Global conflicts double over the past five years

All forms of conflict events have increased. 

But bombings now represent over 90,000 events in 2024, are close to double the rate of battles, and triple the rate of direct violence against civilians. As states engage more with challengers domestically and internationally,  warfare has become more sophisticated and widespread. Bombing and ‘remote violence’ nearly doubled as of 2022, growing by over 25% per annum since 2022. 

Most protests are not included in the Index, but over 143,000 protests occurred in 2024, and major protest movements were linked to pro-Palestine agendas.  

In 2024, over 3 billion people across 70 countries went to the polls to vote in national elections, with many more casting their ballots to elect local representatives. Over a third of the countries where a national election was held this year experienced at least one act of electoral violence, affecting authoritarian and unstable states as well as established democracies. 

Did the countries with elections experience a notable increase in conflict rates? 

Generally, yes: Countries with elections in 2024 had — on average— a 63% increase in national political violence compared to over 21% increases across countries without elections. Increases in violence occur when governments or political opposition groups are willing to use violence to remain in power or seize it when they believe that the vote has been rigged. Political interests then arm militias and mobilize their supporters well before election day. Post-election, countries often return to their pre-election disorder rate. 

Yet, electoral violence is not overly effective: Election results in countries like India and Senegal — where incumbent governments lost their absolute majority and presidency despite widespread violence — suggest that violence does not stop democratic choice and change.

But the patterns of conflict overall confirm that living in a democracy is not insurance against conflict. Most conflict is not occurring in ‘poor’ or ‘isolated’ autocratic states but in ‘partially free’ countries. 

Most conflict is also now occurring in middle-income countries, and it is growing more strongly in middle- and high-income countries. In short, more development and democracy do not constrain violence. Conflict adapts to political circumstances, changing form and direction according to perpetrators’ agendas.

Movement around the Index

Over the course of 2024, Lebanon rose significantly in the Index, entering into the ‘extreme’ list, whereas it previously had hosted ‘high’ levels of conflict. Libya and Peru have also become worse, both because of increases in fatalities as a result of political violence. Levels of violence overall declined in Yemen despite remaining a site of very high conflict levels. Yemen has decreased consistently year-on-year — from more than 10,000 in 2020 to just over 2,000 in 2024 — but its violence is expanding into new areas and against new competitors in the Red Sea. 

Haiti has approximately double the number of events in 2024 compared to 2020 but reported fewer fatalities in the past year. 

Despite fears that the United States’ election year would result in a surge of violence, the US is no longer ‘turbulent.’ The US election was covered in great detail in our Crisis Monitor, and while pro-Palestinian protests were very popular across the US, militant and violent movements were massively overpredicted by the media, and significant violence did not occur.   

Violence patterns are varied across the Index’s extremely conflicted countries. 

The most violent places are experiencing quite different conflict types: From bombing campaigns across the Middle East, mob violence in India, a cartel civil war in Mexico, internal jihadi competition coupled with (formerly Wagner) mercenaries in the Sahel, Red Sea antagonisms, an inter-state stalemate in Ukraine, to Sudan’s violence upon civilians.  

Communities and governments can be equally and deeply challenged by multiple gangs that extort, build illicit economies, kill civilians, and destroy public space and politics, as they are by an established insurgent group with a hierarchical military structure and national political agenda. Each form of conflict is detrimental and widespread, resulting in a larger share of the global population being exposed to continued political violence. 

The conflicts that proliferated in 2024 starkly demonstrate the differences between being in power and being in control. In the Sahel, governments in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are in power but hardly in control of the local areas: Rather, jihadi groups, external mercenaries, and local arrangements create a chess board of control and competition. Governments in Myanmar, Mexico’s new president, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition are all running into the abyss of ‘control vs. power.’ The results are drastic increases in violence rates and more violent groups, while influence over how violence evolves and ends is elusive. 

2025: What to expect

Recent levels of violence have been unprecedentedly high, with several ‘record breaking’ months in the past year. What can we expect in 2025? In the beginning of 2025, conflict event rates are expected to grow by 15% due to more bombings and battles, and result in approximately 20,000 reported fatalities per month.¹Using ACLED’s CAST warnings 

Throughout the year, ACLED will assess whether conflict continues to increase, or whether armed groups will revert to a high, but stable, average rate of violence. This will largely be determined by how specific conflict actors engage in violence across multiple places. The recent activity in Syria is a test case of whether the involvement of external parties (e.g., Iran, Russia, Hezbollah, Turkey) reduces the conflicts these actors are involved in elsewhere. 

Throughout 2025, levels of violence are expected to remain very high relative to the recent historical norm, and an annual increase of 20% is likely. However, the places, contenders, and forms of increased conflict in 2025 could be drastically different than the pattern in 2024. ACLED’s CAST will continue to predict conflict patterns throughout the year.