Lasting peace remains elusive between armed groups with international ties

Conflicts in the Great Lakes region involved numerous military forces and foreign-backed armed groups in 2024, with violence involving the Rwanda-backed March 23 Movement (M23) rising. In the past year, the M23 and Rwandan military forces (RDF) aimed to broaden authority in North Kivu province, extract resources from mining sites, and generate revenue through taxation.¹IPIS, ASSODIP, and DIIS, ‘Le M23 “Version 2”: Enjeux, motivations, perceptions et impacts locaux,’ p. 5, April 2024 The Congolese military forces (FARDC) drew upon additional regional alliances to combat the M23-RDF rebellion, operating alongside Burundian soldiers and Southern African Development Community (SADC) forces, along with an increasing number of local armed groups. Further north in Ituri, regional collaboration continued between Congolese soldiers and Ugandan military forces against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) — an armed group initially formed with intentions to overthrow Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni but later shifting toward further alignments with the Islamic State and local power in eastern DRC.²Congo Research Group, ‘Inside the ADF Rebellion,’ Center on International Cooperation, New York University, November 2018 Amid the fighting among several militaries and allies within the DRC, violence by foreign armed groups declined in Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda in 2024.

In 2024, Rwandan military forces (RDF) increased their direct involvement in the DRC, supporting the M23 in being the most violent non-state actor in the Great Lakes region for the second consecutive year. The RDF deployed around 3,000 to 4,000 troops into DRC to support the approximately 3,000 M23 fighters operating in North Kivu,³United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 31 May 2024 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council,’ S/2024/432, 31 May 2024, pp. 10-15 aiding the M23 to use more advanced weapons and increase artillery strikes. The M23 and RDF also expanded the territory under their influence, especially around the economic hub of Goma, while also pushing westward into Walikale and further north compared to 2023.⁴Jean-Michel Bos, ‘Congo’s M23 rebels on the trail of mineral resources,’ Deutsche Welle, 8 November 2024 Overall, hostilities involving the M23-RDF led to an initial escalation in violence in the Great Lakes region during the first six months of 2024 before peace agreements between the Congolese and Rwandan governments brought a decline in violence by the second half of the year. The deployment of SADC and Burundian forces brought additional countries in the Great Lakes region into direct conflict with Rwanda, exacerbating already tense relations. Burundian soldiers had been sent into the DRC in past years but signed new agreements and bolstered troops in September 2023.⁵Sonia Rolley, ‘Over 1,000 Burundian soldiers covertly deploy in eastern Congo, internal UN report says,’ Reuters, 30 December 2023 The SADC mission brings further troop contributions from countries in the Great Lakes region, including Malawi and Tanzania, which deployed to North Kivu on 15 December 2023.⁶Mary Wambui, ‘EACRF completes withdrawal from Eastern DR Congo,’ The East African, 21 December 2023 Although SADC forces have taken a more defensive position against the M23 and RDF around the North Kivu capital of Goma, the operation complicates the SADC mission alongside the RDF in Mozambique.⁷Southern African Development Community, ‘Deployment of the SADC Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo,’ 4 January 2024 Additionally, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC continued its drawdown of forces over alleged failures to suppress violence in the region, popular demands to remove UN peacekeepers, and a broader regional trend of shifting toward regional and bilateral security partnerships.⁸Benjamin Petrini and Erica Pepe, ‘Peacekeeping in Africa: from UN to regional Peace Support Operations,’ International Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 March 2024; United Nations Affaires, ‘DR Congo President sets early withdrawal of UN peacekeepers, country will take reins of its destiny,’ 20 September 2023; Tlhompho Shikwambane, ‘The Disengagement of MONUSCO in DRC: Did the UN Peacekeeping Mission Fail in the DRC?’ Institute for Global Dialogue, 12 September 2024

In reprisal for the ongoing joint Congolese and Ugandan military forces under Operation Shujaa, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) carried out increasingly lethal attacks on civilians — especially in more populated areas.⁹Uganda Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Gen Kainerugaba, DRC’s Gen Tshiwewe Hail Successes of Operation Shujaa,’ 1 November 2024; United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 31 May 2024 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council,’ S/2024/432, 31 May 2024, pp. 6-8 While the ADF has long carried out high levels of civilian targeting in response to military operations,¹⁰United Nations Security Council, ‘Letter dated 31 May 2024 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council,’ S/2024/432, 31 May 2024, pp. 6-8 the number of civilians reportedly killed by the ADF surpassed 1,300 and rose over 17% in 2024 compared to 2023 — making the ADF the most violent actor toward civilians in the Great Lakes in 2024. To avoid direct conflict with the better-equipped joint military operations, the ADF continued with more mobile tactics through frequent changes in location and moving camp sites, resulting in a decline in clashes against opposing armed groups in 2024 compared to the previous year.

What to watch for in 2025

Albeit fragile, peace agreements and ceasefires between the DRC and Rwanda will likely diminish overall levels of violence in the Great Lakes region in 2025. Although spokespeople in Kigali long denied direct military deployment and support for the M23 rebellion, Rwandan operations have jeopardized funding and political support for other military operations, such as its bilateral deployment in Mozambique.¹¹Romain Gras, ‘EU divided over financial support for Rwandan intervention in Mozambique,’ The Africa Report, 31 July 2024 Despite its threats to cut peacekeeping operations,¹²Federico Donelli, ‘Rwanda’s New Military Diplomacy,’ IFRI, N.31, 2022 Rwanda likely desires a resumption of positive relations with Western donors, which requires a conclusion to their military deployment in DRC and support for the M23. Reduced hostilities involving the M23 and RDF could permit the FARDC to pivot military attention and allied armed groups northward against the ADF. As hostilities involving the previous M23 rebellion declined in late 2013, the ADF suffered several setbacks at the hands of the Congolese forces, which inflicted heavy losses among the militant ranks and forced many fighters to flee outside the country or into forested areas. 

Peace agreements remain especially delicate due to the inability or unwillingness of the Congolese and Rwandan governments to rein in violence by proxy groups. Continued clashes between the M23 and allies of the FARDC — especially the Wazalendo, a loose coalition of armed groups with a growing number of members since the resurgence of the M23¹³Coralie Pierret, ‘The “wazalendo”: Patriots at war in eastern DRC,’ Le Monde, 19 December 2023 — may spoil peace agreements similar to a previous surge of Wazalendo violence in late 2023. If hostilities involving the M23 and RDF decline, the Wazalendo coalition may lose a common enemy and give way to infighting between previously allied armed groups. Especially if the Congolese government negotiates or forces a withdrawal of M23 militants from areas of North Kivu province, this may give way to increased competition over access to strategic mining sites, control of roadways for tax revenue, and influence over local authorities.

Part of the negotiations between the DRC and Rwanda also involved promises by the Congolese government to eradicate the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).¹⁴Security Council Report, ‘Great Lakes Region: Briefing and Consultations,’ 7 October 2024; Liam Karr, Kathryn Tyson, and Yale Ford, ‘Africa File, October 10, 2024: AUSSOM Challenges; Fano Counteroffensive; DRC Attacks FDLR; Mali’s Northern Challenges; Togo Border Pressure,’ Institute for the Study of War, 10 October 2024 The FDLR still holds links to the former Hutu regime in Rwanda, which carried out the 1993 genocide, and is frequently mentioned by Kigali as a major security threat.¹⁵See, for example, YouTube @RwandaTV, ‘President Kagame discusses Tshisekedi’s threats, M23 & the DRC, Burundi & FDLR alliance,’ 25 March 2024; Charles Onyango-Obbo, ‘Kagame: DRC has crossed red line, war won’t be in Rwanda,’ The East African, 26 February 2023 Given the integration of FDLR personnel into the FARDC and fighting under the Wazalendo coalition,¹⁶Ebuteli, ‘La résurgence du M23,’ August 2024; Human Rights Watch, ‘DR Congo: Army Units Aided Abusive Armed Groups,’ 18 October 2022; Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen, ‘The volatility of a half-cooked bouillabaisse: Rebel–military integration and conflict dynamics in the eastern DRC,’ African Affairs, October 203, pp. 563–582 the challenge for the FARDC involves removing key personnel from within their ranks and among allies without disrupting military operations or sparking additional retaliatory violence with the FDLR. An escalation of fighting between FDLR and Congolese forces could especially affect areas of Rutshuru territory where the FDLR has long maintained an active presence.¹⁷Human Rights Watch, ‘DR Congo: Army Units Aided Abusive Armed Groups,’ 18 October 2022

Despite the joint military efforts to eradicate the ADF, Operation Shujaa has yet to offer protection for civilians from increasingly deadly violence. As the ADF employs increasingly mobile and insurgent tactics, joint forces must find ways to adapt to the more itinerant maneuvering of the Islamic State affiliate. In 2024, reports also surfaced of Ugandan military support for M23 militants, which may erode the relationship between Congolese and Ugandan forces in the coming year and reduce their capacity for bilateral missions.¹⁸Lucy Fleming and Didier Bikorimana, ‘Two armies accused of backing DR Congo’s feared rebels,’ BBC, 9 July 2024 Without changes in military strategy and increased protection for civilians in more densely populated areas, civilian fatalities will likely escalate in the coming year — especially in hard-hit areas in North Kivu and Ituri provinces such as Beni, Mambasa, and Mamove. 

Notwithstanding the challenges within DRC, military operations against rebel groups and bolstered border security will likely diminish the capacity for armed groups such as the ADF to carry out cross-border violence outside of Congolese territory in the coming year.¹⁹Africa News, ‘RDC : la frontière avec le Burundi submergée, un défi quotidien,’ 13 August 2024; Taarifa, ‘Rwanda and Uganda Agree to Strengthen Border Security and Community Awareness,’ 1 December 2024; Adam Ntwari, ‘Goma (RDC) : renforcement de la sécurité sur la frontière Goma-Gisenyi, crainte d’une possible fermeture des frontières entre la RDC et le Rwanda,’ SOS Médias, 22 January 2024 However, the likelihood of cross-border violence largely rests on negotiations between the Congolese and Rwandan governments, as well as the subsequent implications for Burundi and Uganda. If peace agreements and bargains reach unfavorable terms for one or more conflict parties in the coming year, countries in the Great Lakes are likely to resort to arming proxy groups to conduct cross-border attacks.²⁰Burundi Human Rights Initiative, ‘An Operation of Deceit: Burundi’s secret mission in Congo,’ July 2022; Crisis Group, ‘Averting Proxy Wars in the Eastern DR Congo and Great Lakes,’ 23 January 2020