidated its camps from six to three and moved them into more remote areas to provide sufficient defenses against Congolese and Ugandan forces (see map below).²⁹ By increasing the number of militants in fewer camps, the ADF has attempted to better defend itself during clashes with Congolese and Ugandan soldiers.

Baluku commands the largest camp of approximately 1,000 people, commonly known as Madina.³⁰ This camp is located near Lolwa, to the north of the Ituri River in Mambasa territory.³¹ After facing increasing pressure in 2024, the Madina camp has tried to avoid confrontations with the Congolese and Ugandan militaries so far in 2025, with ACLED recording only three violent events between January and May.

By the end of the first quarter in 2025, the M23-RDF offensive had reached an ADF camp in Lubero territory under the leadership of Ahmad Mahmood Hassan, who is commonly called Abwakasi.³² Abwakasi, a Tanzanian national who frequently appears in ADF media, is known for his capacity to build explosives and likely orchestrated the 2023 killing of 38 school children at Mpondwe-Lhubiriha Secondary School in Uganda.³³ The camp under Abwakasi’s command was the most deadly toward civilians in the past year. Civilian fatalities by the ADF in Lubero — the area under Abwakasi — account for over 40% of the total number of reported civilian fatalities by the ADF since mid-2024.

The third ADF camp, which is under the leadership of Seka Umaru, has been operating in the area northwest of Oicha. UN experts describe Seka Umaru as Baluku’s second-in-command and potential successor.³⁴ Umaru joined the ADF after the departure of former leader Mukulu in 2014 and was an early advocate for allegiance to IS Central.³⁵

ADF violence increasingly kills more civilians

The ADF has generally been able to avoid direct confrontations with Congolese and Ugandan forces so far in 2025, with battles involving the ADF declining. As the M23 took control of vast tracts of North Kivu and South Kivu in the first quarter of 2025, the ADF used the disruption to authority caused by the Congolese military’s diverted focus on limiting the M23 rebellion to carry out a string of deadly attacks against civilians. As a result, civilian fatalities rose by 68% in the first quarter of 2025 compared to the previous quarter — the second-deadliest quarter of civilian targeting by the ADF since ACLED began recording data on the group in 1997.

ACLED records at least 450 fatalities by the ADF in the first quarter of 2025, exclusively among unarmed civilians, including the abduction and mass killing of 70 people at a church in the Lubero territory on 11 February. This followed simultaneous attacks on five localities in Lubero on 15 January that reportedly led to at least 112 fatalities. Together, these attacks led to 15% more civilian targeting incidents in the first quarter of 2025 than in the final quarter of 2024.

Civilian targeting by the ADF not only increased in the first quarter of 2025, but it also became increasingly deadly. Like other IS affiliates, the ADF tends to carry out high levels of civilian targeting each year and has been the most violent actor toward civilians in the DRC since 2018 (see graph below). Compared to other IS affiliates, the ADF was the most violent group toward civilians in 2024. In fact, attacks by the group resulted in 2024 being the deadliest year of civilian targeting by the ADF under the leadership of Baluku, with over 1,600 reported civilian fatalities. Instead of trying to usurp local authorities and govern areas of the eastern DRC, the ADF tends to devastate areas through mass killings, extensive looting, kidnapping for ransom, and setting property ablaze.

The ADF shares photos and videos of such brutality through their own media channels and via IS Central.³⁶ In exchange for the IS affiliation and media of violence frequently framed against “Christians,” “crusaders,” or “infidels,”³⁷ the ADF receives funding, notoriety, and training from IS, especially through their regional network in eastern and southern Africa stretching from Somalia to South Africa.³⁸ Since mid-2024, IS Central has increasingly posted media about the ADF’s operations, with a quicker turnaround between the time of the attack and the time the post is published by IS Central.

As IS Somalia increases as a hub of the group’s global operations,³⁹ the ADF is likely benefiting from the increased attention of IS throughout Africa. With the additional finances and training of IS Central, the relationship permits the ADF to operate not through generating positive relations with local populations, but by generating external legitimacy from IS Central through brutal violence against civilians.

The relationship with IS Central has also opened up the resources and training to build and carry out explosive attacks and, more recently, operate drones. Each of the ADF camps possesses a limited number of drones, primarily used for surveillance and avoiding direct confrontations.⁴⁰ The ADF initiated its first attempted use of an explosive carried by a drone on 11 August 2024 against Congolese soldiers in Malyajama, Beni territory. The explosive device failed to detonate, but the incident shows the ADF’s capacity to use such techniques in the future.

The ADF capitalizes on regional instability

To combat the M23, the FARDC will likely need to further deploy its military forces to the northern frontlines in Lubero territory. This will open up new areas for the ADF and other armed groups to operate with less resistance. Despite the challenges for the FARDC, the Ugandan military has been ambitious in 2025 to place increased pressure on the ADF and other armed groups in Ituri, notably CODECO.⁴¹

The Ugandan government likely fears the possibility that the ADF will move closer to the Ugandan border with the FARDC distracted elsewhere, especially with the ADF’s proclivity for conducting cross-border attacks into Ugandan territory. However, the UPDF on its own will likely prove insufficient to deter violence by the ADF. In addition to the UPDF, the FARDC will also likely need to rely on other local armed groups and self-defense militias to control localities and guard against future ADF attacks.

If Ugandan and Congolese militaries are unable to sustain their continuing pressure on the ADF, this would likely enable the ADF to regroup and adjust its own strategies. The ADF’s frequent scorched-earth tactics may shift to more stationary extraction of resources. Already in April 2025, the ADF engaged in revenue generation that indicates an intention to hold territory for longer periods, using purported “taxes” on civilians and controlling mining sites.⁴² In recent years, these forms of local revenue generation have been uncommon for the ADF, which tends to plunder areas and leave rather than engage in more long-term relations with civilians.

The instability generated by the M23 rebellion and concurrent ADF operations in North Kivu has displaced thousands and already led to over 1,600 reported fatalities in the province in the first three months of 2025.⁴³ In the coming months, the ceasefire agreements between Rwanda and the DRC are unlikely to reduce overall violence in the eastern DRC but will probably shift violence to other armed groups who will continue taking advantage of the instability to strengthen their own position in the region. The conflict with the M23 has required the FARDC to pivot attention away from the ADF, which may permit the ADF to increase deadly civilian attacks in the second half of 2025. Despite a relative lull in the M23 rebellion, the ensuing collapse of authority has provided ample opportunities for the ADF to entrench its presence in the eastern DRC, exposing the local civilian population to the effects of mass violence.

Visuals produced by Christian Jaffe.